RELIGION AND CONDUCT

The Report of a Conference Held
at Northwestern University
November 15-16, 1929

Progress on religion as a factor in shaping conduct and character.

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CONTENTS

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

THE conference of which this report is a sequel had its origin in an informal group of a dozen persons representing almost an equal number of different fields in several schools of Northwestern University. The idea and plan of the conference sought the sole purpose of securing full and free discussion on one single problem: "*The Place of Religion in Shaping Conduct and Character.*"[1]

This was essentially the line of reasoning back of the calling of the conference: Religion has been looked upon as a strong normative factor in conduct. Recent conferences on character education have given comparatively little place to religion in their discussions. Is this because religion is taken for granted or because it is being rejected as a factor in character development? If the former, is such complacency justified? If the latter, ought we not at least to give religion a fair hearing before dismissing it?

It was judged best, because of the semitechnical nature of the problems involved, to place admissions to the conference programs on an invitation basis. This was done except for one public meeting. An astonishing response was received to the invitations, more than six hundred persons, many from a distance of hundreds of miles, coming at their own expense to participate in the discussions. Distinguished scholars from both seaboards and various intermediate points came without financial remuneration and made careful presentations of their thought.

[1] This was the problem of a conference held at Northwestern University, November 15-16, 1929.

Naturally, the question at issue was not settled; it was only opened for discussion. Those who contributed most to the conference would be the first to agree that nothing final was arrived at. But the problem itself was more sharply defined in the minds of hundreds of persons. Discussions were started which will go on. Influences were set at work from which new emphases and perhaps new light may be expected.

This report is published both because those in charge believe the papers and discussions contain much of real value and because nearly seven hundred persons from among those who attended the conference and those who were unable to come have asked for a printed report. We believe also that a much wider public will be interested in its discussions.

Recognition and gratitude are due many persons who gave valuable services freely to make this conference a success. In addition to those who appeared formally on the program, special mention is due to Professor William C. Bower, of the University of Chicago, to Professor Marion O. Hawthorne, of Northwestern University, to Dr. George A. Coe, and to Professor Samuel N. Stevens, of Northwestern University, for help in editing this report; and to President Walter Dill Scott for the financial provisions which made possible the holding of the conference.

GEORGE H. BETTS,
Chairman Conference Committee.

WORDS OF WELCOME

PRESIDENT FREDERICK CARL EISELEN
GARRETT BIBLICAL INSTITUTE

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

It is a distinct privilege to extend, in the name of the local institutions, this brief but honest and sincere word of welcome to the men and women who have come to take part in this conference. Those who have had the responsibility of selecting the topic of discussion and of formulating the program were fully convinced of the importance of the subject chosen, but they could not even guess how widespread and enthusiastic the response would be. Many other conferences dealing with the subject of education or the subject of religion have been held, but to the best of my knowledge this is the first time that men and women have come together for the purpose of discovering by scientific processes of investigation the influence of religion as a factor in shaping conduct and character. Evidently, many in all parts of the country are thinking about this subject; and the local committee has every reason to be satisfied with the attendance. We are especially pleased with the fact that so many persons who occupy positions of prominence and responsibility in the fields of education and religion have been willing to take out of their busy life the time necessary for bringing their contribution to this gathering.

While sitting here I have been looking back over the past twenty-five years or more during which I have been connected with the school I represent, and certain

questions have come to my mind: How much interest was manifested twenty-five years ago in religious education? How many departments or schools of religious education were in existence at that time? How many professors of religious education could be found in colleges, universities, and theological seminaries? A comparison of the present with conditions twenty-five years ago shows how much progress has been made in education, including education in religion. For all this we ought to be truly grateful.

During all these years most educators have proceeded on the assumption that religion does play an important part in determining conduct and character. It is only in more recent years, especially since the movement of character education has come to occupy such an important place in educational thinking, that serious questions have been raised as to the part which religion does or may play in education which seeks to influence conduct and character. In recent years some writers on educational subjects have denied to religion any place in character education; but these too have proceeded on the basis of assumption. Surely it is significant that now, instead of being satisfied with assumption, five or six hundred men and women have come together to make a calm, unbiased study of the whole problem.

The success of the conference, in the nature of the case, will depend upon the leadership furnished by those who have given time and thought and effort to the discovery of the truth in this important field. We appreciate their readiness to come. We believe that the conference will prove decidedly worth while, and we are glad to welcome you to the conference, to the school, and to the community.

I. RELIGION AS MOTIVE IN CONDUCT

1. THE PROBLEM STATED

PROFESSOR GEORGE H. BETTS
Northwestern University

THE problem of this conference is very definite and clear, though infinitely difficult. It stands out so sharply that there will be no danger of our missing it, and no excuse for discussing something else. It is all comprehended in the simple question *whether religion as we interpret, teach, and practice it to-day is capable of motivating life.*

By "motivating life" I mean acting as a powerful or determining factor in conduct where men touch each other through the activities of daily living in business, government, industry, the relations of the home, the community and the wider world outside. Can religion as we conceive it, or as we *may* conceive it, qualify or control conduct and so shape character?

You note that I arrive at character through speaking of conduct. For character except in terms of conduct, behavior, has no practical meaning. And the corollary of this is that all behavior, conduct, is the expression and the antecedent of character.

I spoke a moment ago of motivating life. That the complex of thoughts and deeds which we call life is actuated by many diverse motives I know. In common with lower forms of life we respond to the drive of hunger, to the desire for a mate, to the compulsion of fear and anger, to the urge to live and to defend our life. These motivations are all very simple and

direct. They spring from nature's demand that the race shall not end, but shall go on.

But is there another source of motivation—call it a higher source if you will—which is able to condition these more primitive and subjective drives and cause men to act with reference to values outside themselves? Is there a source of constraint capable of making men serve ideal ends? And *is religion this source, has it this power over men?*

Putting the matter somewhat more concretely: Many persons will tell you that religion can and does give subjective peace, comfort, consolation, significance and meaning to life to those who possess it. This we will gladly grant, and it is a very considerable contribution to human happiness. From this subjective point of view religion richly justifies itself. But this is not our problem in this conference.

Our problem as we have chosen it is, rather, one of expression, of action; it has to do, as we have said, with conduct: Can religion, for example, take hold of the spirit and practice of our democracy and make its organized agencies, such as municipal, state, and federal governments, function ethically without graft or privilege? This is a question of the hold of religion on the conduct and character of the men who run these governments. Can religion make men honest?

Can religion take hold of industrialism in this age of science and invention and of the glorification of material things and cause it to be fair and merciful to the weak? This will depend on the power of religion to determine the ideals and govern the acts of the industrialists. Can religion decide whether selfish greed or the more lovely traits of justice and generosity shall rule?

Can religion take hold of the church and help it ful-

fill its high mission of spiritual enlightenment and leadership now so sadly lacking in our civilization? The answer will depend on the extent to which religion is able to set up the goals for the church's activities and supply adequate motives for their pursuit by the highest prelate and the lowest layman.

Can religion take hold of the individual—common men like ourselves—and, by giving us a proper perspective of values, help us to shape a true philosophy of life? Can it sublimate our appetites, our passions, and our desires and cause us to use our powers to social instead of a-social ends?

We are told that religion, particularly Christianity, has the power to transform life, and thereby reshape the desires, and the sum total of conduct that we call character. But it doesn't always do it. It doesn't always do it even for those whose vocation is within the church itself. It doesn't do it generally enough and completely enough for the rank and file who profess religion. There is too little difference between men in the church and men outside.

If you say that this is the fault not of religion but of human nature, I will answer that this evades the question. The problem of the conference is whether, taking human nature as it is and taking Christianity as we can best conceive it, religion can be made a powerful or a dominating factor in controlling conduct and shaping character.

It is altogether fitting that this question should be discussed and its solution found if possible. Probably at no previous time of which we have any record have the conditions been on the one hand so favorable for bringing to full fruition every power and capacity of human nature, nor on the other hand so dangerous and full of difficulties for moral development. It is doubtful

whether even ancient Greece and Rome, or modern Russia in the period of its social transition, offered a medium so full of the influences that threaten character as the present in our own country.

This is not because the modern age has invented any new and malign factors which work uniquely for evil among us. It is, rather, because the recent period of scientific and industrial enterprise, together with the universal increase in wealth and leisure time, have amazingly multiplied the situations which require moral choice and adjustment. Human nature at the turn of the present century was subject to the same inner drives and impulses as to-day. But it did not then have to deal with the social and moral problems which have followed the advent of the automobile, moving pictures, the radio, and other inventions. The young did not then find themselves in an atmosphere in which, to the same degree, established conventions were flouted, law disregarded, and religion ignored. Much easier it is now than it was a generation or two ago to secure the cultivation of intellect and the training of skills necessary to successful achievement in an industrial and commercial age. On the other hand it has not become easier to secure influences favorable to the development of manhood and womanhood.

Nation-wide concern exists over certain evidences of moral unrest observable in present-day society. This condition is not limited to any particular social level nor does it apply to youth alone. Old sources of authority have given way and old sanctions seem to have lost their force. Many careful students of social trends fear that national character is not successfully standing the strain of modern conditions. Religion has long been looked upon as potentially a chief agent

for the rectifying of ethical norms; *has it this power?* If so, where does the fault lie that we are not making better use of it in the building of character among our people, and how can that fault be remedied?

For three centuries in America the Christian religion has had untrammeled freedom without restraint or opposition from any source to carry out its program and exert its influence over the lives of men. This period probably constitutes the most favorable opportunity the church has had at any time since its inception to make its power felt. We call ourselves a Christian nation, using the term in a somewhat emphatic and unique sense. We claim for Christianity that it not only has power to save for a future life, but that it can transform and control the present life in a way that reveals itself in character and personality. Remembering the frailties of human nature and considering the fact that no human institution ever works perfectly, can we say that religion has made good this claim in its effect on national character? Does religion hold the promise that warrants us in undertaking to make it the chief, or at least a leading, factor in the new emphasis we are placing now on character as the outcome of education?

So I close this statement as I began it, with a question: *Is religion in its combined institutional and personal aspects capable of acting more effectively as a conduct control in present day society than it is now doing? And if so, how can it best be made to fulfill this function?*

2. SOURCES OF MOTIVATION IN HUMAN NATURE

PROFESSOR FRANK N. FREEMAN
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THE study of motivation in its broadest sense is a study of why people act as they do. The study of the means which may be taken to influence conduct is a secondary study and is derived from the primary study of the sources of human energy and the ways this energy manifests itself. Many of the questions which are raised regarding motivation and many of the experiments on motivation which have been made in the psychological laboratory deal with the circumference of the problem. They are concerned with detailed methods or devices by which the individual may be induced to do this or that or to exert greater energy in a particular direction than he would otherwise put forth. A complete understanding of the problem, however, and an interpretation of the outcomes of these particular investigations involves the grasp of the larger and more general problem. We must, therefore, ask ourselves why people act at all and why they act as they do when they are under no special form of stimulation from other individuals, in addition to raising the special problem of how conduct may be controlled.

The problem of motivation is perhaps most commonly thought of as the problem of evaluating various motives from the point of view of their strength and arranging them in the order of their force. Thus, we may put the question whether the motive of self-preservation is stronger than the motive of sympathy or of mother love. We may ask whether the desire for

approval is stronger or weaker than the fear of disapproval, whether the desire for gain is more powerful than the sense of honor, or whether the pleasure in succeeding at a task is a stronger motive than the enjoyment from excelling somebody else. Some of the experiments on motivation have seemed to proceed upon this formulation of the question. Without anticipating the results of these experiments, however, we may say at the outset that the problem of motivation, when it is put in this form, is an insoluble one. Motives do not exist like a set of independent forces impelling the individual in this direction or in that. A motive is not a simple impulse impelling to a given specified sort of activity. It is a generalized concept which we have formed from the observation of a large variety of particular forms of conduct. It is a disposition to act which is derived from the combination of fundamental drives and of a long train of experiences in adjustment to a complicated set of present circumstances. The attempt to formulate a scale of motives constitutes a profitless line of attack upon the problem. Such generalizations as we shall be able to make will be found to issue from a different mode of attack.

The practical purpose of the study of motivation is, of course, to study the means by which one person may influence the action of another, or the means by which society may influence the action of the individual. The implication of the question is that it is possible and desriable for society, as represented in any of its institutions, to influence the conduct of the individual, particularly of the child. The further implication is that it is desirable for society to so influence the child's conduct that it will be different from what it would otherwise be. It is assumed that the child's con-

duct needs some control and some direction from outside. This assumption, however, may be taken in two senses; and the practical applications which we make depend on which assumption we hold. We may hold, in the first place, that it is necessary to head off some of the child's dispositions and to reinforce others, to suppress some impulses and to strengthen others. Because some of the child's impulses are good and others are bad, motivation is then thought of as a sort of corrective which it is necessary to apply in order to restore the proper balance between the child's impulses. It rests upon a form of the doctrine of depravity. It conceives the process of the child's adjustment to his world as largely a matter of properly regulating his impulses—checking the bad ones and giving rein to the good ones.

The other conception of the need for control emphasizes much more largely the function of the parent, the teacher, or the institutions of society as agents in enlarging and supplementing the child's experiences. The notion behind this view is that the child's business is to adjust himself to the world about him and that the greatest obstacle to this adjustment is the poverty and inadequacy of his experience. According to this view, the child's conduct may best be influenced by giving him a correct conception of the world in which he lives. When he has obtained an understanding of the world at large and of the particular world in which he lives, he will know how to adjust himself to it. These are two quite different conceptions of motivation, and they lead to quite different procedures. We shall come back to this issue after endeavoring to interpret the experiments in the psychological laboratory and the findings of modern physiological psychology.

When I was invited to prepare this paper, the request

was made that I base my discussion upon the scientific evidence on the problem. While recognizing the desirability of treating the problem from this point of view, I at first hesitated from accepting, from the feeling that the experiments were too meager and dealt with too superficial aspects of the problem to form the basis of a fundamental and thoroughgoing discussion. It is, in fact, difficult to arrange experimental conditions by which we may investigate the deeper springs of conduct. The conditions which we set up in an experiment may slightly modify the intensity or direction of one's act for a short space of time. The factors which are studied, however, are usually not the sole determiners of even those acts which they are designed to influence. For example, in an experiment to determine whether children do a piece of school work better under praise or reproof, we may use for comparison a control group which is neither praised nor reproved. When this is done we find that the control group has learned nearly as much as either the group which is praised or the group which is reproved. There must, then, be some underlying motive which induces all the groups to learn, and the praise or reproof must be only a supplementary factor. What this underlying factor is is not brought out in such an experiment, but it is necessary that it be taken into account in any complete survey of the problem. If we focus our attention too sharply on the minute devices which have been employed to modify the child's conduct, we are likely to miss the large pervading forces which are operating continually and powerfully. However, we may be able to surmount the limitations of the experiments if we keep this caution in mind, and if carefully studied they may lead to interpretations which do not lie on the surface.

The foregoing stricture does not apply to an experiment made by Miss Rietta Simmons to determine the relative effect of a series of fundamental drives in prompting rats to run a maze. Miss Simmons studied the rapidity with which the animals learned a maze under the stimulation of desire for different kinds of food, for sex gratification, to return to the litter, to escape and return to the box which was the animals' home. She found the basic, fundamental impulses connected with food, sex, and the young to be the strongest. It is important to determine this fact even though it is in accordance with what might have been expected, but it is a little difficult to say just what the results of such an experiment mean for human life. If one is inclined to carry them over bodily, one may conclude that hunger, sex, and solicitude for children are the most powerful incentives. Perhaps they are, but this experiment does not prove it. The vast difference between the nervous systems of any of the lower animals—certainly of a rodent—and man, makes it probable that the balance between various springs of action is different. The activities in question are controlled largely by the visceral centers of the sympathetic nervous system. The co-ordinating center of this center is the thalamus. Thinking, on the other hand, is carried on by the cerebral cortex, the gray matter of the brain. Now it happens that the thalamus is large in the lower animals and the cortex small. In man, on the other hand, the cortex is very large in comparison with the thalamus. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that the function of thinking, which is so much more prominent in man, may have an influence on the objectives of his conduct. This opens up the whole question of the relation between the visceral and the cerebral activities or between emotion

and thinking, which we shall have to explore more fully later.

Another point should be noted. While the three motives of hunger, sex, and parental solicitude were the strongest motives in rats, they were not the only effective ones. As compared with these we might expect the desire to go to the familiar nest to be negligible. And yet it is nearly as strong as the others. In the light of this fact it would not be at all surprising to find other motives of great strength in man, whose brain is so differently organized from that of the rat. Again, this other motive in the rat is an independent motive, not derived from one of the others. This may lead us to question the practice of some psychologists of deriving all motives, no matter how seemingly remote, from two or three primary ones.

We pass to experiments with human beings. There is one class which deals with reward or punishment. The reward or punishment may be physical pleasure or pain or it may be the satisfaction or dissatisfaction which comes from social approval, disapproval, and other indirect goods or evils. The experiments usually compare action stimulated by reward or punishment with action stimulated in some other fashion, such as mere instruction to do as well as possible; or they compare the effect of reward with the effect of punishment.

In experiments on animal learning the incentives which are most commonly used are punishment in the form of an electric shock, and reward in the form of food. Both incentives promote vigorous learning and the comparisons which have been made indicate that punishment is probably as effective as reward and that a combination of the two is more effective than either alone. In human learning, experiments have been

made by Johanson, Rexroad, and Vaughn, to determine whether punishment in the form of an electric shock or the threat of punishment by a shock increases the rapidity of reaction in comparison with the speed of reaction under the instruction to react as quickly as possible.

Rexroad has analyzed the effect of punishment as being of three sorts. In the earlier stage, particularly, the punishment may have an instructive or an informative effect. That is, it notifies the individual whether or not he is reacting according to instructions. In the second place, it may operate as an incentive. That is, by intensifying the emotional attitude of the individual it may increase the intensity of his effort. In the third place, it may be disruptive; that is, it may throw the individual into a state of disorganization and thus interfere with the reaction. The disruptive effect is more likely to occur when the reaction has not been thoroughly learned than later on. We shall find this analysis useful in our attempt to interpret the experiments as a whole.

Reward of a tangible sort has been found to increase the rate of work or the rapidity of learning. Kitson, in his study of the effect of a bonus upon linotype operators, found that even veteran operators greatly increase their speed as a result of this form of incentive. McAfee, in his study of school children, found that a money reward increased the rapidity of learning arithmetic, but it also decreased the accuracy.

A number of studies have been made for the purpose of measuring the effect of the attitude of other persons upon the performance of the individual. These studies have dealt particularly with a comparison of the effect of praise and reproof. On the whole, these studies indicate that both praise and re-

proof increase the energy of activity of the learner, but that praise is usually somewhat more effective than is reproof. The conditions of these experiments are somewhat artificial, since praise or reproof, as the case might be, were given in blanket fashion. In order to be most effective, of course, praise or blame should be suited to the performance of the individual in a particular case. It is possible that indiscriminate praise has a more stimulating effect than indiscriminate reproof, but it is also possible that reproof given in a more discriminating fashion, at a time when it suits the particular circumstance, may be more effective than it appeared to be from the experiments. Both praise and reproof, given in the indiscriminate fashion which was characteristic of these experiments, probably have as their chief effect the stimulation of the emotions and the general intensification of effort. They can have very little, if any, informative or instructive effect. Given in more discriminating fashion, however, they may have instructive effect as well as general stimulating effect, and, furthermore, reproof which is given in association with specific suggestions for improvement may have an entirely beneficial effect, whereas indiscriminate reproof may have a much more largely disruptive effect. It may produce merely a general sense of failure and of frustration which inhibit effort instead of increasing it. The disruptive effect of indiscriminate "razzing" is brought out by an experiment by Laird with a group of college students. Such "razzing" was found to produce greater rapidity of movement in the case of some individuals and to reduce the rapidity of movement in others. In all cases, however, it decreased the accuracy and steadiness of movement.

The powerful influence of a motive which is over-

looked by those who identify human motives completely with those of the lower animals was studied by Knight and Remmers. This motive is the desire to stand well and to be recognized in one's social group. A group of fraternity pledges were given an arithmetic test ostensibly as a part of their initiation. In spite of the fact that they were fatigued from loss of sleep and by the performance of numerous stunts required of them, these freshmen students made a score nearly twice as high as that made by a group of junior students. The motive in this performance was evidently the desire to adjust successfully to a social situation.

Several experiments have been made to test the effect of competition upon the intensity of action or upon the rate of learning. Many years ago Triplett called attention to the fact that races which are paced are more rapid than unpaced races. He also demonstrated in the laboratory the fact that pacing increases the rapidity of movement. In other experiments, such as those of Brumbaugh and Sullivan, the attempt has been made to determine whether or not a competitor is more stimulated by the knowledge that he is behind in the competition or by the knowledge that he is ahead. As might be expected, competition was found in general to be stimulating, but the effect of the knowledge that one is ahead or behind depends upon a variety of circumstances, such as the individuality of the learner and his general ability and previous experience.

In the experiments which have been described, the purpose was to inspire the subjects to greater effort in the performance of specific tasks by connecting success with the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain and discomfort. The subjects were children in school who, in general, recognize their obligation to perform the tasks set before them, or they were

students in college classes who recognize the authority of their instructors to set tasks before them. In such cases there are really two types of incentives, the general and the special, but only the special incentive is measured. The conclusions to be drawn from such experiments, then, apply only to these special incentives. Again, these experiments exemplify the use of special and artificial spurs to conduct in order to make it more energetic than it would be without these artificial spurs. When this type of motivation is used in the school it is commonly called extrinsic as distinguished from intrinsic motivation. The motive to the action arises from some factor outside the activity itself and its relation to its natural setting, instead of in the recognition by the individual of the inherent desirability of the action. We shall have to take this fact into account in interpreting the bearing of these experiments on the larger question of motivation. The fact that it is possible under some circumstances to produce more energetic activity by the use of special devices must be weighed in the light of other and more general considerations.

We now turn to a final group of experiments which attack the problem from a different angle. Instead of applying some form of stimulation which may be expected to arouse desire or aversion, the procedure in these experiments is to attempt to clarify and define the situation for the learner. This usually takes the form of making clear to the learner when he succeeds or when he fails or of informing him of the degree of his success. Such information may have one or both of two effects on the learner. First, it may guide him in the better direction of his activity toward its specific goals. Second, it may stimulate him to greater exertion. The first effect is illustrated in Judd's early experiment

on practice without knowledge of results. This experiment indicates that little improvement takes place unless the individual is given the knowledge of the results of his efforts, which enables him to discriminate between success and failure. A later experiment by Spencer, using a different method of tabulation, suggests that successive attempts may become more consistent, even without a knowledge of results, but does not prove that they become on the average more correct. While this experiment touches directly only on the effect of the better direction of effort, we may probably assume that the more effective direction of effort will, in the long run, also increase the output of energy. By knowledge of results in this experiment is meant an analytical knowledge which informs the individual wherein he has succeeded or failed. It informs the individual not only that his error is large or is small, but informs him of the nature of his error. It gives him specific indications of the way his actions should be modified in his subsequent attempts.

In contrast to this specific, analytical knowledge of results may be set a mere knowledge of the score, of the amount one has accomplished. The effect of such knowledge was measured by Wright and Arps with the ergograph, by Book and Norvel, and by Ross in several simple types of motor and associational learning. In all of these experiments it was shown that a knowledge of one's score, and particularly a graphic record of one's score, has a stimulating effect upon the output of effort and upon accomplishment. We may conceive the effect of this knowledge of score to be partly stimulating and partly informative. The knowledge that one is improving may be stimulating and the knowledge that one is not improving may also be stimulating for another reason. In addition to this,

however, the knowledge of the score may give the individual information as to whether certain attitudes of mind or certain general methods of procedure which he follows are effective. In this way a knowledge of the score may improve the general direction of his effort even though it does not give him the analytical information afforded by a detailed knowledge of results.

A special form of this phase of the problem concerns the relative effectiveness of learning with the attention directed toward the positive or toward the negative aspect of the situation. The question is whether the individual learns most readily when he pays attention to those things which he wishes to do or those things which he wishes to avoid doing. Such experiments as have been made on this question suggest that, in the performance of an overt activity, at least, it is better to attend to those things which are to be done rather than those things which are to be avoided. This may be due to the fact that attention to the positive aspects of the situation or the activity gives a more specific guidance to that activity, for it may be due to the fact that positive attention releases more energy than does negative attention. In any case, it would not be safe to generalize from these findings so widely as to conclude, as some have done, that directions should always be of a positive nature. While the chief emphasis may well be upon positive directions, it is undoubtedly necessary in many cases to call the attention to things to be avoided, either because one already has habits of which one is unaware or because one may fall into ineffective ways of acting without being conscious of it.

The experiments which have been reviewed have dealt chiefly with the question of how conduct may be

modified or intensified in certain of its detailed aspects by the employment of specific incentives. Another attack upon this general problem of the control of conduct is made by means of the technique of the conditioned reflex. We may consider briefly the procedure followed in the so-called conditioning process and appraise its significance for our problem. The process of conditioning is looked upon by some psychologists and educators as the sole and sufficient means by which the conduct of the child may be modified and directed.

The process of conditioning starts out with a very simple and specific reaction which the individual already makes to an object. The reactions which are most important for us are the feeling reactions of repulsion or of attraction, and these feeling reactions may be assumed to prompt an individual to overt behavior. The process of conditioning is simply the development of a feeling reaction toward a given object because it is associated with another object toward which this feeling reaction already exists. For example, a child is afraid of a rabbit, and we wish to change the attitude of fear to one of liking. We gradually and with great care bring the rabbit into the presence of the child while he is eating. The pleasure which he has in his food and his liking for it is gradually transferred to the rabbit, until, if we have not introduced the animal too rapidly or too suddenly into his presence, the child comes to like the rabbit instead of being afraid of it and finally becomes willing and eager to play with it. By this method we have set up a new attitude toward the rabbit and have induced the child to carry on a set of activities which are in accordance with this attitude.

Many attitudes and forms of behavior which were

formerly ascribed to instinct are now accounted for by the conditioned reflex. The hypothesis is that there are only two or three instincts in human beings, and that all the other dispositions to behavior are formed in the course of our experience by the process of conditioning.

The criticism of instinct which is involved in this argument is probably a sound one. An instinct is a mode of behavior which is supposed to be carried on by the individual as the result of an inherited structure or set in the nervous system. The action is carried on without having been learned and without explicit or conscious direction on the part of the individual who performs it. A good many simple reflex acts conform to this description, such as the enlargement or contraction of the pupil of the eye, sneezing, swallowing, withdrawal of the hand on touching a hot object, shivering when cold, and so on. In some of the lower animals, furthermore, notably in the insects, we find complex trains of activity adjusted toward somewhat distinct ends in addition to reactions to immediately present stimuli, as in the reflexes. In human beings, however, no such complex and unvarying trains of activity directed toward a remote end may be found. Little remains of the concept of instinct after an analysis of human activity, except the fact that most human beings do in general strive for certain vital ends. The means by which they seek to attain these ends, however, are very complicated and varied. Thus, to secure food is a universal human end and striving, but after early infancy the means by which men secure food are infinitely variable and complex.

The theory of the conditioned reflex attempts to overcome the difficulty involved in supposing that the great variety of activities carried on by human beings

in satisfying their basic needs is to be accounted for by inheritance. But there are difficulties also with the hypothesis of conditioned reflex as anything like a complete account of the driving forces of human behavior. The hypothesis, in the first place, assumes the permanence of conditioned reflexes, and this has not been proved. A recent experiment by Miss Katherine A. Williams, in fact, casts some doubt upon such permanence. Miss Williams studied the value of a conditioned stimulus as an incentive in the learning of white rats. She found that this stimulus had for a time a strength comparable to that of more fundamental motives, such as hunger. She used as the reward at the end of a maze, a food box in which the animals had learned to find food, and which, therefore, had become a conditioned stimulus. The rats were motivated for a time to run the maze in order to reach this empty box; but, though they continued to discriminate correctly in other experiments, the empty box soon ceased to operate as an incentive.

A second difficulty is one which attaches to both the conditioned reflex and the instinct as an hypothesis to explain human behavior. This difficulty appears both from an analysis of human behavior itself and from a study of the nervous systems of men and of animals. Human behavior and the structure of the nervous system both testify to the important rôle of ideas in guiding human conduct. Instinct and conditioned reflex take no account of ideas. They account for conduct in a purely mechanical fashion. The great variety of human activity and the nice adaptation to the demands of the environment which is to be found in it strain this type of explanation to the breaking point.

The inadequacy of the conceptions of instinct and

of the conditioned reflex as explanations of motivation in human life does not mean that they do not exist in human experience. Human nature has its roots deep in animal life, and some of the simpler adjustments are carried on by human beings at the instinctive level. The transfer of emotional attitudes from one object to another does take place in human life by the simple mechanical method of the conditioned reflex. Feeling and emotion, it may be added, furnish the fundamental driving force in human behavior, as in the case of the behavior of the lower animals. Furthermore, it is possible, in some measure at least, to influence human conduct by appeal to the primitive impulses and by guiding and redirecting the attitude through the process of transfer by associations. The experiments in motivation by the use of simple and direct reward or punishment illustrate the possibility of guidance through these methods.

What, then, is the rôle of ideas? The experiments in motivation indicate that the control of conduct is not carried on solely by an appeal to the more primitive impulses and to their redirection by simple methods of associative learning. Some of the experiments, as we have seen, take as their point of attack, not the feelings or the emotions, but the ideas. The experimenters sought to influence the individual's conduct by giving him a clearer notion of the task which he was to perform. Their immediate purpose has been to enable him to distinguish clearly between his successful and his unsuccessful attempts to perform his task and to enable him to trace definitely the degree of success which he attained. It is, of course, not to be supposed that this emphasis upon ideas or upon the comprehension of the nature of the task and the knowledge of success in performing it, rules out of

consideration the emotions as driving forces in his conduct. It does, however, shift the emphasis in a way which is very important both for theory and for practice. It sets up ideas as the directing agencies in human conduct and relegates feelings to the rôle of instruments operating under the guidance of ideas. These suggestions from the experiments are re-enforced by a review of the development of animal behavior and structure.

The place of instinct and emotion as a method of adjustment of the organism to its environment has changed radically in the course of evolution. In some of the lower organisms very elaborate forms of adjustment are made in an entirely mechanical fashion. This is especially true in the case of the insects, in which instinct has reached its most elaborate development. In the vertebrates conduct is more variable and more dependent upon the processes of learning. As we go up the scale of the vertebrates we find a changing balance in the relation between relatively uniform, inherited modes of behavior, accompanied apparently by characteristic feelings or emotions, and a type of adjustment in which only the general ends of behavior are laid down, and in which the detailed actions for the attainment of these ends are worked out by the individual himself.

When we come to human beings we find the detailed method by which these adjustments are made to be largely worked out in the realm of ideas. Man, in contrast to the animal, studies the nature of the world in which he finds himself and seeks by elaborate inventions to adjust himself more and more perfectly to this world. The first condition underlying behavior is the understanding of the world. In order that he may meet his bodily needs he must understand the

nature and organization of the physical world. In like manner the satisfaction of his social needs demands a clear grasp of the nature and organization of the life of mankind. We may perhaps carry the analysis a step further and say that man works out his adjustment to the larger universe by working out a comprehensive theory or point of view by which to explain the world and to understand his relationship to it. In other words, he builds up for himself a conceptual universe. This conceptual organization may take the form of a theological or a philosophical system, or it may be represented in a scientific interpretation of the world.

This analysis of the change in emphasis from the instinctive and emotional systems as controlling factors in conduct to the system of ideas, parallels the development of the nervous system which was referred to in an earlier paragraph. The enormous development in man of the cortex of the brain, which is the basis of higher forms of learning and of thinking, in contrast to the thalamus, which is the organ for the co-ordination of the impulsive and emotional reactions, completely justifies the emphasis upon ideas which has been made in the foregoing discussion. Those psychologists who emphasize the visceral reactions and the very simple forms of behavior as the chief determiners in human conduct have selected for attention only one side of human behavior, and have blindly ignored that aspect of human behavior which is characteristically human. A doctrine of motivation which is based upon this exclusive emphasis on impulses and feelings, therefore, is a seriously one-sided doctrine.

The doctrine that ideas are the crucial factors in human motivation does not deny that feelings or emotions impel one to conduct. What it asserts is

that the feelings which we have toward certain objects or certain courses of action may be determined by our ideas concerning them, and that, therefore, the most effective and intelligent way of controlling conduct is to see that the ideas are sound. We find traces even in early childhood of the way in which one's ideas about an object affect one's feelings toward it. An example from the experience of a small boy two or three years of age shows this. The first time this youngster saw a toy balloon rise in the air he exhibited an apparently unaccountable fear of it. No explanation of this fear was ever found, except on the hypothesis that the child was afraid because the balloon acted so differently from all the other objects which he had ever known. In all his earlier experience objects fell to the ground when released. He had learned how to react to objects behaving in this way. Here was an object which did not fit the formula. His familiar scheme of things was thrown into disorder. The adjustment which should be made to this strange situation was uncertain. Confusion and fear were the consequence.

The conception of motivation which emphasizes the development of the understanding and the clarification of the individual's ideas concerning the situation to which he must adjust himself, does not ignore the feelings and emotions. It recognizes that feelings and emotions exist, but holds that they are determined very largely and may be controlled most safely by means of ideas. This conception of motivation is that, if the ideas are once straightened out, the feelings will in large measure take care of themselves. We are, of course, not considering the rôle of the feelings in æsthetic appreciation, but only their relation to conduct, and our conclusion concerning conduct is that our primary

business is to help the individual to straighten out his ideas of the world, and that when this is done his feelings will impel him to appropriate conduct. An exception to this rule may be made in the case of individuals who have developed attitudes which produce a serious maladjustment. These attitudes may need to be attacked directly through the process of re-education. Neither do we imply that the attachment of feelings to specific objects is not an important feature in the life of the very young child. The rôle of ideas in conduct, however, appears quite early and becomes more and more important as the child grows older.

It is my task in this paper to discuss the general psychological principles of motivation rather than to apply them to the specific theme of this conference, which I take to be the bearing of religion and religious education upon conduct. The particular question is whether the religious sanction is an essential feature in the motivation of conduct. I may perhaps be permitted, however, to make a few concluding remarks touching on one phase of the application of these principles to this specific problem.

Religion is sometimes thought of as a set of feelings or attitudes relatively independent of any set of ideas, and sometimes as primarily an interpretation of the world we live in and its relation to ourselves. Particularly in a time like the present, in which the traditional theological beliefs are thrown into confusion, if not uprooted entirely, there is a tendency to regard the beliefs which form the structural foundation of religious feeling as relatively indifferent and to regard the feelings as capable of independent cultivation. Thus, a great many people, whose beliefs have been radically modified by modern science and modern

speculation, observe the forms of religious ceremony for the sake of the feelings which they arouse. This has produced a divorce between feelings and ideas. It is a grave question whether the feelings, thus detached from the ideas which naturally arouse them, can have the motive force which we expect them to have.

Instead of attempting to utilize feelings in this abortive fashion, the sound procedure would seem to be to face the intellectual issue and get it cleared up. The sincere fundamentalist has a perfectly clear-cut solution of the problem. He holds to the traditional view of the world which goes with the older theology. The conduct that goes with this view is clearly laid out for him and the feelings which are aroused in him by it prompt him toward this conduct.

The modernist, however, is in a dilemma. He wishes to retain the forms after the content has disappeared. He repeats words which have lost their original meaning for the sake of the feelings which were aroused by these words when they had their original meaning. The words, forms, and ceremonies to which we have been accustomed in our youth do, of course, continue to have an emotional effect regardless of the change in our beliefs. The arousal of feeling which is out of harmony with the ideas that originally promoted it results in a confusion, however, which can hardly lead to well-organized, intelligent conduct. The conduct itself becomes uncertain and lacking in directness and sincerity. This disorganization of conduct may be the result, not of a change in belief, but of an attempt to combine new beliefs with expressions and feelings which are appropriate to old ones.

If modern science necessitates a radical revision in our conception of the world, our task should be, in my opinion, to develop the new conceptions and their

implications. If we regard the older theological conceptions as sound, we should hold to them and teach them. We should not, however, regard the individual's conception of the world, whether in accordance with the older theology or with a new conception derived from modern science, as a matter of indifference. We should not put new wine in old bottles. We should be less intent on the preservation of certain feelings and more intent on the development of a true conception of life. The problem of the religious sanction, according to this view, becomes the problem of clarifying our ideas.

The problem of motivation is in this conception coincident with the whole problem of education. It is lifted out of the realm of devices. It is not a matter of applying spurs to the child to incite him to do this or that particular thing. It is, rather, the problem of so clarifying his conception of the situations in which he lives, both immediate and remote, that he will understand what action is appropriate to the situation. His understanding of the situation will carry with it the appropriate feeling to energize his conduct.

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3. INTERPRETING RELIGION TO MAKE IT FUNCTION IN CONDUCT

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DOCTOR FREEMAN has said, "We should not regard the individual's conception of the world as a matter of indifference." To this I should like to reply,

"Hear! Hear!" For I too believe that "ideas are the crucial factor in human motivation," and therefore that man's conduct will in the end be determined by his conception of the universe in which he finds himself alive.

Joseph Conrad, to whom be gratitude forever and ever, might fittingly be described as the apostle of grit. In one unforgettable story after another he seems to be saying that when all faith and hope have been washed away at least grit may be left, and blessed is the man who has it. Blessed indeed is the man who can say: "The universe is able to conserve the finest results of our labors and it will conserve them; but if not, if all of good that we undertake to do is destined ultimately to be frustrated, if the whole race of men is destined finally to be blotted out of the universe, which has noted neither its coming nor its going, we shall, nevertheless, will and work so long as we may to improve the human situation."

But how many men are able to say that? Mr. Bertrand Russell's "firm foundation of unyielding despair" is anything but firm for the multitude of mankind. Most men do not despair and fight on; they despair and give up. It is, I think, safe to assume that if, not only here and there but everywhere, human beings should come to the conclusion that what they are engaged in is a hopeless fight, they would presently cease fighting. In the fall of 1917, when thousands upon thousands of her people were eating food substitutes barely sufficient to maintain life and not sufficient to maintain health, Germany nevertheless went on fighting. But in the fall of 1918, when it became evident that there was absolutely no chance to win, Germany gave up. If the whole race of men should come to the conclusion that in a universe which is

unaware of their existence and indifferent to their fate there is absolutely no chance to win, an occasional Joseph Conrad might hold on to his grit, an occasional Bertrand Russell might stand on his firm foundation of unyielding despair, but human morale generally speaking would be likely to collapse.

Sufficiently upsetting would be the conclusion that there is in the universe itself no basis for moral values and, therefore, no guarantee of their survival. But what if men should come to the further conclusion that there is no basis for moral values even in their own natures? That is the conclusion to which you are likely to come once you have denied the spiritual foundation of life. You begin by doubting that there is anything divine beyond man; you end by doubting that there is anything divine within man. You start with the assumption that nature is completely indifferent to moral values and may not be expected either to promote or to conserve them; you end with the assumption that what in human nature looks like concern for moral values is merely the peculiar but wholly mechanical functioning of the human larynx and intestines. You begin with the assumption that "all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system"; you end with the assumption that on "a microscopic dot" of the solar system "tiny lumps of impure carbon and water of complicated structure, with somewhat unusual physical and chemical properties, crawl about for a few years until they are dissolved again in the elements of which they are compounded." And then what? On the assumption that man is a spiritual being there is nothing in the way of fine conduct which you may not reasonably expect of

him. But what may you reasonably expect of him on the assumption that he is nothing more than a "tiny lump of impure carbon and water"?

What we, the rank and file of men, are led to believe we are will certainly influence, if not determine, what we undertake to do. Persuade us that we *are* something, and we will undertake to do something worth while in the world. Persuade us that we are nothing, or next to nothing, and although you may beg us on your knees to act like gentlemen there will be nothing doing. Yes, and what we, the rank and file of men, are led to believe you are will certainly influence if not determine our treatment of you. Persuade us to believe that there is something divine in you, and we may treat you with respectful consideration; we may some day even consent to listen to you when you tell us that we ought to reverence personality. But you can hardly expect us to reverence you if you persuade us to believe that all that you are is a "tiny lump of impure carbon and water."

Will anything less radical and creative than religious faith prove adequate to effect those changes in human attitudes which simply must be brought about if ever we are to have a better world? Consider, for example, the prevailing attitude toward men of another race. It is, I should think, becoming sufficiently evident that one of the most dangerous phenomena in our modern world is race prejudice. One of the most frightening skeletons in the closet of civilization is just the awful possibility that some day a proud and sensitive and infuriated East may engage in a death grapple with a superiority-conscious West. And in our own American closet is there any skeleton more haunting than the tension that now exists between the white race and the black? But how may race prejudice be removed?

Much of it, no doubt, would gradually disappear in any brave attempt on the part of representatives of different races to work together for a common end. But the very willingness to do this is often absent; and when it is, how can it be produced? Only by the force of a new and radical and creative idea such as that which is furnished by religion in its belief that there is in this man of another race something that is at least potentially divine.

In reply to all this, attention may be called to the fact that there is to-day a not inconsiderable number of persons who have, apparently, no religious faith yet who are, undeniably, living not below, but above the moral average. But is it not also a fact that such persons, notwithstanding their indifference to or repudiation of religious faith, are in large part a product of a religious conception of life? They have grown up in a world where human beings for many generations have believed that man is a spiritual being with a spiritual background and a spiritual destiny. The experiment of letting a generation grow up from infancy to manhood totally uninfluenced by a religious conception of life is for the first time in history now, in Russia, being conducted, with what results it will be interesting to see. It will be interesting to see how long human courage can endure the thought that man is destined in the end to be a victim of the cosmic process; and equally interesting to see how much of reverence for personality can be maintained among a people who are taught from childhood to believe that they are not in any sense sons and daughters of God.

A few days ago a young medical student said to me, "In the school which I am attending most of the fellows consider it almost indecent to profess any sort of religious faith." And he added, "It is really aston-

ishing what a difference in personality quickly results from the utter repudiation of religious faith." If religious faith should be repudiated by a growing multitude of men, what would be the probable result in human character and conduct? We may not dogmatically say, but with no uncertainty we may say this: The finest idealism that has ever appeared in this world was born of a religious conception of life. The Sermon on the Mount came from the mind of a Man who was to an extraordinary degree a religious personality. And it is, I should say, far from certain that idealism such as that which we now associate with the name of Jesus would be able long to flourish in this world should it ever be completely severed from its religious root.

The topic assigned to me, "How Can Religion Be Interpreted to Make it Function in the Control of Conduct?" appears to assume that religion may be so interpreted. But in view of the fact that this is by no means universally conceded, in view of the fact that in some quarters religion is considered to be non-essential if not positively detrimental to the control of conduct, I have felt constrained to say this much in support of the thesis that human conduct will ultimately be determined by human faith as to the nature of the universe and the nature of man.

It is plain, however, that I ought now to speak to the specific question which I am expected to consider, and this I believe: The one great religious conception which offers most for the control of conduct is that which is embodied in the phrase "the kingdom of God." By Jesus this phrase was never defined, which is fortunate. Had he attempted in the first century to give to it a definite content, it might not in the twentieth century have been able to serve us. The fact that it has never

had any specific meanings enables us to-day to make use of it. For us in this twentieth century, as for Jesus in the first century, it may stand for a divine-human society in which men are eager to know and to do the will of God. Of this glorious society we may paint our own picture, putting into it all of personal and social value we are able to dream of, realizing that those who come after us may paint a somewhat different picture, but inspired none the less by what we ourselves have conceived. It is not too much to say that Jesus' own vision of the kingdom of God "created his character and determined his conduct down to the last detail." Nor is it, I think, too much to say that if what we want in this world is character and conduct that are measurably Christlike, the one and only way to get them is first to persuade men that a better world is possible, and then to persuade them that it is the pearl of great price to obtain which they can well afford to sell their goods and their lives.

It is necessary to persuade men that a better world is possible. Jesus' own hope that a divine-human society would appear soon upon the earth was destined not to be realized, but he died believing that such a society would some day appear. And it is, I should say, practically certain that he would not have been what he was or have done what he did had that conviction ever deserted him. On the assumption that a better world is possible we shall get one type of character and of conduct. On the assumption that it is impossible we shall get a very different type of character and of conduct, and a very different social result.

In a recent number of a worthful periodical which calls itself the *Magazine of Controversy* appears an article written by a rear admiral of the United States navy. On page one it says, "We militarists deplore

the evils of war as much as pacifists do." On page two it says, "We militarists hold that war is the inevitable result of progress." On page three it says, "The causes of war are too deeply rooted in human nature ever to be dislodged." The argument is not unfamiliar. Many persons besides rear admirals appear to think that it is sound. They hate war as much as anybody does, but . . .! They believe that war is a very costly and somewhat uncertain method of settling international disputes, but . . .! They want peace as much as anybody does or could want it, but . . .! And if everybody in the world had as little faith as they have, the future would be dark enough for mankind. What to-day is imperatively needed is a growing number of persons who will dare to believe in the possibility of international peace. Such belief would produce certain notable results in personal character and conduct. It would also produce in human society an atmosphere of hopeful expectancy in which a way to permanent peace might actually be found.

Belief in the possibility of a better world is plainly one of the all-essential conditions of its appearance. And I should like to make also the further observation that it is one of the all-essential conditions of any personal character that is truly noble and of any personal conduct that is truly heroic. I for my part have long since ceased to expect anything approaching Christlike character or conduct in the case of persons who do not believe in the possibility of a better world.

There is to-day a crying need for the re-orientation of religious faith. In other days religious faith has been associated with historic creeds and catechisms. In far too many instances it has been associated with untenable theories of biblical inspiration, unhistorical

notions of ecclesiastical development, and unscientific conceptions of the universe. It has been identified with an uncritical submission to authority, which has made of it a reactionary power. It has produced not only in Roman Catholicism, but in many forms of Protestantism the sacerdotal mind, whose great virtue, like that of the military mind, is obedience. Of both these minds it may be said, "Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to believe and obey though they die." The type of mind which is content to obey orders—wrong orders as well as right orders—may hardly be expected to make any significant contribution to the solution of human problems. The type of mind which is content to bow to authority, whether or no it has any truth to commend it, may be expected to champion the *status quo* in both the political and the economic order. To-day, religious faith needs to be associated with that better world in the hope of which hundreds of thousands of brave and beautiful spirits have given their lives. It needs as its test, not any such question as, Do you believe in the virgin birth? but such a question as, Do you believe in the possibility of permanent universal peace? In a word, it needs to be associated with the kingdom of God, an association which would prevent its becoming ever a reactionary force and make it the greatest creative force at work in the world.

It is likewise necessary to persuade men that a better world, a divine-human society, the kingdom of God, is "the goal of all human life that wills to make itself worthy."

It is well, no doubt, to remind ourselves that a good world awaits the appearance of good men. It is also well to acknowledge the fact that it awaits the appearance of very much better men than those whom institutional religion has up until now been willing to pro-

nounce "good." Men who were faithful husbands, kind fathers, amiable friends, loyal citizens, *and* ruthless industrialists, *and* conscienceless speculators or investors, institutional religion has been accustomed to pronounce "good." But it is only too evident that they are not good enough to build on earth anything suggestive of a kingdom of God, or even to prevent the outbreak of a futile war which exacted a toll of twenty-three million human lives. And it would be difficult to refute the contention that, in thus pronouncing "good" men who were not good enough to build a better world, institutional religion has rendered a positive disservice to human society. It has thrown over a vast deal of naked selfishness a concealing cloak of piety and respectability and thus has encouraged to respect themselves men who should have been profoundly ashamed of themselves.

This disservice of institutional religion has sprung from the fact that it has presented for men's allegiance a number of lesser loyalties rather than one supreme and all-inclusive loyalty. It has urged men to be loyal to their wives, their friends, and their country. It has not urged them to be loyal to the kingdom of God. A supreme loyalty never betrays a lesser loyalty. On the contrary, it is the one and only passion which may always be depended upon to maintain a lesser loyalty. Let a man "seek first the kingdom of God" and there need be no anxiety about his treatment of his wife or his devotion to his country. But a lesser loyalty may betray a supreme loyalty. It has done so times without number. Men who were faithful husbands and "one hundred per cent" patriots have betrayed the kingdom of God. They have countenanced practices and condoned policies which have wrecked the chance of a better world.

A good world does await the appearance of good men. But it is necessary to add that it awaits the appearance of a kind of "good man" which only a supreme and all-inclusive loyalty to the kingdom of God can be expected to produce.

It is evident that institutional religion must discover new forms of inspiration and restraint. The old heaven-and-hell incentives have petered out. They no longer function in the control of conduct. Our generation is influenced neither by the hope of heaven nor by the fear of hell. To-day you cannot persuade people to be good, even in a conventional sense, by holding before them the prospect of future bliss in a heaven whose inhabitants spend their time playing harps and waving palm branches. Not only do our contemporaries appear to prefer jazz to the sort of music which heaven is supposed to provide, they appear to consider that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, that the certain delights of this world are more to be desired than the problematical delights of a world to come. Nor can you any longer restrain people from being bad by holding over them the threat of a future hell of physical torment. They merely laugh at you and refuse to be scared. As a matter of fact, these heaven-and-hell conceptions never did function adequately in the control of conduct, for the now obvious reason that they were subtle appeals to human selfishness. Persons who consented to be good in a narrow, conventional, Pharisaical sense, in order to obtain the joys of heaven and to escape the pains of hell, were not the sort of persons with whom it was possible to build a better world.

Nor will it now much avail to substitute for the hope of heaven the hope of material prosperity and for the fear of hell the fear of Bolshevism. A well-known authority on finance has said to his clients, "The

bulwark of our investments is religion. . . . Therefore, by all that we hold dear let us give more time, money, and thought to the churches, for upon religion the value of all that we own ultimately depends"—a statement which provokes two queries. First, is it true that religion is the bulwark of our investments? Suppose we have invested our money in Negro slaves, or in breweries, or in munitions of war, or in industries that even in time of peace bruise and blight human lives. May we in that case think of religion as the bulwark of our investments? Of one type of religion, yes—the type which produces a Caiaphas and crucifies a Jesus when he dares to "cleanse the temple." But hardly of a type of religion which produces a Jesus and defies a Caiaphas when he derives his income from cattle and doves sold to the pious for sacrificial purposes at exorbitant prices. And this assertion that religion is the bulwark of our investments provokes also another query. Even on the supposition that there is some truth in it, does it offer any adequate incentives for desirable conduct? Not if by desirable conduct you mean the sort of conduct which will produce high-grade individuals and, eventually, a high-grade civilization. For in this case, no less than in the case of the old heaven-and-hell conceptions, what is subtly appealed to is human selfishness. And you can hardly hope to secure godlike character by covert appeals to ungodlike motives.

I for my part am fully convinced that adequate incentives for desirable conduct are to be found only in some such vision of a kingdom of God as that which determined the career of Jesus. The time has not yet come—it may never come—when society can afford to dispense altogether with extraneous rewards and punishments as moral incentives. A very considerable portion of mankind is still, apparently, in the kinder-

garten stage of moral development. Benjamin Franklin observed that few men in public affairs act from the mere view of the good of their country—an observation which will hardly be challenged even now by any citizen of Franklin's state or of ours. Appeals to personal fears and ambitions we must, no doubt, in many cases continue to make, with, however, a clear understanding that their legitimate function is that of a schoolmaster leading men up to the point where they may see a holy city, a new Chicago, coming down out of heaven from God, made ready as a bride adorned for her husband, and from that vision derive more adequate incentives for noble living. Certainly it is true that the one hope of a fairer future lies in the chance that increasing numbers of men may be induced to respond to such an appeal as that which was made by the aged Pasteur to the students of France: "Say to yourself, first, 'What have I done for my institution?' and as you gradually advance, 'What have I done for my country?' until the time comes when you may have the immense happiness of thinking that you have contributed in some way to the progress and good of humanity."

To ask men to devote themselves to the kingdom of God is not to ask them to live and labor without hope of any kind of reward. It is worthy of note that Jesus frankly recognizes not only the power but the legitimacy of the hope of reward as an incentive to heroic conduct. Even when he asks his disciples to surrender much which the world prizes he is careful to add that great shall be their reward. The rich young ruler is told that if he goes and sells whatsoever he has and gives to the poor he will have treasure in heaven. Peter is assured that there is no man who has left house or brethren or sisters or father or mother

or children or lands for the kingdom of God's sake but he shall reap an hundredfold now in this time houses and brethren and sisters and mothers and children and lands. Recall also the saying, "Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in heaven." But the reward which Jesus urged men to seek was something intrinsic, not something extrinsic. It was the joy which is inherent in any form of creative or beneficent activity—the joy which the poet finds when he produces an immortal poem, the joy which the musician finds when he produces an immortal symphony, the joy which the scientist finds when he discovers some new domain of truth, the joy which the manufacturer finds when he produces something which the world needs and which he is able to offer to it at a fair price, the joy which the prophet finds when, notwithstanding the jeers of his contemporaries, he hears from afar the laughter of little children whom his vision has blessed and the prayers of countless thousands whom the truth in him has delivered from needless fears and preventable miseries. To ask men to devote themselves to the kingdom of God is not, therefore, to ask them to do any such impossible thing as to live and labor without hope of any kind of reward. It is, rather, to ask them to engage in an undertaking in which, to quote Pasteur, an "immense happiness" may be found.

It remains to be said that the kingdom-of-God-vision is to-day imperatively needed to prevent civilization from going to pieces on the jagged rock of a selfish and shortsighted nationalism. In our modern world there has developed an idea which the mediæval world would not have sanctioned for a moment—the idea that the

state owes no allegiance to any authority beyond it or above it. Dean Inge has truly declared that this notion that the state is above law, all law, that it is indeed a law unto itself, would not have been tolerated by those middle ages which many persons to-day feel disposed to despise. It was introduced by Machiavelli, sponsored by Francis Bacon, applauded by James I and Louis XIV, and is to-day indorsed by thousands of people who know nothing about its history, but who find it convenient when it comes, for instance, to the economic or industrial exploitation of backward, undeveloped countries. In consequence, international conduct has been shockingly bad. It has been characterized by a cynical disregard not only of international law, but of elemental human rights. Someone has said with not very much exaggeration that governments have "lied and called it diplomacy, stolen and called it annexation, borne false witness and called it a state paper, coveted and called it manifest destiny, killed and called it war."

To anyone who is able to take a long view of the human situation it must be evident that this notion that the state is above law will have to be repudiated if civilization is to endure. The time has come when even the state must recognize the existence of a higher sovereignty than that which any human institution may be said to possess. In principle this higher sovereignty is recognized every Sunday morning when on every battleship of the United States navy, above even that dear flag which stands for native land, there is hoisted that white flag which stands for the all-inclusive kingdom of God. But the time has come when this higher sovereignty must be recognized not only in principle and in ritual, but in actual fact in all governmental policies and procedures. The state must

seek first, not its own selfish interests and aggrandizement, but the universal good and glory of mankind.

My own observation leads me to believe that devotion to the kingdom of God is altogether the most redemptive force now at work in the world. It redeems men from selfishness; they find so much fun in gallant attempts to secure for underprivileged folk a more abundant life that they are no longer seriously tempted to think only of self. It redeems them from pettiness and vindictiveness. "I shall do nothing," said Lincoln, "in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing." When men undertake in any serious fashion to build a better world, they soon discover that what they are dealing with is too vast for petty, vindictive dealing. Devotion to the kingdom of God redeems men likewise from prejudice. Prejudice cannot, apparently, be removed by argument, but it can be removed by action. As men of one race co-operate with men of another race in some intelligent attempt to promote better feeling among both races prejudice disappears. Devotion to the kingdom of God redeems men finally from parochialism; the world becomes their parish. And as they strive to build on earth a kingdom of justice and peace they discover the folly of dependence on "reeking tube and iron shard," the wisdom of dependence upon intelligently directed good will.

Here, then, is a force which the church is only beginning to employ, but which, if only she should dare to employ it persistently and courageously, would enable her to transform at once the lives of individuals and the whole structure of society.

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II. PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF RELIGION

1. A METHOD FOR PERSONAL RELIGION

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BY the personal as over against the institutional I shall understand that which the individual does upon his own initiative or by the exercise of his own judgment. If, when I go out for a walk, I turn to the right or the left because the secretary of state, or a committee, or a priest tells me to do so, my act is institutional. If I turn to the Bible and find a verse and say, "I shall do as that verse prescribes and not otherwise use my judgment," I act under an institution, because the Bible is an institution, or the meaning is largely shaped by an institution unless we exercise our own judgment and intelligence in trying to get a meaning from it.

The outstanding expression of personal religion would be worshipful problem-solving. When an individual solves the important problems of his life worshipfully, we have personal religion in its highest expression.

Personal religion can be distinguished from institutional, but it cannot be distinguished from the social. The personal and the social cannot be contrasted. Everything personal is social in some sense or other. There are at least four meanings of "social." The first is, anything that is modified or shaped by association with others. This includes everything that is human.

Another sense of "social" is like-mindedness, or thinking as other people think, feeling as they feel, and so on. There are times when this is a good thing, and times when it is not. A third sense of "social" is mutual understanding and co-operation. The people may not think the same, they may not feel the same, or do the same, but they understand one another, and they adapt to one another in a co-operative way. This is a much more worthy kind of "social." But there is a fourth sense, the most important and the most valuable. It is to strive for a greater degree of mutuality, a more inclusive system of more mutual support and mutual enhancement than now prevails. The man who strives to do this may not be social in the second and third senses; he may not be understood; he may have to fight or to be fought against. The great outstanding individuals of history who have striven for this—I might say the kingdom of God—have not been understood. Often they have been cast out, ostracized, isolated.

The kind of personal religion that we want is also a kind of social religion, but it is, I think, pre-eminently the third and fourth kinds of "social" that we want in our personal religion. We want to know how such religion could be practiced in such a way as to promote to the maximum this third and fourth kind of sociality, and pre-eminently the fourth; for I think the fourth is the great task of personal religion. The institutional can do the second and third, but the burden of the fourth must rest upon personal religion. This is the greatest task I think we have before us. This is the road to the greatest good, the most inclusive system of the most mutual support and mutual enhancement. Mutual enhancement is more than mutual support. It means not only to support, but

to clarify and to promote the several values that are possible in our association with one another.

What does the individual need in order that his conduct may be controlled to this kind of social living? He would need at least three things, of which the first is the maximum exercise of his own intelligence. Being intelligent in itself alone is not sufficient, but it is indispensable. It is one of the great moral and religious requirements of life to exercise our intelligence to the utmost. The man who does not do so is often a source of vast evil. Next, he would need zeal. First, intelligence and then zeal, drive, propulsion, energy. Third, a vision of the practicable possibilities of attainment, the things to strive for, the ideals. Intelligence, zeal, and vision—if these can be promoted by some kind of practice of personal religion, it will be doing the kind of work that it seems to me we have in mind to accomplish.

The method of worshipful problem-solving that I am about to sketch is not novel. It is in one form or another an ancient practice. Jesus practiced worshipful problem-solving forty days and forty nights in the wilderness, solving the problem of just how he should conduct his public life—a very prolonged and earnest struggle of problem-solving worshipfully done. The day before he chose his disciples he spent all night in prayer, solving the problem of just whom he should choose, presumably. The night before the cross, in Gethsemane, there was a very terrible struggle with the great problem of his life—worshipful problem-solving again. No doubt there were many other times also. If Jesus needed to practice it, we all do.

The method that I am going to give you is drawn from, or at least exemplified in, certain stages in the Lord's Prayer, which was Jesus' answer to the question

how people should conduct their private worship, how they should pray.

The first step, when one has retired to solve his personal problem, I call relaxation. That is, just remember the fact, which is a very obvious one but which we constantly forget, that we are not running the universe, nor even ourselves. Not more than one millionth of all the processes that enable us to live moment by moment are controlled and sustained by our own intelligence. We are borne up, as it were, by a stream. You can put it in scientific language. You can talk about the function of the cells and the organisms and the social process, or call it God, but however you wish to define or specify the fact, manifestly we are borne up, moved along, so that, though our own effort plays a part, an indispensable part in the best living, it plays only a part.

What is the value of this relaxation to us, this resting back upon that which sustains? I do not believe it is possible to deal adequately with the major problems of life unless we do this, because, for one thing, we must free our minds of those distorting and confining prejudices and anxieties and fears and worries and envies and hates that ride our thoughts and prevent us from seeing our problems in the right light and the true perspective, and that prevent us from drawing upon the resources of our own experience; that, in a word, frustrate the use of our own intelligence. But when we thus relax, especially when we relax religiously with a sense of being borne up, the mind is freed of these cobwebs, distortions, confinements, and intelligence is released.

It is a psychological fact, I believe, that when our mind is dominated by prejudices, anxieties, worries, fears and hates, there is a good deal of the mind that is not accessible; there are many things we know,

experiences we have had, that we cannot draw upon. We suffer repressions, or whatever other technical term you want to use. But when the mind is free of these, then the potentialities of our own experience are more readily available. This is the reason for the first step.

The second I call aspiration; that is, being aware of the possibilities of living, even of unexplored and unimagined possibilities; for one can be aware of what is not yet known. To put it figuratively, one can feel the dawn on the horizon of the day that has not yet loomed, one can live in a lure of possibility. Jesus put it in these words: "Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven." What does this mean? It means the glorious possibilities of life—thy will done on earth as it is in heaven. Then is the great fulfillment. Just what it is specifically, we do not know, but it is the utmost reach of hope and aspiration. I do not think I need to pause to show the importance of it as a preliminary state for problem-solving.

After one has thus relaxed and experienced aspiration, then let one face the problem, whatever it may be. Everyone who is living earnestly has a problem. Let him face it; get it in perspective; see how other things bear upon it and how it bears upon other things. The biggest thing one can do—and it is a marvelous achievement—is to get one's problem in the right perspective, see it comprehensively and wait in the presence of it until an illuminating suggestion comes. You have done the utmost; wait now for the suggestion. It will likely come, because you have cleared the ground, you have prepared the situation, you have put yourself in the right state of mind. You have the problem in the right perspective, and now, if ever, you will get the "hunch." Maybe it will not come. Try again. Maybe it will never come. Maybe the final

conclusion will be this, that here I stand before an inevitable fact, stubborn and unmovable, nothing to be done about it except to adapt myself to it; but to be able to see the inevitable and adapt myself to it is a great achievement.

The next step I call self-examination. It is looking at oneself to see what habits, mental attitudes, ways of doing things, have been tripping me up, and what reconstruction of personality, what change of habit, is needed. But never stop merely with finding what is wrong; always go on until you find, if possible, what corrective mental habit is required, then put it into words that state it as clearly and definitely and adequately as possible. This is a statement of need. "Deliver us from evil" is this stage in the Lord's Prayer as I interpret it. The evil, by no means all outside but also within, is going to hurt us. We want to make just as specific as possible the particular corrective mental attitude. I say, repeat it a number of times. Use auto-suggestion to stamp it in. This is the final step in worshipful problem-solving. You stamp in your findings, your conclusions, so that they will work automatically within you when you go out and give your mind to other things.

This is a brief and inadequate sketch of a suggested method of worshipful problem-solving which in my mind exemplifies personal religion performing the function of controlling conduct.

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2. PERSONAL RELIGION IN THE CONTROL OF CONDUCT

DR. GEORGE A. COE

THE form of this question may possibly suggest to some minds that we ought to look for, or invent, some device for bringing personal religion, as it is commonly understood, into closer connection with moral conduct, as it is commonly understood. But as long as present conceptions of moral conduct and of personal religion prevail, no real solution of our problem will be possible.

Conduct, as church teaching commonly understands it, presupposes conditions of society that no longer exist, and only faintly recognizes conditions that do exist. How often must students of morals point out that our prevailing code reflects the rural and small-community life of three or more generations ago, and that this code is and must be ineffective in our present indirect, long-distance, largely corporate relations? We deal constantly with persons whom we never see, whose names we may not know. Who is it that communicates the news to me through the morning paper? From whom did I procure the bread that was toasted for my breakfast? Who serves my luncheon at a restaurant? To whom do I pay my trolley-car fare? With what persons am I in relation when I replenish my gasoline tank? When I buy sugar, to whom do I pay the customs duty that is included in the price?

Our inherited consciences represent a far simpler set of relations. Much that is good and bad in the life of to-day we have not yet included within our concept of moral conduct. Hence it is that we can regard ourselves as morally good, as good Catholics, Prot-

estants, or Jews, though we are insensitive to inhuman situations in our own corporate life. Therefore, in order to function efficiently in the development of moral conduct, personal religion must find or make a new moral code.

This necessity is made poignant by the fact that, interfused within these new relations, there is knowledge of good and evil that was not available to our fathers. Already we have abandoned our fathers' notions of what is good or bad for a child, and their convictions as to what constitutes a good child or a bad one. We are likewise partly aware that yesterday's standards for young people somehow do not fit, and cannot be made to fit, the youth of to-day. A like process has started with respect to what is good for an adult, and what constitutes a good adult. Consider the knowledge that recently has become available concerning mental hygiene and maladjustments within the personality, the sex-factor in human happiness and in harmonious marriage, the varieties of individual endowment, the effects of various kinds of labor, the causes of accidents and of diseases, the effects of economic strife and of war, the—but why go on? Concerning every sort of weal or woe we are learning things that could not have been guessed when some of us were born. Much of what is called goodness is, in fact, a clog upon the development of really appropriate moral conduct. The good man of to-morrow may be as unlike the good man of to-day as the good child of to-day is different from the good child of tradition.

The concept of personal religion, also, requires critical scrutiny. For this concept, as it is commonly used, means some sort of purely private intercourse between an individual and God, which, though it is supposed to have moral effects, is not, itself, a moral process. In

its essence it is, so the assumption goes, a one-to-one communion, above and apart from all the tangle of social interests and relationships. Thus it comes about that personal piety, thus understood, can yield satisfactions of an intense sort apart from all consideration of the weal and the woe of the world at large. That is, personal religion can be a-moral.

Two phases of this religious a-morality may be mentioned. In the first place, resorting to this supposedly private relation with God may be a flight from the problems and the difficulties of the moral life; it may be the actual substitution of supposed divine communion for facing actualities and doing one's part in the world. In the second place, this assumed intimacy with God is almost certain to be taken as a certificate and seal of one's own good character. Hence the multitude of pious persons who practice private prayer and yet serve their own self-interest by unjust treatment of their fellows.

These evils will continue to be respectable until religious educators assimilate what psychology has shown concerning this supposedly private communion with God. What I am about to say does not involve a denial of everything that bears the name of mysticism, for this term is now used in so many different senses that it actually covers contradictory views concerning communion with God. I limit myself here to a single result of the psychological study of religion, namely, that personal religion such as I have just described is illusory. The alleged one-to-one relation between the devotee and God does not exist. For, in prayer or contemplation, one ascribes to God what one has learned through social experience to regard as divine, and to oneself what one has learned to regard as human. The society within which I attained my

selfhood is more or less reflected in every function that I perform. My environment, then, acts within my prayers without intermission. I never am lifted out of the entanglements of our imperfect and struggling humanity.

What, then, shall we understand by "personal religion"? "Personal" sometimes means intensity of conviction and of self-giving to a cause. But the most mechanized institutional religion can be personal in this sense. On the other hand, if by "personal" we should mean performing the most characteristic function of personality, which is the discriminating apprehension of fact or value, and re-direction of conduct, in a new situation or in a new view of an old situation, then personal religion could acquire the greatest significance for moral development. Whenever personal religion is otherwise conceived and promoted, it hinders moral development, either by the anæsthetic of undiscriminating goodness or by the fortification of outworn customs and beliefs.

If, then, teachers of religion desire to promote moral development through personal religion, let them teach that God is to be looked for in what men have in common with one another, and that individual communion with him is to be sought where the seers and prophets of various religions have found it, namely, in such awakenings and reawakenings of our consciences as make for a progressively just society.

By what method or process can this be done? By avoiding the rôle of dictator or censor, and by assuming the rôle of experimenter and creator. Religion, whether institutional or personal, is unfit to be a moral dictator, for the particular religion that exists at any time and place is an expression of the same imperfect humanity that requires guidance. Religion

is unfit to be a censor, for the standards of censorship are necessarily derived from an uncompleted history. The moment that religion attempts either dictatorship or censorship, it threatens to obstruct moral development. Even if the specific precepts that it utters be wholesome, they are interfused with an authority that says, "Comply with what I tell you, and all will be well"—which is not so!

If anyone should ask whether the law of love does not offer a fixed formula whereby conduct may be censored, the reply, which has often been made but seems ever to need repeating, is that the formula cannot be applied until we investigate causes and effects in a world in which both facts and methods of investigating them are changing. The loving conduct of to-day may to-morrow be found to contain something injurious, or not to contain all that the new situation requires. The law of love, then, is not a yardstick for the use of a censor; rather, it is a stimulus and guide for fruitful questioning in a changing social world. It calls for mutuality or togetherness in facing all the facts that have to do with our weal and our woe; it admonishes me to look at all satisfactions and discomforts through my neighbor's eyes as well as my own; it avers that what is good is a shared good, and it spurs us to experiment in sharing.

I hear someone remarking that even if we could abolish our religious dictatorships and censorships in respect to adult conduct, we cannot do it in respect to the young. The function of religious education, this voice insists, includes authoritative determination by adults of what is right and what wrong in the conduct of the young, and the inculcation of such personal religion as re-enforces the dictates of this authority. To this the reply is that, though this

kind of teaching can produce moral conduct somewhat like that of the teacher, its very successes lead the young to repeat the process whereby we of to-day are able to be piously comfortable in the presence of profound injustice.

Children are persons. They grow morally by exercising the functions of a person. The core of these functions is discriminating use of precedent, together with discriminating experiment and deviation from precedent. There is not one law for the self-realization of an adult, and a different law for the growth of a child. There is no way whereby dictated and censored conduct in childhood can be made to produce free and creative conduct in later years.

Not by commanding, not by producing habits of compliance, not by inducing a supposed one-to-one communion with God, can religion best function in the development of moral conduct, but by broadening and deepening our sensitiveness to the objective facts of personal and social weal and to causes and effects therein, and by providing fellowship of old and young in the experiments and the creative activities that constitute the movement of the kingdom of God.

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3. FORUM DISCUSSION

Dr. Timothy Lehmann (President, Elmhurst College): Do we get very far with personal religion if we leave the thought of God as vague as it seemed to be in the opening address?

Chairman Wieman: There is nothing in the world more important than an adequate idea of God. The ghastliness and tragedy of life are due in no small part to the fact that, not having an adequate idea of God, we do not relate ourselves rightly with him. But I did not venture to specify the nature of God for a number of reasons. For one thing, present thought is confused upon this matter. In this room, no doubt, there is a great difference of opinion with regard to just the nature of God. Since this is not a theological gathering, and I did not want to arouse controversy, I did not enter into the matter. But the more adequate, specific idea of God that we can have, the better.

The Rev. F. H. Hutchins (Curate, Grace Episcopal Church, Oak Park, Illinois): Do we really need a new code of morals, as Professor Coe claims? Would not the present code be sufficient if we extended it to all group or corporate relations?

Doctor Coe: We know much to-day about the nature of good and evil that was not known yesterday, and we have to reckon with social forces and interests that were unknown when our present code arose. For example, the duty of handling delinquency and dependency by the case-work method has been only recently discovered or evolved. What code yet formulated can show us where is the dividing line between right and wrong conduct in the advertising business? Is it right to wage a truthful advertising campaign that appeals to people's vanity, or that induces people to buy superfluities? Who can say? Even in as simple a matter as the mother-and-child relationship, old standards fail. A scientific study of childhood simply knocks in the head the old-fashioned motherhood.

Professor E. J. Chave (Religious Education, Uni-

versity of Chicago): Why, in the fourth sort of "social," do you not include the possibility of the same striving by organized institutions?

Chairman Wieman: I think the fourth form of "social" could be a group or institutional endeavor. Yet, if you strive for a degree of mutuality beyond that which is recognized by others, you automatically are isolated. But isolation is not a good thing. The more we can find fellowship or co-operation with others in this great endeavor, the better. It is a very great, almost tragic, thing that Jesus of Nazareth dared to stand alone, and he did. Many another soul has had to stand alone. It is nothing to be glad about, but it is one of those grim, hard facts of life that you have to face; to dare to stand alone is sometimes the important thing.

Doctor Coe: I do not see why, in the nature of man, an institution, at least a group, might not go through the very process that Professor Wieman described. One of our moral tasks at the present time is to develop group or institutional habits of that type. How much we need them you can judge if you will answer this question to yourself: How many cases of corporate repentance do you know? I have been asking this question for twenty years and I have not yet a half-dozen satisfactory cases in my collection.

Chairman Wieman: I agree with all that has been said; yet all of us have personal problems that are intimate, deep, subtle things that we have to thrash out by ourselves. Some of the most important and urgent problems you cannot share with more than one person, and some you cannot share with anyone.

Mr. Chave: Can the individual be trusted to make his own moral code, or must new codes be made by social thinking?

Doctor Coe: By co-operative thinking. Our big problem is to make prophecy one of the regular functions of society. We need, for instance, to have in every endowed institution an endowed critic of the same institution. Yet I fear that I have contradicted myself, for the endowed critic would become institutionalized by the endowment. Hence we have to look for free lances and make a place for them. We must form an institutional habit of at least listening to those who say what we do not yet believe.

The Rev. John E. Locker (Methodist Episcopal Church, Charlevoix, Michigan): Does Professor Coe really think that we adults should abandon the dictation of morals to growing youth?

Doctor Coe: Yes. One of the humors of education, especially of religious education, is the notion that it is difficult to get children to be as good as we are. This is the easy part of character education! You do not have to dictate in order to induce the young to be as good as we are. Just let a child live happily in a group, and he will drink in the standards and methods of it. When it comes to asking him to be better than we are, dictation does not work. But thinking and judging do.

The Rev. Mr. Hutchins: How can you develop moral intelligence in children without showing them ways in which to experiment, that is, without dictating certain things to do, to see whether they work or not?

Doctor Coe: I am not quite sure what the word "dictating" means here. I should be the last one to deny that leadership is needed. Is Doctor Rugh present? I want him to know that I learned from his lecture yesterday about "leadership as a pragmatic substitute for authority and obedience." I suggest the title of that lecture as the solution of the problem.

Mr. Fred L. Brownlee (Executive Secretary, American Missionary Association): Professor Coe spoke about discriminating in the field of existing moral standards, and about experimenting with new. Do you call this in itself religion and the religious process at work?

Doctor Coe: If you can qualify my phrase by adding what Doctor Wieman said at the beginning, yes. The worshipful attack upon a problem is to me religious, as he said. He and I did not collaborate on this formula. I did not know what he was going to say about it. But it seems to me that he said just the word that I need to make clear my own position with regard to the experimental attack. A frivolous experiment is no experiment at all. Any real experimentation has got to be serious. It has to realize that there is something important that needs to be known that is not yet known. If we approach the problems of the moral life with such seriousness, we cannot find any dividing wall between the moral and the religious; it disappears.

Mr. Brownlee: May I ask Doctor Wieman a further question—whether he would consider worshipful problem-solving and serious or earnest problem-solving as the same thing?

Chairman Wieman: Worshipful problem-solving is serious, but is every case of serious problem-solving worshipful? If it is serious enough, if the individual faces up to whatever in his mind is the ultimate factor in determining the destiny of human life, I should call his act religious. This ultimate factor, whether he calls it God or not, functions as God for him. But I do think he must come to this point before it is explicitly and completely religious.

Mrs. W. T. Sawyer (Church-school Teacher, Saint

Mark's Church, Evanston, Ill.): Does the Bible have any relation to this new moral experience or new moral code, and where does prayer come in?

Doctor Coe: Let me answer the second part of the question first. In principle Doctor Wieman has already answered it. He was talking about prayer as I understand this term, about facing the ultimate just as far as we are able to face it, and dealing with the ultimate in a practical manner, which includes the attempt to assimilate it into ourselves by correcting ourselves and by devoting ourselves. Prayer, thus understood, has an enormously important place within the code-making process. We shall have to correct, however, a popular conception of prayer. We must realize that prayer both in its concept and in its practice is a flowing, changing thing. It differs from religion to religion. It differs from age to age within a given religion. We have not merely to continue a tradition of praying, we have to develop prayer. As to the other question: The Bible, first of all, is a heterogeneous thing. If you will go through it from cover to cover, making in parallel columns an index of the contents, in the first column placing those parts of it which you have any reason to suppose will be helpful to you or anybody else in solving your problems, and in the other column the things that you are pretty sure will not be helpful in solving your problems, you will probably be surprised to find what a small part of the Bible falls into the first column. This is true even of the New Testament. If this be heresy, make the most of it. What then? One can say right away that the small pamphlet that you will have left will be of tremendous significance. It can be made very important in working toward the advance of the kingdom of God that we heard about this morning.

The method of doing this is perhaps involved in the question, and this I shall not dodge. Those who are anxious about the Bible should demonstrate what parts of it really do help in the control of conduct and how they help. I suspect that if they take this scientific question into their bosoms, hold themselves to this standard, they will conclude that certain parts of the Bible help us to solve our problems, not by dictating the solution to us, not by dictating our conduct to us, not by furnishing us a censorship formula, but by stimulating us to think, to judge, and to repent. I should like to know how anybody can go through certain parts of the Bible and be satisfied with himself.

The Rev. Victor H. Keiser (Minister, Methodist Church, Westville, Ind.): In presenting religion to a community that has almost none, should I offer it as something to be used or something to be enjoyed? That is to say, am I going to present religion because it will help them do something that they do not already want to do, and thus have the double task of making them want to be good and wanting to be religious so they will be good? Or shall I present religion as something that they are leaving out of their lives to their detriment, as though a man had a deformed arm that he could not use, thereby losing a part of the great enjoyment of life? Religion brings blessedness, beatitude. It seems to me that our conference is treating it simply as a means to something else.

Doctor Coe: Let us revert to a statement made this morning by Professor Freeman. From what he said about ideas as one source of motives we may infer that the quality of our life depends in part upon the degree of our insight. I like to think of religion as our supreme effort at objectivity. It consists in

opening our eyes to the utmost, seeing things as they are without dodging, facing the question of our own place within reality, and taking a place with conviction. Religion thus conceived is not a particular thing, either to be used as a means to something else or to be used for present enjoyment. Dealing with both basic reality and supreme value, it transcends use. I shrink, especially, from the oft-repeated praise of religion because it makes us moral. You do not have to wait for religion in order to be moral. On the other hand, such religion as I have described will affect not only what we call our morals, but also the activities to which we do not give this name.

Mr. Owen Geer (Director of Religious-Work Institutes, Board of Education of the Methodist Episcopal Church): Doctor Tittle suggested that because the kingdom of God has not been given a fixed content it remains as a motivating power when other ideas are outgrown. Does the same principle apply to the ideas of God, sin, and prayer? Are they most effective when they are left somewhat hazy?

Chairman Wieman: Indefiniteness is never good. We want to be as clear as possible, just as complete and adequate. But the utmost clarity and completeness that we ever achieve with respect to the great factors of life is never adequate. In other words, acknowledge the plain, simple fact, which humility ought to dictate to us—that the human mind is incapable of saying the last word concerning these matters. Therefore, we should clarify as much as we can, yet not wait for any specific degree of clarity. Is it possible, then, to have passionate devotion and complete self-commitment to the enterprise of religion and yet be tentative in all beliefs and programs? This is a difficult thing to do, but the combination, it seems

to me, is indispensable. The supreme way of religion is to do just this, to be tentative and yet passionately devoted, not to this one specific belief (for it may not be finished), but to the undefined supreme good and the inadequately conceived reality upon which we are dependent, with which we must work to attain this good. Get the clearest possible beliefs. Yet our commitment is not to our particular definition, it is to the reality, our definition simply being the best intellectual tool at our command for dealing with reality.

Dr. James M. Yard (Director of Religious Activities, Northwestern University): Isn't this the question of how we can be passionately devoted and at the same time have the modern attitude of tentativeness and indefiniteness?

Chairman Wieman: You put the question that I suggested and did not adequately answer. How can we be tentative and at the same time passionately devoted? Let me give an illustration. A scientist is passionately devoted to knowledge, but he does not know what it is, and he never discovers more than the smallest fraction of that to which he has committed his life. When he dies at the end, he does not know, and yet that something unknown is the object of his supreme devotion. If it is possible for a scientist to do this with respect to knowledge, isn't it possible for us to do it with respect to the total good of which knowledge is only a small component? I admit it is not easy. This is high religion, to be tentative in our commitments but completely devoted to the undefined objective. This is done. Human individuals, as I say, great scientists, always do it.

Doctor Coe: I should like to give another example of the same thing. Think of what fathers and mothers do when they send their children to college. They are

committing themselves to the indefinite and yet they believe in it. They do not know what the children are going to become, but they send them.

Chairman Wieman: Another illustration—when you get married.

Professor Charles E. Rugh (The University of California): Let us distinguish between—(1) experience *in toto*, (2) reflection about experience, and (3) the formulation of this reflection. God is to be experienced with the total personality. Language is twice removed from what it purports to represent; reflection is once removed. Reflection is experience, but it is a very focalized and special experience. Formulation, or talking, is experience, but in a highly specialized mode. We have been putting supreme faith in formulations, as though by starting with words we could end in total experience. This puts the matter the wrong end to.

Dr. S. M. Duvall (Professor of Religious Education, Scarritt College, Nashville, Tennessee): I wonder if I might briefly comment on one of the questions raised about finality. We can make a distinction between loyalty to a direction in which we are progressing and the assumption that the particular point in that direction along which we happen now to be is final. We can be loyal to the ideal of love or co-operation by our increasing progress toward this goal; it can be the center of our convictions, but we need not say that our present conception of love is necessarily final. There are times when our direction needs fundamentally to be changed. This is one place where I might take issue with one of the questions raised. I believe that the code of the past was built essentially upon a relation of group to person and the maintenance of unjust vested interests. Here is a place where we need to be converted. Even the direction to which we

are loyal needs to be under surveillance and to be constantly criticized.

Mr. Thomas H. West (General Superintendent, Church School, Methodist Episcopal Church, Wilmette, Illinois): My question is Problem Question No. 2 on this synopsis. "What sort or sorts of personal religion are fostered by present-day religious education? What are the effects upon moral conduct?"

Doctor Coe: I have not gone through enough recent textbooks to make a confident generalization, but my impression is that, in general, in the newer types of curriculum material an attempt is made to transfer the concept of authority from a particular historical source to an inner appreciative source, and thus to promote personal religion in Doctor Wieman's sense. But much indefiniteness remains; there is a kind of straddling, unintentional no doubt, between an appeal to the individual to see and judge, and obedience to an historical authority that is supposed to have settled everything already. There is compromise between these two, but compromise often indicates advance.

Mr. Ernest Palmer (Chicago): Should not institutional religion stimulate personal religion, awakening dormant intellectual and spiritual forces within us? When they are awakened, will not like attract like, as the old mystics said, and will not meditation yield positive illumination, knowledge?

Chairman Wieman: I am not sure that I understand just what sort of mysticism you have in mind. There is more than one sort. Anyhow, institutional religion should stimulate personal religion, and personal religion should awaken not only the intellect, but also our total receptivity to the fullness of the whole realm of experience. But this stimulation of the personal by the institutional is being inadequately done. The

church should concentrate more upon instructing people how to conduct their own personal religion. No other institution does this, or can do it. As to like attracting like; when you get the right attitude of your total personality, you are so disposed that the good, and the conditions and factors and institutions and opportunities open themselves up to you in a way that is quite beyond the power of your intelligence to control. Just because you have this attitude, the world sort of opens out to you. Things come your way, as it were, that are productive and helpful to the better life. I think this is true, but we do not have to resort to any magic to account for it. Take any particular form of it, as graciousness of personality. You win friends; this goes on of itself; they just flock to you. So it is with other goods of life.

Professor Howard Fifield Legg (Professor of Bible and Philosophy, Evansville College): Do I correctly understand that religious experience is impossible without some objective reference to the ultimate?

Chairman Wieman: We constantly use the phrase "religious experience" these days, but rarely with any adequate definition. It is greatly in need of definition. Different people mean entirely different things by it. Is religious experience possible without objective reference to the ultimate? If by religious experience you mean just a glow of acceleration, just an effervescence of feeling, that, of course, can occur under all kinds of conditions, without reference to anything in particular. That is one notion of religious experience. Or one may mean by religious experience (I think probably most commonly this is what is meant by it) the feeling, the experience you have when you accept with profound conviction some belief that you have associated with religion, that is, a religious belief, when

accepted with deep conviction, gives you a certain experience. For example, suppose I were a Christian Scientist. I should believe there is no evil in the world, no sickness, nothing mean at all. If I believe this with profound conviction, it gives great peace to my heart. It gives me a lift and joy and enthusiasm. I am gracious and kind to others. It even affects my organism and gives me better health, and so on. Or, I believe that my sins have been taken away. If I believe this with profound conviction, it gives me great joy and deliverance and peace.

Take another simple illustration. If I believe that the chauffeur is not drunk when he is drunk, I have peace in my heart, much more peace than if I believed he was drunk. The effect of a belief upon you will produce an experience. If it is called religious belief, this is sometimes what is meant by religious experience. Whether this requires reference to an objective ultimate depends upon the nature of the belief.

The only kind of experience I would call religious is the experience that one has when one either deals with or tries to deal with that which one thinks is of ultimate significance in life, the supremely important condition or factor in life. Until one is dealing with this one is not experiencing what I call religion.

Professor Legg: Suppose the individual denies all reality to the ultimate except human reality; conceives of the ultimate as simply comprehended within the human, having no reality beyond the human—that is, the moral ultimate. Would you consider this religious experience? That is, a thoroughgoing humanism?

Chairman Wieman: I find the humanistic position rather vague. Every religious person, humanist or other, would say that the most important thing for man to do is what man can do. This is just a truism.

Of course the most important thing for me to do is what I can do. Man's own conduct is the most important thing for him to see to. This is true of any kind of religion. But if you mean a religion which would say there is nothing outside of man to which he must adapt himself, meaning that he does not have to adapt himself to the sun or to the earth or to the climate or to the movements of life, and so on, I cannot conceive of anybody taking that position. I want the humanist to specify what he means.

Dr. Clarence E. Wolsted (Missionary to India, Winnetka, Illinois): On the question of dictating, I cannot reconcile myself to what has been said. In this country, it seems to me, it is entirely different because we have a different social environment. But when you are dealing with a district in which you are the only white person that has this idea, and there are thousands of people that are really children when it comes to the intellectual side, depending a great deal on the giving out of Scripture portions, I see no other way than that it must be dictated. We must dictate the ideals that we wish them to have. There must be dictating in order to help them to understand. They must follow the Bible. On the Scripture portions that we give out, we cannot say to them: "Follow this social environment. These people will be the ideal." Does it mean that in that large area I must be the example to all of those people? That is the thing I cannot understand.

Doctor Coe: It is not necessary to dictate. It is necessary to be a friend and an illuminating friend. What people need is illumination, not dictation. We already see on some of the mission fields the untoward results of dictating. Don't you realize that if the missionary dictates, what he does is to dictate the thing

that he already is and thinks, the thing he has learned from an imperfect environment? Don't you realize that whenever you dictate you are putting yourself into an unjustifiable relation to the people you dictate to? You cannot separate yourself from what you dictate; your own imperfections go with it. The Bible verses you distribute carry a meaning that is not in the verses, but in the situation in which the verses are distributed. Therefore, what you have to do with a primitive population as well as any other is to develop capacity.

Doctor Wolsted: Mr. Chairman, I just did not mean the word "dictating," but that we must hold up great moral principles. I do not see any other way. We must expect them to follow certain principles. We cannot say, "You follow the social environment," or, "You follow the people you see around," because they do not see that. There must be some great teachings that they will find in the Bible that they must follow. We must say to them very plainly, "That is the ideal."

Doctor Coe: I think we are close together now. Instead of holding up a thing and saying "Do this," hold up contrasts, and show results, and compare the results of following two contrary modes of action. Then the people will see for themselves, and you will not have to dictate.

Professor Walter Guy Parker (Professor of Religious Education, Evansville College): I should like to ask a question that goes back to a statement made this morning by Doctor Freeman concerning ideas as a motivating control in life. As I understood him, his conclusion virtually was this: that if we develop adequate ideas, the emotion or feeling that causes those ideas to motivate life will largely take care of itself. I should like Doctor Coe to speak a little

more fully on the relationship of ideas and feelings and emotions as motivating conduct, and on the place of activity in the development of conduct control.

Doctor Coe: We should associate two things: revealing to a pupil the actuality of situations so that he gets new ideas, and providing a social fellowship of the highest type. We perhaps always assume that these two should go together, but we do not always make this explicit in our statements of principles. Suppose, then, that a child, already having happy association with a morally developed group, encounters a new situation. When the actualities of the situation are revealed to him, feelings will arise that reflect both the situation and his experience in this group. The new idea thus includes the fruits of experience, and so does the new feeling-impulse. This is why we can trust the new idea to develop its own motivation. Does this answer your question?

Professor Parker: Yes, in part. I shall be glad if you will proceed further. My thought concerns particularly the importance of ideas becoming emotionalized and expressed in activity.

Doctor Coe: A situation grasped in thought evokes an attitude directly. You don't have to work up an emotion in the case of ideas that are kept close to real situations. An emotionalized idea is sometimes called an ideal and then substituted for actuality, whereas an ideal should be understood as including an attitude, and an attitude should be understood as nascent activity. An attitude is the racer's nascent action when he hears the signal, "Get ready; get set." Therefore any reasonable theory of education through ideals is continuous with the theory of education through activities. Be concrete, and you will not have to insert emotions into the series. Overt action too is

important. To stop with merely nascent activity is dangerous.

Professor Frank McKibben (Professor of Religious Education, University of Pittsburgh): In the statement of what an individual needs in order to control conduct, three things were named: a maximum exercise of intelligence, zeal and drive, and a vision of practical ends. I should like to have "zeal and drive" defined a bit further, say in the terms of a nine-year-old girl or a twelve-year-old-boy. When is it religious and when is it not religious?

Chairman Wieman: The method of worshipful problem-solving is designed not for children, but for adults. As I understand our topic this afternoon it is not how to pass something on to other people, but it is how personal religion can be practiced. Our time for discussion is up.

4. THE RELIGIOUS MOTIVE IN CHILDHOOD

President Edna Dean Baker
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The question has been asked how, without dictating to children, we can help them to achieve a personal religion that will be effective in controlling conduct in this present age with its changing social structure. If we agree at all with Harry Emerson Fosdick in his statement that "religion is at least the sum total of life's reactions to the universe," we must admit that each individual would have his own sum total and that his religion would constantly change as he lived on. "Gradually the individual evolves a theory and an experience of life," Fosdick says, "regarded with con-

fidence, trust, loyalty, hope, or with suspicion, fear, selfishness, despair."[1]

Even the little child of two or three years of age shows by his attitude toward the members of the family what theory and experience of life he is evolving and that they are functioning in the control of his conduct. When they approach him, he runs to meet them gladly or he cowers away. He shows the playthings and the gifts that are brought to him spontaneously to others, or he clutches them tightly and draws apart suspiciously. The child of five or six who is entering kindergarten or first grade withdraws from the teacher, sometimes even dodging at her approach as if he anticipated a blow, or he greets her confidently with a friendly manner. His theory and experience of life have been forming for five or six years and his reactions tell whether he is regarding life with suspicion and fear or with confidence and trust.

If, then, "religion at its best is a theory and experience of life regarded with confidence, trust, loyalty and hope," how are we to help children achieve religion at its best, how are we to help them develop a theory and an experience of life regarded with confidence, trust, loyalty and hope? As we observe children closely over long periods of time, as we record their reactions and the stimuli that seem to prompt them, we ask ourselves the questions, What is it that takes hold of the child most vitally? and, Where do the most powerful stimuli of behavior come from? Are they not the other active agents in his environment interacting with him? We cannot overestimate the influence of these other personalities—father, mother, brother, sister, more distant relatives, playmates, milkman, grocery

[1] Harry Emerson Fosdick: "Teaching Your Child Religion" (World's Work, February, 1929). Reprinted by permission.

boy, plumber, the policeman on the corner and the characters he meets in literature. Life is a drama in which he plays a part—as actual participant or observer he is in the game, and action is the magic word.

Through action and reaction the child learns the disposition of people toward him and toward each other. Through action he has his lessons in kindness, courtesy, dependability, unselfishness, or the reverse. Through the actions of those about him he interprets the nature of the universe and its source, whether loving, just and honest, or tyrannical, deceitful, hard. As he shares life, such as it is, he not only gets intensive knowledge, but he develops emotional drives in the way of attitudes, likes, and dislikes, ideals contingent upon that knowledge, which in turn influence subsequent action. Gradually his view of life develops, plastic, changing still, but becoming more difficult to change because of certain slants, biases, habits. These tend more and more to control his conduct, which in turn affects the action of others toward him.

If, then, we as teachers and parents wish to help children achieve religion at its best, is it not clear that we must somehow manipulate environment? We must supply a free, happy atmosphere in which the child may interact with other children, adults, animals, all living things. If there are conditions in the home, in the neighborhood, in the larger community, in the school, that are causing him to develop a theory and an experience of life regarded with suspicion, fear, selfishness, despair, then we must either change those conditions for him, or, if he can change the conditions, we must stimulate him to work out the problem constructively.

Through discussions with groups of children when problems in conduct arise within the group itself or as

one or more children bring in the problem, the teacher can guide the problem-solving process until a tentative solution is agreed upon. If when tried the solution fails or is only partially successful, then it is the teacher or the parent who draws the group together again to consider. Often each one of a group is so intent upon his own part in the general activity that constitutes the behavior of the group as a whole that he does not see the parts in relation; and the teacher may bring awareness of the problem by putting what has occurred into story form, naming the children as she relates the total activity.

Very often the most fruitful ideas eventuate by presenting personalities in action in fiction, the historical story, picture or drama, thus enlarging experience and enabling the children to see their problem in a different setting or to face new problems. Does not the power of the Christian religion lie in the fact that it depicts a truly beautiful, strong, and loving personality in action, one who loves his neighbor as himself and lives his theory of love in meeting the needs of the social order of his day? The drama of his life carefully sifted from all extraneous matter and truly depicted does stimulate admiration, appreciation, and aspiration in the young. For children and youth to adopt ideas they must attach them to personalities in action. Theories of life, views of life, must live in personalities.

A little girl of eight was a member of a group of children some of whom expressed hatred of a child in the group who had torn down their work. Catherine spoke out frankly in the discussion which was taking place, "You would not feel that way if you had seen the movie of 'The King of Kings.' I used to feel like you do, but now I am different." When questioned she

told what had been done to Jesus by his enemies, describing the scenes graphically and telling that Jesus did not do anything mean to his enemies, that he made Peter put up his sword and said, "Father, forgive them." Her understanding of the situation and the ideal was convincing as to what that experience had taught her. The children were intensely interested in Catherine's story, discussed it at length and finally, without further exhibition of dislike, they worked out their difficulty with the child who had torn down the work.

Children should see, as they progressively meet various problems in group living, the godlike ideal, the principle of love for others equal to love for self, in action in a variety of lives representing young and old, in every conceivable situation of present-day living. Gardner, a boy of nine, had heard Tolstoy's story, "Where Love Is There God Is." Two or three weeks later he came into the room with this story: "I was out with a group of boys who were bad boys, although I did not know it when I went out with them. They opened hydrants, they pulled flowers, they broke windows. I tried to stop them, but they wouldn't listen to me. I thought of calling the police. Then I remembered Martin and I didn't. I went home and talked to my dad, and we want to help them." We will remember Martin as the old shoemaker in the story who persuaded the apple woman not to turn the boy who stole her apples over to the police, but to try first to help him. This group of children began immediately to discuss what Gardner and his family could do to get the boys of the neighborhood started on constructive activities.

In these two instances the children themselves understood the meaning of character in relation to

others, were stirred emotionally and without help made the application to their own conduct. The teacher or parent can never be sure that the children will make this application to their own conduct without further guidance—they may or they may not. A group of third-grade children had played for the first grade the story of Moc, the Good Indian. Moc had been cheated by a half-breed who had robbed his trap of a fur. Moc's first reaction was to mutter, "A good Indian never forgets." Then there came to him words that he had heard many times at the mission school, "If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink; for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head." Shortly afterward the half-breed upset his boat on the lake and was about to drown. Moc appeared on the scene and without a moment's hesitation launched his canoe and went to the rescue of the drowning man. The day after the first grade had seen this story dramatized three little boys were sitting at a table. One little boy knocked off the crayons of a second little boy. The second little boy picked up his crayons with some difficulty and a few minutes later gave a hard push to the crayons of the first boy, which sent them off the table. The third little boy said to the second: "Why did you do that? You had a chance to act like Moc." In this instance the third child was the only one of the three who saw the application to conduct in that situation. The teacher, observing what had happened and hearing the remark of the third child, entered into the conversation and there followed a very lively discussion.

This incident suggests the desirability of helping the child to make surer of the meaning of the story, to gain a clearer understanding of the relationships it has

presented, to express its ideals in conduct. To point the moral of a story after telling it or to question the child upon the facts it has presented might serve to put an end to the interest and thus prevent a transfer to his own conduct. If, however, a lively discussion of the story ensues prompted by questions from the children themselves, if opportunity is given to dramatize it or picture it later with art materials, if the children retell the story or tell other stories that present the same problem or develop the same ideal; and, best of all, if they set about to recreate the image or the ideas in the actual situation in which they live, then indeed conduct or behavior is being affected with likelihood that permanent attitudes and habits will eventuate.

A few years ago a group of young women played a story which represented the transformation of two lazy little boys into industrious workers by the captivating idea of making their father and grandmother think that two little brownies had been in the house during the night and had tidied up everything nicely for breakfast the next morning. These two little boys in the play very dramatically cleaned the house and set the table, brought in the wood and prepared the breakfast. The play was given before hundreds of children in all parts of Chicago; and from dozens of teachers came the report in the weeks immediately following that in the homes, according to the report of the parents, as well as in the schools, the children were spontaneously seeking opportunities to co-operate in the household activities and in the school-house keeping, carrying over in their own life situations in their own social groups the ideal of the play.

"When the emotional force, the mystic force of shared life and shared experience, is spontaneously felt,"

Doctor Dewey says, "the hardness and crudeness of contemporary life will be bathed in the Light that never was on land or sea."[1]

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5. INSTITUTIONALIZED RELIGION AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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IN discussing this question I assume that we are primarily interested in the part the *Christian* religion should play in social control. Christianity might be defined in many ways. I think most of us would agree that Jesus posits a Father God concerned with the welfare of humanity. It follows that all men are brothers sharing a common life on earth. We must seek first the kingdom of God. Love for God and love for men are twin-born in the religion of Jesus. Truth is part of God's law; whatever is opposed to truth is opposed to the will of God. It thus becomes apparent that organized religion must not be used as a form of control in such a way as to deny truth or thwart human welfare. I think it is also reasonably clear that in our complex modern so-called "civilization" the Christian Church should not itself attempt to run the state, the economic order, or public education.

[1] From *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, by Joseph Ratner. [Reprinted by permission of Henry Holt and Company, publishers.

Other institutions have been set up for this purpose. But it is equally clear that the church must not be subservient to any one of these institutions and must exert a moral control wherever the moral welfare of humanity is involved.

There is small disagreement on the proposition that it is the duty of the church to lead men to individual morality. There is much more difference of opinion as to whether the church as an institution should exert a control on social movements, whether it should attempt to secure programs of reform such, for example, as the abolition of slavery or the prohibition of alcoholic beverages.

The first point which I wish to make is that the church has a moral right to exert social control on any institution, any movement, any social reform provided that in so doing it is aiding truth and the welfare of humanity. No moral program is debarred from church action. The church was made for man. Indeed, unless the church does take social action it cannot even redeem the individual spiritually. For the individual is being profoundly affected by the social order at every point.

Therefore the church must strive to redeem the social order, regenerate mankind, build a kingdom of God on earth, in order to win individuals. But sociology teaches us that it must also do this because of the effect of society on the church itself. We know that the church is not isolated from society. There is a constant interaction taking place all the time between the church and other cultural forces. This means that if there are stimuli in our social order which are inimical to the common good, they are impinging on the church; to some extent, molding the church against its supreme purpose.

In a symposium of the attitude of labor leaders throughout the world toward religion which I published this year under the title *Labor Speaks for Itself on Religion*, it is the almost unanimous testimony that the church has been subservient to capital in the struggle of labor for justice.

Since the church does not believe in economic motivation for selfish profit, either the church will mold the economic order on the basis of good will or the economic order will mold the church into harmony with the Kingdom of Profits. Last year I made a statistical study of the control of churches in the United States. I found that out of 346 reporting churches the average percentage of manual laborers on their boards including postmen, mechanics, and a score of other categories was 14 per cent. On the other hand, the average number of managers, proprietors, and the professional classes was over 55 per cent. The largest single group were the bankers. It is obvious that the men who are on the boards of control must exert an influence on the kind of sermons which the minister gives and the activities of the church.

One of the gravest dangers in our society is *inertia*. The stimulating but discouraging picture of an average American town, in the book *Middleton*, portrays the actualities of the scene. The church has made being a Christian synonymous with being "civilized" as we conceive of it, or being an "honest man" or a "reputable citizen." This means conforming to the conventional norms and acquiescing in any practice which is respectable. Hence religion becomes the mask of customary exploitation, and selfishness cloaks itself in piety and tolerance of wrong. That type of religion stimulates inertia. Hence, as the author says, one minister is afraid "to start a forum for fear it might

cause dissension." On the other hand, he is quite willing to preach on the topic "Business Success and Religion Go Together," and another minister prays, "If God has given you wealth, be happy; if he has given you poverty, be happy." Nearly all the surveys of the church show it runs away from the areas of desperate social need. Tanney has shown in his *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* how the practices of the economic order slowly and persistently exerted pressure on the church until it made its teaching conform to capitalism.

The real basic challenge which the church faces in any plan of social control and of creating a Christian conscience is the danger of being merely idealistic, poetically spiritual. The lofty ideals of brotherhood, the Golden Rule, love to one's neighbor, and service are so often like the beautiful chimes on some of our great cathedrals. Ideals in the abstract must always be translated into the concrete if we are to make the church as an institution effective in social control. This is shown throughout the history of the Christian Church. The prophets did not speak of ethics in the abstract, the morality which they had in mind was not so much the individual morality of the home, the family and personal purity, but the public morality on which the national life was founded. They said very much less about purity of heart than of justice. They spoke concretely of evils of their community. They definitely took sides with the poor and oppressed and were not afraid to be called partisan. Anyone who repudiates social action on the part of the church must repudiate the prophets. Jesus invariably coupled a high ethical pronouncement with a call for action. His demand on the rich young ruler is as vigorously refused now as it ever was in his day. Jesus not only preached; he was always taking action. He was so

aroused at the exploitation in the Temple that he took violent action. He attacked the evils connected with private property and riches as few religious leaders have ever done. The overwhelming bulk of the gospel record is concerned with his social teaching or his social action. Jesus might have talked only in general terms. He might have discussed the poor, or the Golden Rule, or the responsibilities of charity in the abstract. He might have done this, but he didn't. Had Jesus played safe in his time, he would never have been crucified. He did not say to the deacons and elders of the church: "Come now, be kind and honest and pure; administer your wealth for God." He thundered at them, "You that devour widows' houses."

Let us turn to modern scientific thought. The latest social educational theories declare that it is impossible to build up a structure of moral ideals separate and distinct from moral action. To make the child realize what love involves we must give examples of social conduct from life as the child experiences it. For the adult this inevitably means the application of Christ's teaching in industry, crime, politics, and race relations. Psychology renders a similar verdict. William James long ago proved that physical action creates attitudes. Since then Watson, Thorndike, Woodworth have all testified to this fact. Woodworth, for instance, says: "Group activity is interesting for its own sake; helping the group itself generates the desire to be helpful." Modern philosophy reaches a similar conclusion. Whitehead says:

"Religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to embellish a comfortable life. Religion will not regain its power until it can apply its spirit to life. It is the nonreligious motive in dis-

guise which is responsible for the comfortable organization of modern life. But the worship of God is not a rule of safety—it is an adventure of the spirit, a flight after the unattainable. It is the business of religion to be dangerous."

John Dewey says: "Character means intelligent desire to do good which is shown by resolute endeavor. If there are no outward evidences of effort and action, the character is not formed."

Because it is so largely concerned with theoretical idealism, the church is also slow to readapt its program to modern needs. One of the dangers of institutionalism has always been that it becomes fossilized. Thus Paul Douglas in his study of *1000 City Churches* reports that the city church is essentially a hangover of outworn rural patterns. It uses "an elaborated country-church program." At any rate, it is apparently true that there is a rather serious lag between the ethical needs of our changing industrialized and mechanized society and the program of the church.

If we recognize that Christianity must be something more than an individual gospel, if it is to create a social conscience, we must ask ourselves, by what methods can the church best create a Christian conscience? In the first place, can we not recognize at once that the church must treat the community life as at least coequal in importance with the individual life? None of the standard departments of the church —preaching, the Sunday school, the Women's Missionary Society, the Ladies' Aid, the Young People's Society, the men's organizations—really attempts seriously to deal with community conditions. The emphasis is too much on personal salvation, which is selfish, and not enough on social redemption, which is unselfish.

It is obvious that ethical generalizations must be made concrete in terms of daily experience. Whiting Williams, who worked as a common laborer in the steel industry, said that while listening to a sermon in church he felt like throwing a brick at the pastor. His platitudes were so remote from life. Every abstract ideal must be discussed in terms of the daily conduct pattern of the hearer. If the Golden Rule is being discussed with business men, it must be brought to earth by the question, what does this involve in the matter of wages, hours, and trade unions? Brotherhood with a class of high-school boys involves such questions as the place of the Negro in the community, in business, on football teams, and at dances.

We need a series of conditioned reflexes in church thinking and practice such that the old loyalties will be transferred to the new situations. At present we have a sentiment in the social conscience for truth. To deny having stolen from the church when one has done so would be recognized by the church as an outrageous crime; to tell extravagant untruths about the merits of real estate property in Florida or the prospects of profits in a new stock issue is "good business." Every year my students are assigned the task of grading different types of sin. Always they tend to rank personal sin as infinitely worse than social immorality. Wrong relationships between a lover and his future bride are considered much worse than the systematic exploitation of five thousand girls through low wages. We need a conditioned reflex in the moral realm, a transfer of old loyalties to new situations, a creation of sentiments around new ideas which have a social content to meet twentieth-century conditions.

Now, it seems obvious that the church cannot do this effectively unless it knows something about the

modern problems of society. A second technique is therefore a thorough knowledge of community conditions, especially the frontiers of human need. The church should know the leaders of labor in the local community. Because they have not made friends with the trade-union men as they have with the bankers, they are apt to think that labor leaders are either morons or Marxians.

We all think that those we do not know are idiots. There is no reason why the Sunday school should not use the community as its laboratory. Its classes should not only be studying the Bible but the local community in the light of the teachings of Jesus and social welfare. Every class should make trips of observation to jails, to local factories and to trade-union headquarters. If we do not know the conditions affecting the marginal classes in our community, it makes us tend to be unbrotherly. Judge Gary always said the workers liked the twelve-hour day. In Gastonia some of the ministers say that the workers enjoy night work, therefore they could not help change conditions. In other industrial communities I have found the minister abysmally ignorant about the real human problems confronting the workers. The fact is that in order to speak as Jesus spoke the church must critically examine the social order, its customary behavior and traditions. So much of what is customary is socially unhygienic.

The church in America has long stood for the eight-hour day, yet in many communities, including the city in which I live, the nine-hour day is prevalent and the church does nothing. It is self-evident that in finding out the facts about our social order the church must use disinterested and expert knowledge. This means that it must work in close alliance with the social

scientist. It must then educate its membership to whatever sociological data is significant. It is obvious that the minister cannot himself be an expert in every social sphere, but he should be able to appropriate the moral significance of the expert's data. Thus he can utilize scientific facts against alcohol or the twelve-hour day in steel and crusade against both.

America needs a sort of collective psychoanalysis. This time the patient will be all of us. We should be led back over our pioneering development and made to see how the struggle for existence in a harsh frontier land developed individualistic qualities and a profit psychology. We should be made to recognize that in our modern industrial civilization these characteristics must give way to co-operation and service. The church and the social scientist must aid in the task of psychoanalyzing the group mind of America and let the people understand their own stereotypes and psychoses.

After the facts are found, church and community must be educated on changes which should be made. This leads to a third technique which we might call attacking the kingdom of evils. One educational device here is the adoption of a statement of social ideals which will set up certain standards such as the eight-hour day and the right of labor to organize. This will then arouse discussion and thought. The sanction of the church will be thrown behind policies which are beneficial to humanity. Even with such standards a Christian conscience cannot be developed in society if people do not know what are the basic evils in their community.

The church as a whole, as Doctor Tittle reminded us this morning, no longer fears a future hell. We have also gone a long way in cutting out sin from our vocabulary and our thinking. To some extent we

need to reintroduce to the American mind sin in its social forms and convict the individual and the group of collective sin. In America sober reflection will lead to the recognition that class and racial conflicts, sex difficulties, property selfishness, and international conflicts need attention. Every department of the church must be correlated to meet the challenge of these evils as they exist in the local community. Why should not the Sunday school and adult men's groups be made actually aware of the gross evils of unequal wealth distribution?

Some will retort, that the church will make mistakes in attacking evils. They will cite instances where the church has sided with injustice. They will tell of questionable tactics which the Anti-Saloon League has used. This, of course, proves nothing. So has every other institution used questionable tactics. Gladstone once said that in fifty years of public life he had found that on every great moral issue the aristocratic class, the propertied class, and the educated class had always been wrong. There would be few, however, to draw the inference that society should not try to educate its citizens. In exerting its social control, in creating a Christian conscience, the church should have the right of every organism to experience, to make mistakes. All must recognize that the pastor speaks not as a representative of his congregation, but from his own conscience and as a prophet of God. This enables him to proclaim unpopular truth. Nevertheless, just because the minister and the church are likely to make mistakes both must rigidly insist on freedom for each sincere soul to speak even in opposition to the belief of the church. Religion must provide a sounding board for sincere men who oppose current conventional standards and practices.

A fourth technique, then, must be the dedication of the church to freedom of speech for every sincere soul with a religious and social message. One hundred years ago the school board of Lancaster, Ohio, was asked to grant the use of their schoolhouse for a debate on the merit of the railroad. Here is their reply:

"You are welcome to the schoolhouse to debate all proper questions, but such things as railroads are impossibilities and rank infidelity. There is nothing in the Word of God about them. If God desired that His intelligent creatures should travel at the frightful speed of fifteen miles an hour, he would have clearly foretold it to his Holy Prophets. It is a device of Satan to lead immortal souls down to Hell."

We laugh at this, but perhaps we are doing exactly the same thing ourselves.

Last spring a Christian Endeavor Society wished to invite Norman Thomas, a Presbyterian minister and a socialist, to speak to the members. The church authorities prohibited the meeting. As a result the entire Christian Endeavor Society seceded from the church. Wherever a church body takes an action or pronouncement that is wrong, it should be challenged and opposed by other groups who feel that they know better. Out of the clash of varying facts and opinions, if Christians can keep the Spirit of Christ, the truth will inevitably emerge. In the twentieth century we must give up the concept of the church as unerring and infallible. We must establish the tradition that it has freedom. But this makes all the more imperative pronouncements by the church on moral problems. Wherever human welfare is threatened, there the church has not only the right but the duty to speak. The sanction which the church throws about her pronouncements must not be of the type which stifles criticism.

They must stand the test of every bit of truth that can be brought against them. If they cannot withstand scientific criticism, they deserve to be overthrown.

A fifth technique which the church as an institution must use is a positive program of action to meet human need. It is a serious mistake to divorce the church from all community forms of social service. Religion has its physiological side which needs expression. We need laboratory work in altruism. We need to provide tasks for the army of the spiritually unemployed in our churches who do not understand the practical application of the Golden Rule. It is not enough to ask them to translate their ideals individually. There should be some collective experimental stations under church guidance.

Whenever society is not doing some badly needed service for human welfare, the church must either inaugurate it or get someone else to do it. In either case part of the responsibility rests on the church. It is idle to say that the church should never undertake a community service which in the end should be run by the state. If there are no schools and the state refuses to act, the church does right in starting schools. If there are no hospitals and the community refuses to act, the church does right in starting hospitals. The time may come when those agencies can be handed over to the state, but in the meantime the church should act. Thus we find that in foreign missionary activity to-day the church has found it necessary to start schools, hospitals, orphan asylums. even factories, because there was an unmet need.

To-day the church is handicapped by a lack of unity which immeasurably harms her program of service. We need a renunciation pact among Christians. We need to recognize that every Christian, no matter of

what denomination, is the equal of every other Christian. A minister of God should be able to officiate at an Episcopal communion even if he is a Presbyterian and president of a theological seminary, the recent case in New York notwithstanding. As long as Christendom is split into warring and rival factions it may be necessary for the church to hand over nearly all her social tasks to community secular groups. Whether or not this should be done is merely a question of the most expedient line of action in a given situation and not a principle.

It is also the duty of the church to enlist the moral conscience of her membership behind proposals for legislation which will prohibit gross evils. The church did this in the case of slavery and again in the case of the saloon. For nearly one hundred years the fight against the saloon continued. The resulting prohibition law is not an attempt to legislate righteousness, it is an attempt to remove certain grosser forms of harmful stimuli from our environment. To make such a law successful demands far more collective righteousness than any individual pledge of abstinence. It is obvious that if it took over one hundred years to secure a moral conscience against the saloon, we can not judge the effect of the law at the very minimum in less than fifty years.

If after such a period of time the Prohibition Amendment can be shown scientifically to have injured the welfare of humanity and some other technique in regard to alcohol can be demonstrated far superior, then it will become the duty of the church to create a new conscience on the subject and mobilize for action.

Let us turn in conclusion to two concrete problems which the church must face—her relationship to the state and the economic order. It is obvious that the

church dare not be subservient to either. Take the need of building for peace. The church must not only make pronouncements that war is a collective sin, that it will never support war in any form, but the church must definitely build international friendship and the spirit of good will between races. The church must oppose the exploitation of backward peoples. Thus, intervention in Nicaragua demands action by the church which will show her friendship for the people of Nicaragua. The church cannot keep silent in the face of conflict against a weak and defenseless nation. Or take the church and our economic life. There is probably no field in American life which so needs the services of the church. The church must oppose the profit motivation which places selfishness at the heart of our economic order. It must seek equal rights for both employer and worker. The church everywhere should demand that workingmen have the genuine right of collective bargaining so widely denied to them in some of our industries. The church must oppose unjust injunctions denying freedom of speech and assistance to labor. The church should know labor leaders as well as the employers, it should certainly know men who are making significant experiments such as Hapgood of the Columbia Conserve Company. There is no reason why the church should not assist the trade-unions with forums in their own trade council halls. The church should use its consecrated leaders to make the labor morale in America a more unselfish, a more spiritual, a more noble form of unselfish service. In the past forty years America has been revolutionized industrially; the church has not yet met the full implications of this revolution. It is still possible for the deacons and prominent church laymen to use workers at low wages and long

hours without any form of representation and still not even have the faintest conception that they are being unchristian.

As far as I can see, then, the best means of social control by the church as an institution is nothing less than an attempt to revolutionize the whole social order in the light of the highest social and moral intelligence that we have. It means that the definite task of the church must literally be the social redemption of humanity. This is not an easy task. I realize the dangers involved. It is far more comfortable to avoid controversial areas. The rich say we can have money if we leave certain questions for the economist. Religion, they say, is something which should be either subservient to the state and the economic order, or else it should abandon the present world and live in the realm of the mystical and ideal. The church cannot accept either alternative.

The only strategy which the church can adopt is rigidly to insist on the transformation of the social order. Social action is more important than abstract idealism. The church must take action where life is most inhuman and unjust. It must Christianize all of life.

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6. POSSIBILITIES AND DANGERS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED RELIGION

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A WELL-KNOWN modern educator recently remarked that what the youth of this generation need in order to make them behave is a good dose of old-fashioned hell. I preface my remarks on this subject with the observation of this influential educator as a rather striking illustration of a complete misconception both of religion and of control through religious sanction. In the absence of statistical data I have the disquieting misgiving that this view is shared by a distressingly large number of persons who deal with children and youth, whether they are parents, educators, or the leaders of public opinion.

This point of view raises for us directly the whole question of the concept of social control. An analysis of the remark with which this paper is prefaced discloses the fact that the ideology that lies back of it is characteristic of an external and authoritative concept of social control. This ideology belongs to a well-known pattern of thought that has had many historical and contemporaneous embodiments. It also rests upon a widely prevalent traditional view of the nature of religion. I propose, therefore, that we set ourselves right in our own minds regarding the connotation we shall give both of these concepts, since our view of the use of religion as a means of social control will depend upon our assumptions with reference to both of these concepts.

There are at least three identifiable concepts of control concerning which we will need to come to clearness before we can make up our minds as to the

way in which institutionalized religion can best make use of religion as a means of social control. At the one extreme is the concept of radical social control in which the will of the group is imposed upon the complying individual. This control is external authoritative, and, on the whole, coercive.

External and authoritative group control operates through several forms of social pressure. In its simplest form social pressure operates informally and unconsciously through the *mores* of the group. There is no planned effort to secure conformity on the part of the individual member of the group. Nevertheless, the constraint is extremely coercive. The person who does not conform to the social habits of the group is made to feel that he does not belong. In its higher forms, social pressure becomes conscious and planned. In its non-preinstituted forms it assumes the character of morals and voluntary pressures brought to bear upon the individual constraining him to adopt approved modes of behavior. These pressures are enforced by positive group approval or disapproval. In its pre-instituted forms it assumes the character of rules and laws enforced by penalties, of force to the uttermost in extreme cases of nonconformity. Authoritative social pressure by no means operates solely through physical force. Its most effective sanctions are psychological—group approval or disapproval, suggestion, habit, the manipulation of facts, propaganda, appeals to self-interest, prejudice.

At the opposite extreme from radical external social control is the concept of radical self-control. In this sheer individualism the person involved follows his own impulses and desires without regard to the social consequences of his acts or any sense of group responsibility.

Somewhere between these extreme conceptions of control is a third which integrates the positive elements in both. According to it control is an act of co-operation. In it the group does not seek to impose its will upon the individual, but places at his disposal its experience and its standards of value as a basis for forming judgments of his own and admits him to responsibility for the social enterprise. The individual, on the other hand, does not act without due regard to the experience, the values, the standards, and the welfare of the group. This type may be called co-operative control. Its technique is through the sharing of experience, understanding, values, standards, purposes, and responsibilities. From the standpoint both of constructive education and of sound character it is assumed that this co-operative type of control is the only one that is available for the use of religion as a means of social control.

At the same time that our problem forces us to examine our concept of control it also forces us to examine our concept of religion. One finds himself under the necessity of choosing between a traditional and more or less popularly accepted view of religion as a system of dogma, ritualistic practices, and institutional structures invading human experience from some external and authoritative supernatural source, on the one hand, and, on the other, the view which is held by the scientific students of religion who see it growing up, like all other systems of ideas, practices, and institutions, within human experience as an aspect of man's most fundamental adjustment to his world and, therefore, as consisting in the revaluation of all his values in terms of the total meaning and worth of life in the light of its relation to cosmic reality. The traditional and authoritative conception of religion

fits completely into the conception of authoritative social control and is the form of religion which social control has used, chiefly through an appeal to authority, the supernatural, and fear. It is the concept of religion that lies back of the comment of the educator with which this paper began. On the other hand, the concept of religion as the integrating, comprehending, and motivating aspect of experience that springs up from the revaluation of the values that are in process of continuous creation within an ongoing and creative human experience in which each normal experience receives cosmic reference, fits completely into the concept of co-operative control through sharing of experience, understanding, values, ideals, and purposes. Such a sanction is not extrinsic, authoritative, and imposed, but vital, intrinsic, and creative and springs from the discovery of the values resident in the experience of self-realizing persons as it reaches out toward the supreme ends of human living.

From the point of view involved in this approach, the religious institution has a fundamentally important function in the control of conduct through the inner and vital religious life of persons. It is as necessary—one might say as inevitable—that the functions involved in religion should build up about themselves an institutional structure as that other functions of social living, such as education, the adjustment of human rights, and the processes of production and distribution, should do so. The institution is functional with reference to religion as religion itself is functional with reference to character. Such an approach calls for a functional view of the church and its allied institutions. The function of the institution of religion is to provide a favorable medium within which the religious life may be stimulated and cultivated and an

instrument for the interpretation and promulgation of its ideals and purposes.

But it is equally important that we should remind ourselves of the dangers of institutionalism in religion. As an integrating and comprehending aspect of experience, religion arises at the point where all the more or less specialized values of life, be they intellectual, economic, social, æsthetic, or ethical, are brought together and are fused into a total meaning and worth of life in terms of its relation to God. Religion emerges, therefore, at the center of experience and involves the entire range of experience. Only as religion is kept at this focal center of experience and exercises its reconstructive influence through the entire range of experience can it be essentially religion. But the tendency of the institution is to departmentalize religion, making it co-ordinate with other sets of disparate values, interests, and activities. This it does by accumulating a body of tradition, by developing a body of systematized beliefs, by elaborating a body of liturgical practices, and by creating an official clergy. Religion thus tends to become identified with special times, places, ideas, acts, and persons which, because they are thought of as sacred, are set off from other times, places, acts, and persons which are thought of as secular. In general, the more highly specialized religion becomes, the more it tends to withdraw from its central position as an integrating and comprehending aspect of all experience and assume a specialized status on its own account. Now, when religion has done this, it has lost not only its sense of reality, but its reconstructive and creative function as well. Institutionalized religion has tended to become isolated, formal, regimented, external, and authoritative.

But this is not the only or chief negative result that

may follow the institutionalization of religion. At its worst, institutionalized religion may become a factor of personal and social disintegration. The classic insight into this rotting influence of institutional religion upon character is to be found in Isaiah 29, where the statesman-prophet arrives after long reflection at the conclusion that the moral apathy of Israel toward a moral crisis in the life of the nation was due to the traditional and institutional character of their religion—a religion learned by rote rather than a vital and immediate experience of reality. Psychological and historical data amply justify the generalization that while at its best vital religion is the most dynamic intrinsic sanction known to the good life, when institutionalized in the wrong way it becomes the most corrosive and destructive influence upon moral character known to human experience, rendering persons and groups harsh, legalistic, formal, casuistic, and cruel.

These considerations bring us at once to the problem assigned to this paper: How can institutionalized religion best serve as a means of social control? It is assumed that "best" here may be taken to mean a procedure that can be justified by the essential nature of religion and sound educational procedure. This problem, in the light of the foregoing considerations, now poses itself in something like these terms: How can the religious institution be organized in such a way that religion as a vital personal experience of the highest values may be made to function as an intrinsic integrating, spiritualizing, idealizing, motivating, and re-enforcing factor in the achievement of character?

In answer to this question, on the basis of the foregoing assumptions, I venture to suggest that this end will be achieved through the organization of the

religious institution as a community of religious persons in which the ideals, purposes, functions, and responsibilities of the religious life are being shared in a going religious experience.

To be somewhat more descriptive and specific, I hold that such a religious community will sustain to personal and social living the relations of a laboratory in which the experiences of persons in the Great Society are undergoing interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and reconstruction in the light of religious values and purposes. In this laboratory the fundamental issues of the Great Society will be faced with a view not only of analyzing and assessing them, but with the dynamic and creative purpose of progressively reconstructing them in terms of spiritual and moral values at the points where religious persons are actively involved in the relations and functions of social living, be they economic, civic, interracial, international, intellectual, or cultural. Such an institution will provide the framework for an experiment in religious living, in which young and old together are subjecting their convictions and standards to the testing of actual experience and in which they are engaged in a process of the discovery and creation of more fruitful modes of conduct in the light of the changing experience of the race.

In this community the mature members of the group will not seek to impose their ideals and standards upon the immature, or even so to manipulate the situation that the young will be sure to come out in their thinking where their elders came out. In this community of shared experience the mature members of the group will help the young to discover these issues and to face them realistically. They will place at the disposal of the young the vast stores of racial experience,

including its codes and its standards. But these codes, insights, and standards will be used as resources for helping the young to form judgments of their own concerning the ways of the good life. The older members of the group will help the young to see that these values belong to a long process of human experience in living that has a future to which they are responsible as well as to a past.

In such a community of shared experience and responsibility, there will be no positive guarantee that the young will always choose as their elders would wish. There is always the possibility in the offing that, with the same situation and the same resources of inherited viewpoints and values, the young may choose a different way. The adult members of this religious community must be prepared not only to accept this limitation upon their prerogative, but to rejoice in it, in the confidence that when youth is set in the midst of opportunity and admitted to full responsibility for its choices up to the limits of its capacity it may be trusted to make responsible decisions. The good life is of the very nature of achievement, and achievement rests upon well-considered and responsible choices. The chief concern of the adult members of such a community should be that the young do not overlook essential facts or that they do not have full and unprejudiced access to the results of the long racial experience in dealing with situations similar to those which they face.

And in such a community the adult members must be ready to learn from the young as well as to teach them. It is in some such situation as this that continuity will be secured for the inherited ideals and values of the past and at the same time the reconstruction of these inherited ideals and values in the

light of fresh experience in a moving world at the forward-moving point at which both the life of the race and the experience of the race are being recreated in the experience of childhood and youth.

In this community of sharing, the sanction of the good life will not be sought in any external and authoritative constraint operating through the pressures of habit or fear, but through a vivid and impelling sense of the worth of the good life. This community will recognize that the *vis a tergo* of external social control is only operative under primitive or unsophisticated conditions of life. It is in its essential nature infantile and inappropriate to an advanced and intelligent democratic culture.

Not only the church, but all other social institutions in an advanced and democratic culture will need to develop a new technique of social control. Such a technique will no longer resort to social pressures, even of the refined and quasi-respectable psychological sort. It will find the patterns of its technique in the socialization of self-realizing persons, through the sharing of understanding, of experience, of values, of standards, of purposes, and of responsibility.

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7. FORUM DISCUSSION

Chairman Davis: We are now ready for the open forum.

Mr. D. W. Staffeld (Executive Secretary, Minneapolis Church Federation): The technic of social work has become so highly scientific that the untrained person cannot do much of it except on a so-called voluntary basis. What is your thought with reference to a process by which social case work may be complemented by the process of spiritual case work in order that the church may have its hand in the job?

Chairman Davis: I think that the church must be feeding into the social agencies voluntary workers. It is true, however, that the church has not at present an adequate technic of spiritual case work. There are also needs in the community which are not being met by any agency. There, it seems to me, is the place of the church to find out some of those needs, and at that point, if it cannot get any group to organize to meet those needs, the church itself may have a responsibility

to organize to meet them. Later, after the experiment becomes established, it may be worth while to hand it over to another agency.

The Rev. Mr. Davies (Winnetka, Illinois): It seems to me that the church is faced with the problem of being willing to back up social institutions without having control over them.

Chairman Davis: I think there is a very real danger in that situation. It seems to me quite clear that as long as the church has control of an institution, you get a very much closer relationship and very much closer co-operation and service than you get when the institution is divorced from the church.

Mr. Davies: Doesn't that indicate that the church has become interested in the promotion of an institution rather than in the welfare of the community?

Chairman Davis: That is one of the dangers of all institutions.

Doctor Bower: It seems to me that this discussion raises from a quite different approach the question of the fundamental relation of church and state, as the problem is reset in the modern world. The discussion has shown the extreme difficulty of the church in actually expressing its ideals effectively while keeping its hands off the control of the machinery of society. I have in mind the specific illustrations of legislation in regard to scientific doctrines that are thought by certain religious groups to have religious implications. I think of the pressure that religious groups are bringing to bear upon legislation in various ways. This problem seems to me to call for a technic that we do not as yet possess.

Dr. Forrest L. Knapp (International Council of Religious Education, Chicago): Doctor Bower suggested shared experience as being the best method of

social control. How are we going to introduce a newer ideal of social living, and in our education get at the fundamental difficulties of social sin, unless we deal with the very problem toward which society already has some very definite attitudes? I don't understand how we are going to separate the two if, on one hand, we say that we must deal with actual experience and, on the other hand, stay away from social approval and disapproval.

Doctor Bower: I do not think education is functioning in the most creative way when it is using social pressures either in the form of approval or disapproval. I think we must go the whole limit in bringing people who are attempting to live in any sense responsibly in the modern world to a factual thoroughgoing appraisal of actual, specific situations, including the social attitudes of the group toward them.

It seems to me that the greatest service of the church is in serving as a free critic in the light of the religions of current life. If it assumes that function, it seems to me that the church is in far better position than if it had actual control of the social machinery. I am afraid that if the church had the possession of the machinery it would lose this critical, reconstructive function.

Dr. John M. Mecklin (Dartmouth College): It seems to me that our discussion would be very much clarified if we could get some interpretation of the rôle of the church. What would you say, for example, of the statement by Mr. L. P. Jacks, of Oxford, that a secularized social conscience has arisen which is superior to the Christian conscience of the church, and that the preacher himself constantly appeals to this secularized social conscience for the sanction of his moral ideas on social questions?

It seems to me that another question is the relation of religion to ethics. Is the church primarily a moral institution for the training of character, or is it primarily a religious institution for the conservation and interpretation of religious values and, incidentally and indirectly, a moral force in the community? I think the church is primarily a religious institution. I should say that the symbols of religious imagination have to do primarily with religious values and secondarily with questions of conduct.

Chairman Davis: I may say my own feeling is that religion divorced from its ethical implications is somewhat divorced from the religion of Jesus. I agree with Doctor Mecklin that we must take the most intelligent factual and scientific knowledge which can be secured from every branch of knowledge and apply it ethically. But it seems to me the church has a definite responsibility in trying to make those applications, and that if it does not do so it stands in very serious danger of becoming simply an idealistic megaphone divorced from reality.

Doctor Mecklin: I have the feeling that much evil has been done by confusing the religious with the moral point of view. I am rather inclined to think that men like Bishop Cannon, well intentioned as they are, are really working confusion, for this reason: Bishop Cannon is all right when it comes to molding public sentiment through the pulpit, as Sumner did in advocating the abolition of slavery on the floor of the United States Senate, and I am rather inclined to think that the great contribution of the church to prohibition has been in changing moral sentiment. Now when you get away from that and pass the Volstead Act, you are face to face with a practical program of enforcing that Act. It is my honest conviction that

instead of furthering the kingdom of God he is confusing things and creating a situation exactly parallel to the situation in the South when we forced over on an unwilling South the hard-boiled Fourteenth Amendment, which resulted, instead of emancipating the Negro as it was intended to do, in doing just exactly the opposite. The thing, it seems to me, is due to this fact: Men who deal with this great world of religious values, with its symbols, and who talk in terms of the kingdom of God, with its spacelessness and its timelessness and its eternal validity, are not equipped to deal with the practical side of the matter.

Chairman Davis: I understood in your first remarks that you rather oppose the church voting in favor of a prohibition amendment.

Doctor Mecklin: No, but I oppose the church attempting to work out a practical program for applying the amendment.

Chairman Davis: Then you would not object to the practical program of treating with the saloon by a prohibition amendment, but when the actual administration of that amendment is concerned, you think that is hardly the place of the church.

Doctor Mecklin: I think the men who preach moral ideals tend to incapacitate themselves for the practical application of the program. That should be handled by another type, and I think the sooner we do it in the application of this prohibition amendment, the better it will be for the country.

Doctor Knapp: Would Doctor Mecklin go so far as to say that it is the function of the church to provide motivation?

Doctor Mecklin: I think the rôle of the church has to do primarily with religious values.

Doctor Bower: What Doctor Mecklin has said illus-

trates what I tried to say in my presentation about the nature of religion. As I understand Doctor Mecklin, he says when religion divorces itself from the immediate social situation and makes itself at home in its abstract and eternal verities, it incapacitates itself for social effectiveness. I think that is absolutely true. When religion functions, it seems to me it functions in that social immediacy from which its ideas and its patterns arise. It is in the divorcement of religion from that background and that social immediacy and in its taking refuge in its eternal verities and abstractions that it loses both its essential character and its effectiveness. Religion emerges within experience and it functions there.

Doctor Knapp: If we say that Bishop Cannon, because he is a great idealist in religion, is not capable of being practical in putting into effect his ideals, and if because that is true religion therefore cannot function in the realm of every-day ethics and morals, we draw an unfortunate inference.

Doctor Bower: Why should we relate religion to ethics any more than to science, æsthetics, and our economic and social processes? I know that is a traditional concept, but how can we justify it in the light of modern trends in the psychology of religion? Has not religion as much to do with putting its idealism back of scientific laboratories? Is it not as much concerned with the industrial and economic order as it is with any other specialized field, such as moral conduct? Is not religion as much concerned, for example, with the outlawry of war as a direct and immediate issue involving a fundamental value of human life? Therefore, how can we say that it is a question of the identification of religion with one set of values? Are not all our values involved? Our intellectual and our social

values, quite as much as our ethical values, are fused into the fundamental meaning and worth of life. When we talk in these terms we are in the midst of our whole range of experience. We cannot withdraw religion from it without losing the religious quality of religion itself.

Mr. Paul Fox (Director, Interdenominational Church, Chicago): Isn't religion, after all, a way of life, and if we once divorce religion from its ethical aspect, what have we left? We haven't anything left; we are then in a realm of impractical ideals and dreams which may be all right for the idealist who wants to extract himself from the practical world, but never for the practical man. I think it would be well for us to define just exactly what we really mean by religion.

Chairman Davis: Do you want to give us a definition of religion, Doctor Mecklin?

Doctor Mecklin: I would suggest that Doctor Bower give it.

Doctor Bower: I would say that the working concept of religion which seems to me to fit into the whole movement of social and psychological thinking in our day is something like this: We men think of religion as the revaluation of all our values whatsoever, the values that are resident in the practical processes of life, whether they are intellectual, social, economic, æsthetic, or ethical. It seems to me that it is at the point where all these more or less disparate values come together and are fused into a total meaning of life in terms of its relation to God that religion appears in human experience. From this functional point of view, we should have to say that religion cannot divorce itself from any of the experiences in which these values reside.

Doctor Mecklin: I think that I take Doctor Bower's

definition. But I am faced with this practical problem: That isn't the religion that the masses of America are living by either in the Catholic Church or the Methodist Church. Religion for the masses is primarily a set of symbols or pictures in their heads about God and heaven and hell and all these various relations which have become inexorably woven into the pattern of their lives. I should say that religion is primarily imbued with certain emotional attitudes and finds expression through these symbols. I would say to Doctor Knapp that I think those exercise a tremendous rôle in shaping the moral life and the ideas of practical behavior.

Chairman Davis: The Chair is still in some doubt as to just the point to which Doctor Mecklin would go. Apparently, he is willing to have the church support an effort for prohibition and come out formally in favor of a prohibition amendment, but once the prohibition amendment has been adopted he thinks the church should not concern itself with the application of that amendment. Is that it?

Doctor Mecklin: I would say most emphatically, yes. I think that should be turned over to a statesman and not to an idealist.

Mr. D. W. Staffeld: I think the gentleman just speaking is right. There is a specialization skill required in the settlement of the practical side that the clergy don't have and shouldn't be expected to have.

Mr. Fox: The definition that Professor Bower gave of religion I think is perfectly satisfactory, but if we actually take the position of Doctor Mecklin and the gentleman from Minneapolis, aren't we put exactly in the position where, for instance, the industrialist and the business man tell the Christian minister repeatedly in the church to preach the simple gospel and to leave

problems of economics and politics and social adjustment out of it?

Mr. Paul Boodagh (Okemos, Michigan): If we divorce the moral and ethical life of the people from religion and merely dream about it, I do not see very much difference between Mohammedanism and Christianity or any other religion and Christianity. I am afraid that is all we have been doing for the last few thousand years; we have been preaching about Christ and talking about Christ and preaching about brotherhood and talking about brotherhood, but we have not practiced it.

Miss Snelling: I should like to ask whether the ineffectiveness of the clergy isn't due more to the educative process through which they have come up than to their religion.

Chairman Davis: It seems to me from the consensus that there is some division, but nevertheless on the whole we all feel that religion has to do with character, and character has to do with conduct. We are in disagreement as to just how far religion should be carried into the sphere of conduct. Doctor Mecklin believes that when you come to concrete applications of a moral principle in such a problem, for example, as prohibition and the enforcement of prohibition through law, there the minister does not have specialized training and knowledge sufficient to make him an effective instrument. Some of the rest of you feel that the minister should nevertheless be attempting to be as effective an instrument as he can be.

I see no clear dividing line. It seems to me wherever the welfare of humanity is at stake, there religion has its place; and if the definition of religion in the mass of mankind is not in harmony with science or morality, we must try to change those norms so that they will be.

I am quite willing to grant that Bishop Cannon may make mistakes, but if he is working for the welfare of humanity and does it in an effective way, it is possible that he may be working also from the standpoint of an effective religion. I cannot see any clear reason, if you can work for the prohibition amendment, which is a practical problem, why you may not also be able to work for an eight-hour day in the United States, why you cannot also oppose a twelve-hour day in the United States Steel. It seems to me that is a practical, concrete program. The church did work for it, the church did have an investigating commission, and that investigating commission published its report, and it had some effect on the twelve-hour day.

Doctor Mecklin's point is that when you begin to apply a solution concretely in detailed situations after it has become law, the procedure is questionable. I think we are pretty much in agreement, therefore, that the church should deal with ethical and moral problems, and the only question involved is how far, how specific, and how detailed the minister should be in practical administrative problems.

III. INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT ON CONDUCT

1. RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL CONSCIENCE

PROFESSOR JOHN M. MECKLIN
Dartmouth College

YEARS ago I heard a talk by a professor of comparative philology on "Calling the Cows." On a large outline map of the United States he had drawn two wedges projecting from the seacoast inland. The upper wedge, including New England and reaching as far as Kansas, was marked "Co' Boss." The lower wedge, including the Piedmont region of the South and reaching into the far Southwest, was marked "Suk Cow." The professor told us he had gathered other data, such as nursery rimes and fairy stories, and sought by means of these folklore to trace the migrations of the two great racial stocks the Puritans and the Scotch-Irish. Several years ago, in connection with a field study of the Ku Klux Klan, I had occasion to travel through parts of the South and West and was impressed with the fact that the traditional patterns of belief in morals, religion, and politics, especially in the small towns and countryside, are still those of this old Puritan and Scotch-Irish stock. They crop out with amazing stubbornness in anti-evolution, anti-Catholicism, Sabbatarianism, one-hundred-per-cent Americanism, and the moralistic attitude toward all forms of art. They have provided the

driving force for such movements as "Know-Nothingism" in the fifties, the American Protective Association in the last decades of the century and the modern Ku Klux Klan.

Insofar as there is any fundamental cultural pattern in religion and morals in this country it is to be traced to the religious and moral convictions of these two most influential racial stocks of American life. This explains why, for large sections of this country, all matters of public morals are still incurably religious.

The faith of Puritan and Scotch-Irish was, as you know, Calvinism. This morally militant and socially and politically aggressive form of Protestantism, as opposed to the mystical and quietistic Lutheranism, thus became from the very beginning part of the texture of American culture. It was the theology of Puritan, Dutchman, Huguenot, Presbyterian, Baptist and Episcopalian. Even Methodism, in spite of variations from stern Calvinistic theology, was a sort of Neo-Calvinism or a revival of Calvinism from the moral and social point of view, as students of English Methodism have long recognized. Certainly, one has but to read the revival sermons of Presbyterian, Methodist, and Baptist preachers to see how slight were their differences. Furthermore, when the Scotch-Irish, who were at first prevailingly Presbyterian and hence high Calvinists, were swept into Methodist and Baptist Churches, thanks to the effective revivalistic methods of these denominations, they carried with them into these other communions the habits of thought and life molded by the stern old Calvinistic faith. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to call the Scotch-Irish "the Puritans of the South."

The union of religion and public morals was threatened during the struggle for national independence by

the political philosophy of the Founding Fathers as expressed in the Constitution and by the incursion of French liberalism. Franklin, Jefferson, Washington, and Adams, not to mention others, were cosmopolitan in their outlook and, like all leaders of that day, strongly tinged with the naturalistic view of life associated with Rousseau, Paine, and the Encyclopædists. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to say how far Madison, the father of the first amendment to the Constitution and our charter of religious liberty, was influenced by French liberalism and how far by the desperate needs of persecuted sects such as the Baptists and Quakers and Presbyterians. Two things stand out from the records, the unanimity of the Founding Fathers on the general principle of the separation of church and state and the enthusiasm with which this principle was supported by Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist. These great denominations are now no longer weak and persecuted. They are rich and powerful. Some of them are even accused of maintaining within the very shadow of the halls of Congress powerful religious lobbies, thus stultifying the very principles of religious liberty under the protection of which they have grown great and strong.

The gratitude of the American people for French aid during the Revolution assured a sympathetic attitude toward the naturalistic social ethic of Rousseau and the Encyclopædists. This seemed to presage a still further widening of the gap between religion and morals. From Yale College to the backwoods of the far South deism was rampant. But the old Puritan stereotypes soon reasserted themselves. France and America drifted apart, thanks to political misunderstandings and the indiscretions such as that of Talleyrand at Philadelphia. Timothy Dwight, president of

Yale, joined hands with the Scotch-Irish preachers of the South to inveigh against French deism and French morals. In 1797 the Rev. Samuel McCorkle, of Salisbury, North Carolina, was lecturing against French skepticism. Thus was laid the basis for the stereotype of orthodox American Protestantism that all Frenchmen are atheists and immoral.

More effective still in ironing out the last vestiges of French naturalism in morals was the rise of what is perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of American Protestantism, namely, revivalism. The Great Awakening, associated with Edwards and Whitefield, was but the beginning of a long series of revivals which swept the country periodically during the early nineteenth century. It is hardly possible to overestimate the rôle of revivalism in shaping the social ethics of traditional Protestantism in this country. It galvanized into newness of life the harsh old Calvinistic theology that had already begun to crumble into decay in New England. For it is a familiar fact of religious experience that ideas, symbols, dogmas or what not that become enmeshed in powerful religious emotions tend to take on a reality and a vitality totally independent of their logical, or scientific or historical validity. Thanks to the indefatigable energy of such men as Bishop Asbury, Peter Cartwright, the McCreadys, James Jenkins, and others the revivalist preacher with his outworn theology made himself complete master of the social conscience of the backwoodsman. The very isolation of the pioneer, his utter ignorance of the culture of the older settlements, not to mention that of Europe, his spiritual and intellectual poverty, made it impossible for him to exercise anything even approaching a critical attitude toward the theology or morals of revivalism. Without minimizing the heroic

labors of these revivalist preachers of a century ago in disciplining the moral sentiments of the crude and semi-civilized frontiersman we must hold them and their modern imitators responsible for much of the "cultural lag" that is the sorest handicap of orthodox Protestantism of to-day in facing the problems of modern culture.

Great cities sprang up in time where the pioneer had toiled in lonely isolation. The structure of a vast industrial order overspread the land. Great systems of state education arose extending from the country school to the State university. Jacksonian democracy endowed the "average man," now numbering millions and grown rich and powerful, with the wisdom of a god. But, thanks largely to the persistence of a revivalistic religion, the symbols of his religious imagination are still those of his forbears of hundreds of years ago. The average man has been taught to decide matters of religion and ethics largely in terms of feeling rather than reason. One of the most disconcerting things about the whole Fundamentalist movement is that we have to deal with well-meaning men and women who have never been taught to use their heads in matters of religion. In a memorable passage on the Inquisition Lecky says, "When theologians during a long period have inculcated habits of credulity rather than habits of inquiry; when they have persuaded men that it is better to cherish prejudice than to analyze it; better to stifle every doubt . . . than honestly to investigate its value, they will at last succeed in forming habits of mind that recoil from impartiality and intellectual honesty." The terror and dismay and intolerance as well as the impotence of the Fundamentalist face to face with the issue of evolution is merely the penalty we are paying for the undisciplined emotional excesses of our forbears with their revivalistic religion.

The persistence of a revivalistic and highly emotional Protestantism has had other and more sinister effects upon public morals. Bryce has remarked upon the emergence within American democracy of what he calls the "fatalism of the multitude." The sheer physical expanse of the country and the overwhelming effect of mere numbers and our democratic habit of submission to the will of the majority tend to create in the individual a sense of impotence. The decisions of the majority take on for the average man a finality and inexorableness that savor of the supernatural. Insofar as orthodox religious ideas as to faith and morals become deeply ingrained in mass sentiment they tend to assume this indefectable character. The unpardonable sin of Fundamentalist leaders is that they have stooped to exploit this fatalistic authority of mass sentiment to further their cause. They know that with the majority of Americans ideas owe their power not to their scientific truth, but to the extent to which they are held by the masses. They know there are sections of this country where instructors and even college presidents are filled with terror at the very thought of defying the traditional moral or religious ideas of the community. They are largely responsible for the humiliating spectacle of presidents of great State universities appearing before ignorant legislators begging for the right to teach approved principles of science such as evolution. De Tocqueville, one of the earliest as well as the keenest critics of American democracy, said "that democracy has spiritualized violence." We have substituted for the rack and the faggot the invisible spiritual weapon of an intolerant and uncompromising majority opinion with which to bludgeon the nonconformist into submission.

The American people are a curious paradox. We

advertise to the world in our Constitution that we maintain the separation of church and state and guarantee to each and all perfect liberty in matters of religion. With a naïvete, that to the critics of things American is utterly incomprehensible and highly amusing, we turn our backs upon the lofty declarations of the Constitution, stage a Dayton trial, and write anti-evolution laws into our State constitutions. Liberal leaders in Boston are constantly chagrined by the spasms of social righteousness led by the clergy that place the ban upon literary masterpieces such as Eugene O'Neill's *The Strange Interlude*. Old and forgotten blue laws have a way of suddenly cropping up and throwing an entire community into a turmoil, reminding us in emphatic fashion of the extent to which religion and morals are still mingled in this country. Some of the most powerful lobbies at Washington are those that seek national legislation on Sabbath-day observance and similar religious matters. It is doubtful whether there is another great nation, claiming to be intelligent and free, where more confusion exists among the masses as to the relation of religion and morals than in this great land of ours.

This paradox of American life is due in part at least to a dualism present from the very inception of the nation. It is the opposition existing between the place of religion as outlined in the Constitution and the place of religion in the immediate life and thought of the people. These two traditions we shall call, for the lack of better names, the tradition of the Constitution and the tradition of the Christian nation. The Constitution is singularly noncommittal on religion. Its only statement is negative, insisting upon a separation of church and state. It would be difficult to prove from this historic document that we are Christian or even

that we are not atheists. Article two of the treaty with Tripoli, in May 26, 1797, states, "The government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion." This apparently had Washington's sanction. Madison said, "Religion is not in the purview of human government." Franklin said, "When religion is good it will take care of itself," and when it "has to appeal to the civil power for support, it is evidence in my mind that its cause is a bad one." Some have even gone so far as to suggest that the noncommittal tone of the Constitution on religion is a reflection of the liberal and cosmopolitan ideas which the Founding Fathers absorbed from the Continent.

Side by side with this noncommittal attitude of the Constitution emerged another and opposed tradition. It appeared in the numerous overtures, mostly from the New England colonies, asking that there be embodied in the Constitution some official recognition of the religious character of this people. Even the wise and tactful Washington could reply to the congratulations of the Reformed Dutch Church upon his election to the presidency, "True religion affords to government its surest support." He wrote to the bishops of the Methodist Church, "I shall always strive to prove a faithful and impartial patron of genuine, vital religion." The terms "genuine" and "vital" and "true religion" were often flowing from Washington's pen. One could wish that he might have defined genuine religion for us. There is every reason to believe that the Founding Fathers were at one with Washington in his insistence upon genuine religion as the "surest support" of government and morals.

It is in the deliverances of the courts, however, that the tradition of the Christian nation appears most

unmistakably. Judge Cooley, the great authority on the Constitution, says, "In a certain sense and for certain purposes it is true that Christianity is part of the law of the land." Bryce states, "Christianity is, in fact, understood to be, though not the legally accepted established religion, yet the national religion." It is in the famous decision of the Supreme Court in 1892 that the Christian nation idea finds most unequivocal expression. Trinity Church, New York, had called the Reverend Warren, an alien and resident of England prior to 1887, to be its pastor. The court had to decide whether this was a violation of the congressional enactment forbidding the importation of alien labor under contract to do work in this country. Justice Brewer, after a convincing argument showing that this did not fall within the original spirit and intent of the act and hence was entirely legal, fell back for further support of his position upon the dictum that this is "a Christian nation." In spite of the fact that this was an *obiter dictum* and hence extrajudicial, its effect was tremendous. It had much to do with the passage in August of the same year of a bill of Congress making the appropriation for the Columbian Exposition at Chicago conditional upon Sunday closing. Since this memorable utterance of Judge Brewer no less than fifty Sunday bills have been introduced into Congress and over half a dozen proposed religious amendments to the Constitution.

If we are ever to settle this vexed question as to the limits of religion as a principle of social control in American life, we must reconcile these two traditions, one of which seems to exclude religion as a sanction for law and social ethics while the other makes its appeal primarily to religion.

In a memorable passage Roger Williams, the great

champion of religious toleration, says: "There goes many a ship to sea with many hundred souls in one ship whose weal and woe is common and is a true picture of a commonwealth or human combination of society. It hath fallen out sometimes that both Papist and Protestant, Jews and Turks may be embarked in one ship; upon which supposal I affirm that all the liberty of conscience I ever pleaded for turns upon these two hinges; that none of the Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks be forced to come to the ship's prayers or worship if they practice any. I further add that I never denied that, notwithstanding this liberty, the commander of the ship ought to command the ship's course, yea, and also command that justice, peace, and sobriety be kept and practiced . . . If any should preach or write that there ought to be no commander or officers because they are all equal in Christ, . . . I say I have never denied but in such cases, whatever is pretended, the commander may judge, resist, compel, and punish such transgressors according to their deserts and merits."

This may be taken as a fair representation of the religious liberty and equality sought by the Constitution. But Williams' figure of the ship obviously fails to cover all the factors involved in a democracy where public sentiment is the court of last appeal. The government of a ship is and from the nature of the case must be autocratic. In a democracy, however, where moral sanctions that underly law and law enforcement are colored by religious beliefs, the situation becomes vastly more complicated. Suppose we have a community whose moral sense is offended by Sunday golf or the teaching of evolution in the public schools. Suppose this community passes laws making Sunday golf and the teaching of evolution in tax-supported

schools illegal, what shall we say? It is quite obvious that the illustration of the ship and the negative attitude of the Constitution fail us. We are faced with unpleasant alternatives. If we condemn such laws, we run the risk of discrediting the moral sense of the community without which no law can be effectively enforced. If, on the other hand, we approve the laws we are open to the charge of making religious beliefs sanctions for social control and law, thus violating the spirit of the Constitution. This dilemma is particularly in evidence in the long and interesting story of Sabbath legislation in this country, where religious beliefs have evidently played a most important rôle. Chief Justice Ruffin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is candid enough to acknowledge this. "The truth is that it (Sabbath-breaking) offends us not so much because it disturbs us in practicing for ourselves the religious duties, or enjoying the salutary repose or recreation of that day, as that it is itself a breach of God's law and a violation of the party's own religious duty." On the floor of the Senate Senator Hawley, of Connecticut, frankly acknowledges the religious character of the bill making the appropriation for the Chicago Fair of 1892 conditional upon Sunday closing.

There are undoubtedly large sections of this country in which Sunday laws and perhaps even anti-evolution laws have the support of the moral sentiment of the community. Religious institutions are agencies for fostering public morals, and as such are entitled to protection of law not because of their supernatural origin or their purely religious character, but merely as a means of furthering good morals and good citizenship. The law cannot disregard what the prevailing public sentiment considers proper and decent. "Things which,

estimated by the prevailing community standards, are profane and blasphemous," says Judge Cooley, "are properly punished as crimes against society, since . . . they have a direct tendency to undermine the moral support of the laws and to corrupt the community." But even those elements of the common law which seem most intimately connected with the teachings of Jesus, such as laws safeguarding the integrity of the home, the marriage tie, or the sanctity of human life, must be enforced not because of their divine origin, but because of their value as making for good morals. It cannot be too strongly enforced that the precepts of the great Founder of Christianity were addressed primarily to the hearts of men, while it is the function of law and the means of social control to regulate external conduct only. This being true, it can hardly be claimed that Christianity is in any sense a part of the law of the land, at least to the extent that the courts or the machinery for social control can take official recognition of it as such.

The profound wisdom of the Founding Fathers insisting upon a separation between religion and the state, when combined with the reluctance of the wisest interpreters of the law to admit religion as authoritative for the sanctions of law and public morals, raises the question as to whether there may not be something in the nature of religion itself that unfits it to serve as a principle of social control. Here I realize that I am treading upon highly debatable ground and that many will rise up to refute me. I must remind you, however, that the unmistakable trend of modern psychological analyses of the religious experience, not to mention the revolutionary nature of recent works in physical science such as Eddington's *The Nature of the Physical World*, tends

to discredit the symbols of the religious imagination as bases for either law or morals. Einstein, with his doctrine of relativity, has familiarized us with the fact that the constructs of the imagination, by which we picture to ourselves the external world, never exhaust reality. Eddington says even the physicist lives in a world of shadows. Furthermore, our constructs vary according to the field of experience with which we deal. The constructs of the physicist differ from those of the biologist. The constructs of the historian or economist differ from those of the chemist or astronomer. The constructs of poet or religious seer differ from those of the natural scientist. The constructs of the religious imagination are primarily symbolical and refer to the world of inner realities. The constructs of the physicist refer to the world of external reality. To take the symbols of the religious imagination and seek with their aid to solve problems that belong to biology, astronomy, or even history, is to do violence to the uses of the religious imagination itself. Likewise it is futile to take the constructs of natural science and apply them to religious problems. If we take "Father" and "heaven" in the opening words of the Lord's Prayer in their physical connotations, we are at once landed in absurdities. The terms are used symbolically as vehicles for the expression of inner religious values.

It will be said at once that the inner series of religious values is intimately associated with moral ideals and conduct and that I shall not deny. It will be said, furthermore, that by making religion primarily subjective one tends to destroy its objective validity. To this I would reply that I am not concerned here with the metaphysical problem of religious objectivity, but, rather, with the psychological problem of the nature

and limitations of the religious imagination. What those limitations are becomes evident the moment we try to take the symbols of the religious imagination as a program for concerted action. In his famous Encyclical of November 1, 1885, Pope Leo XIII said, "It is a public crime to act as though there were no God," because God's will is the basis of the law and the state. Likewise a prominent leader in the Methodist Church has said that the strict enforcement of the Volstead Act is "God's will." Now, any unprejudiced analysis of these two statements reveals the fact that in so far as "God's will" can be reduced to concrete terms and embodied in a program of social action the words are symbols of the religious imagination which mean one thing for the devout Catholic and something quite different for the reforming Methodist minister. There is not the slightest doubt that should we consult the religious consciousness of the great Methodist communion as to what is the "will of God" with reference to Prohibition enforcement, we should find considerable diversity of opinion. The "will of God" may provide cosmic sweep for the moral imagination. There is doubtless some moral value in regarding the universe as friendly to Prohibition. But certainly when we draft a practical program for Prohibition we must have regard to those things on which we can all agree, such as the principles of social justice, industrial efficiency, public health or what not. Even here our moral idealism must be disciplined, modified, even compromised, to meet the scientific findings of economist, statesman, sociologist, or health expert. Prohibition enforcement suffers from the moral abandon of an uncompromising idealism shaped more by religious leaders than by wise statesmen and social experts. The religious imagination can inspire. It

cannot be trusted as a guide in solving practical problems of social legislation.

Those who champion the so-called "social Christianity" will reply to the above that the ethical teachings of Jesus are more than mere symbols of the imagination by which a great religious genius expressed his inner emotional experience. They have immediate practical value. Consider for a moment the historical background of the lofty ethical monotheism expressed by Jesus in his "kingdom of God." It goes back through the later psalmists and the prophets to the great national cataclysm when the Hebrews lost their political and national identity and were dispersed throughout the world. Out of the spiritual stress of this crisis the prophets rose to the conception of a God whose kingdom is independent of time and space and is found only in the hearts of his true worshipers. For the expatriated Jew the world of religious values thus became spaceless and timeless in its setting because it was essentially subjective. Jesus reflected this historical background when he said, "The kingdom of God is within you." The ethics of Jesus is, therefore, an eternal paradox. It never grows old. It has never been realized and never will be. Its moral and spiritual value will never be exhausted because it belongs to every age and all time. Its authority and finality are not to be found in any practical social test to which it has been subjected, but, rather, to the inner poise, the all but supernatural perfection of soul of the man who taught it. He spoke as one having authority. Social Christianity, if it means anything, is a socialized and secularized Christianity. The kingdom of God of Jesus is primarily religious and secondarily moral. The symbols of the religious imagination provide the setting for the moral values. From their

very nature these symbols of the religious imagination of Jesus cannot lend themselves to a definite social program without ceasing to be what they were in his own inner life.

The church, then, it would seem, must choose between one of two rôles. She may remain true to the finest traditions of the past and devote her power and influence to the carrying out of the command of Jesus when he said "teach all nations." To do this the church must confine herself to the task of shaping moral sentiment and leave to others the practical problem of drafting programs and effecting the inevitable compromises. The other alternative is to surrender her traditional rôle of the molder of the social conscience and take up the task of practical reform. It may well be that the uncertainty of many church leaders as to just what the place of the church should be in our modern world is the reflection of something more fundamental, namely, uncertainty as to the place of religion in modern culture. But should the church, in her present bewilderment, surrender her traditional religious heritage for a vague sublimated social idealism, she may discover to her sorrow that she has sold her birthright for a mess of pottage.

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2. RELATION OF SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT TO CHARACTER

ARTHUR J. TODD

DETERMINISM is no new doctrine, and social determinism was recognized long before some of the more modern deterministic concepts came into vogue. Biological determinism, particularly the corrupting influence of heredity, was recognized by the prophet Jeremiah in the familiar passage about sour grapes. The equally familiar verse in 1 Cor. 15. 33 takes on a rather precise scientific statement in Moffatt's translation: "Make no mistake about this: 'bad company is the ruin of good character.' "

It is true that the earlier determinists might perhaps be called naïve. Plato, Aristotle, and Plutarch all hint at the geographic influence in determining social forms, but the doctrine of the physical *milieu* can hardly be said to have gotten under way before the middle of the eighteenth century. Since that time a long succession of men like Herder, Montesquieu, Taine, Buckle, and Ratzel have analyzed in more or less general and philosophical terms environmental control. Darwin and Wallace gave a much more scientific orientation to the idea by making it one of the chief agents in natural selection. Huntington and Semple have continued the geographic tradition for American science with Starr and Boas utilizing the idea in handling the anthropological aspects of change in population types.

Lester F. Ward sums up in a single phrase the difference between the earlier crude geographic determinism and culture history. He says, "The environment transforms the animal while man transforms the environment."

In sociology we ordinarily organize our material under the three types or fields of control which have been at work in producing cultural evolution. Beside the factor of geographic or physical environment which I have just touched upon there is the factor of biological heredity and its analogue in name, though not in fact, social heredity; that is, the influence of man's own accumulated institutions, traditions, folkways, culture. There is a tendency on the part of certain recent writers to forget that philosophical and scientific materialism is bankrupt. Some of these belated writers are still rating man as a mere member of the animal kingdom and as determined fundamentally by his animal ancestry. There are others who go still further back and who are still more belated in reckoning man merely as a physical or psychological machine. There are still others who consider man simply as a quaint bit of chemistry, and would lead us to believe that the chemistry of a few little centers in man is the final determinant of man's character and behavior. "Give us the control of man's glands," they cry, "and we will determine the future of the race."

This is all very interesting, but for the purposes of our discussion here it may be abstracted. Our chief immediate concern is the relationship of the social environment to individual character and behavior. That is, we are occupied now with the self as a social product, the process by which the inborn qualities of human beings are brought out, defined, and completed. I have been in the habit of tackling this essential problem of sociology and social psychology by way of a saying of Jean Paul Richter to the effect that "no man can take a walk without bringing home an influence on his eternity."

The scientific study of character formation in chil-

dren goes back at least three decades, perhaps nearly four. Students of childhood like Preyer and Millicent Shinn brought out exact observations from what perhaps may be called the pedagogical side of the problem. While G. Stanley Hall, with his study of adolescence, may have contributed faulty technique and doubtful generalizations, he gave, nevertheless, a strong impetus to the anthropo-psychological approach to the problem. J. Mark Baldwin and Charles H. Cooley arrived at very much the same conclusions while using practically the same method of intense observation of the behavior of developing children, though one started as a psychologist and the other as an economist and sociologist. Both made it unmistakably clear that the human self is a social product; that our world is a world of persons; that *ego* and *alter* are inextricably interwoven in the developing personality; that the child's behavior patterns are more or less a faithful picture of his social exposure.

At the same time the influence of the social environment upon individual behavior was being studied from another angle by a group of observers who were struck by the tremendous pressure of mass or crowd hypnotism. Tarde developed to extraordinary length the inevitability of imitation, until imitation seemed to take on the inexorable character of the physical law of gravitation. Here is environmental determinism with a vengeance! Le Bon went into it even further and seemed to conceive of nearly every aspect of group life as a manifestation of irrational crowd behavior. In his hands society spells mob. Ross organized out of these exaggerated views one of the pioneer attempts at a social psychology and a relation between the individual and the group. Trotter almost plunged us back into the morass of unreason and determinism

by the mob. The more recent studies of propaganda, for example, by Kimball Young, Norman Hapgood, and Harold Lasswell, have indicated particularly the drowning of the individual by crowd psychology in times of crisis like war.

Another fruitful aspect of the problem was opened up by Sumner's pioneer work on the *Folkways*. While this is primarily an essay in social anthropology and most of the material has been gathered from so-called primitive groups to show how the finest details of individual behavior are regulated by the *mores*, the implications are perfectly clear that Sumner and disciples, such as Keller, hold that every aspect of our present-day social life is equally amenable to the *mores*. Neither these sociologists nor a corresponding group among the economists, including men like Veblen, Parker, or Bücher, have given us any technique for observing this process of acculturization through the *mores*. Jacob Riis, the inspired reporter, tackled the problem but, lacking a definite scientific procedure, gave us not carefully studied laboratory cases, but, rather, cases of acute but sporadic observation of certain phases of pathological city environment. The recent studies of gangs and of typical city areas by young investigators, like Thrasher, Mowrer, and Shaw, have been bringing us much nearer to grips with this aspect of the influence of social environment upon individual behavior. Their technique reveals a considerable approximation to the minute and careful observation of processes which Baldwin, Cooley, and the child psychologists did in their study of emergent personality.

The specific status of a narrower phase of the relationship between environment and character appears in the study of individual delinquents and the un-

raveling of the strands of causation by investigators like Healy, Bronner, and, more recently, Byron. Recent students of the family have also begun to make contributions showing in detail how family patterns are stamped and transmitted. The child guidance clinics and behavior clinics have piled up much material which enables us to see more clearly the details of the interaction between environment and human personality. Finally, scientific personnel work and the study of industrial pathology with its strikes, lockouts, boycotts, violence on the one hand, constitutional government on the other, have contributed facts, cases, and also some elements of procedure and method bearing upon our problem.

Notwithstanding all of these approaches and all of the researches which have been made, human character and human behavior patterns are so complex, so subtle, that I doubt if the time has come yet when we can say with positive authority that our technique can work out unerringly a correlation between social environment and individual behavior; and particularly between one single factor in the environment such as, say, religion or home life, and the individual's character and history. If Thrasher covers successfully his study of the influence of a New York Boys' Club upon a certain group of boys, or if Miss Boyd and her associates are able to disentangle the effect of recreational group life upon problem children, we shall have in our hands a much clearer instrument for measuring the effect of religion in the social environment. Meanwhile we are convinced that human nature is not a fixed quantity; that it is highly diverse and malleable; that the social self is the real self, that a dominant activity will build up and color a dominant characteristic and a coherent social self; that the social en-

vironment furnishes not only the mold, but even the very materials that are poured into it for the casting of a social self.

On the other hand we have gone far beyond the earlier rather naïve consideration of religion in general terms as a social control. It used to be a good bromide that a church was the equivalent of fifty policemen. Religion is becoming definitely a positive force, according to Lester Ward's concept that man transforms the environment. The various Golden Rule experiments in industry and the utilization of religious leaders in the settlement of labor disputes are straws indicating the way the social currents are flowing. The desperate struggle which the Bolshevists are having with religion in Russia is not simply an indication of the Bolshevist conviction that religion is an anodyne. It is a confession that they fear the power of religion as a determiner of character and behavior.

It would appear to me, then, that we need two types of study and two general approaches to this problem. The first, a more accurate approach through history and social anthropology, and perhaps even social psychology, toward the general problem of the reciprocal relation between the individual and his group. The other, a careful, observational study of cases and small areas. So far as I can see we need both history and the micrometer; the one to give us accurate detail, the other, perspective.

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3. WAYS OF STUDYING SOCIAL INFLUENCE

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FOLLOWING a suggestion made by Doctor Todd in a letter, I will limit my discussion to possibilities of studying objectively the influence of social environment on character and conduct. As a part of the social environment, we may include organized religion. Two preliminary remarks should be made.

(1) As a practical procedure, it is almost impossible to study all the social influences which affect a given individual or group of persons. Doctor Thrasher, at a recent conference, in referring to a study of boys in a disorganized area of New York, which he is direct-

ing, said that he was attempting to study the complete environment of the boys, and that there were hundreds, even thousands, of variable factors which might possibly affect a given boy.

(2) It never seems quite possible to find the dividing line between social influence and innate impulses and tendencies. Up to a certain point, the native endowment of the individual may be studied. Tests have been devised, for instance, which show fairly accurately what the intelligence of a person is. On the other hand, the social environment may be studied to a certain degree. But there is still a middle ground where we do not know whether innate tendencies or social influences are dominant in determining behavior.

Sociologists usually make one of two approaches to their studies: they use life histories and trace the genetic development of attitudes and habits in the individual; or they study groups and trace the development of group patterns of thinking and acting. It is on the latter type of study that I wish to speak.

In order not to be too vague, I will speak in terms of two studies which I have made: a study of suicide and an earlier, unpublished, study of isolated religious groups.

The suicide study illustrates the way in which groups may be compared by means of very simple statistical rates. It also indicates some types of social environment which disorganize people and break down previously well-developed character.

As one part of the suicide study I compared the rates of suicide of a definite racial and cultural group under different environmental influences. A marked shift in suicide rates, when the environmental background is shifted, is seen in the rates for European groups. To take one illustration: For many years, the rate of

suicide in Germany hovered around twenty suicides per year per 100,000 people. But among German immigrants in this country, the suicide rate in Chicago is 43.4 per 100,000 (1919-21); in Philadelphia, 53.2 (1916-24); in New York City, 64.2 (1911-20); and in Boston, 68.9 (1918-19). Other groups show this same tendency for a much higher rate among immigrants than among people of the same nationality in Europe. For Chicago, it is of further interest to note that the children of foreign-born parents have a lower rate than do native-born Americans, although the foreign-born groups, taken together, have a much higher rate.

The European cultural groups are not alone in experiencing a breakdown of character resulting in increased suicide when they migrate to a foreign environment. In Japan in 1917-19 for every 100,000 people, 18 committed suicide. In Hawaii there are many Japanese, transplanted. For 1918-22, the suicide rate of these Japanese in Hawaii was 28.4 per 100,000 Japanese. This rate is about fifty per cent higher than the rate of Japan. In California for the same period the rate was about 35 suicides per 100,000 Japanese. Thus for every two Japanese who commit suicide in Japan, three commit suicide in Hawaii and four commit suicide in California. We might account for this by saying that only the melancholy Japanese migrate to Hawaii and only the most melancholy to California. An alternative explanation is that the conditions of life in Hawaii and in California place a much greater strain upon the Japanese than does the native environment in which he was reared and to which he is accustomed.

This same tendency for suicide to increase when the environment becomes suddenly more complex than the

environment in which one was reared is seen in rural and city rates. For instance, in the small towns and rural areas of Southern States, the deaths among Negroes from suicide do not exceed about 1 or 2 per 100,000 Negroes per year. In cities, in these same States, the Negro rate is about 5. In Chicago, the Negro rate is 8.6 (1919-21).

Among white Americans, there is also a marked difference between urban and rural rates.

These figures are sufficient to show that, with reference to one very important type of conduct, suicide, the rates shift with reference to the social environment. It may be predicted safely that for Europe or America, within any one cultural area, the urban suicide rates will be much higher than the adjacent rural rates, and that the rates for foreign born will be much higher than the rates in the countries from which the immigrants came.

All this says nothing about the explanations. We can make some guesses as to why urban and foreign-born rates are high. It is less easy to guess why Negro rates are always much lower than the rates for white people in the same area, or why the rates for States in the United States, or for adjacent European countries with the same racial stock, differ as widely as they do.

This study indicates one way in which to attack the problem of social influences on conduct. When the conduct is something objective which may be counted, it is a simple matter to figure rates per unit of the population and to compare them. It is necessary in doing this to keep as many other factors constant as possible. If other factors can also be given an index figure, this may be done statistically. But there are many important social influences which are not represented

by a figure. Some control of these factors may be maintained by using only homogeneous groups. Thus, in the figures quoted, an attempt was made to keep each racial group in a separate category, and to keep each large cultural group separate. Thus, it is much more significant to study the rates for the individual European countries than for Europe as a whole, and for cities and rural districts separately than for a State as a whole.

With reference to another study and another method, I would like to refer to a study of isolated religious groups, the Mormons, the Shakers and Oneida Community, with reference to one phase of life—marriage customs. The method used in this study was a simple comparison of the effect of different beliefs on people's conduct. Dissimilar as these groups were in beliefs and manner of living, they have certain similar elements in their backgrounds. At the time of which I speak, all consisted of people reared in the usual American community, who had in adolescence or adult life joined one or the other group. Thus all had been trained to regard monogamous marriage, with the father as the head of the family, as the proper way to live. While the groups were not exactly contemporary, they were very nearly so. The Shakers were founded in the United States in 1779 and continued to be a strong group until the middle of the nineteenth century. From the beginning, they practiced strict celibacy. The Mormons have existed as a group since about 1830, and from 1843 to approximately the end of the century practiced polygamy. The Oneida Community was founded in 1847, with a form of group marriage.

Here then are three groups, selected from the same cultural and territorial background, trained in the

same beliefs of religion and marriage, who laid aside these beliefs and entered into radically different forms of living. It is too long a story to attempt to analyze in detail how all this happened. In the case of the Mormons and the Shakers, about whom there are the most complete records, we know that a strong leader, after severe religious questionings and mental perturbation, evolved a new system of religious beliefs. The followers came for the most part from puzzled persons who felt that they found in this leader a more adequate answer to their religious and personal problems than they found in the orthodox churches. Opposition from the community forced the new group into isolation, both actual and mental, and in this isolation divergent attitudes and customs continued to originate and grow, supported in every case with a religious philosophy.

The flexibility of human nature and the ease with which it can adapt itself to new customs are very evident in these three groups. Husbands and wives joined the Shakers and lived for years as brother and sister. Wives in the Mormon group shared their husbands with other wives, not without anguish, according to printed accounts, but still firm in the belief that it was the right thing to do. Girls in the Oneida Community gave up the men they loved because love between one man and one woman was thought to be wicked. Even against what we usually think of as natural impulses the social customs prevailed. It must not be overlooked, of course, that there was conflict between the old conventions and the new ones. Some members of each group rebelled and left the groups. It is significant, however, that, so far as one can judge from the published documents, most of the women who rebelled in the Mormon group were

those who had come into the Mormon group as adults—those attitudes regarding marriage had been fixed by monogamous standards. Girls born and reared in the polygamous Mormon community seemed to adapt very well to polygamy.

These groups are especially interesting because of the religious background. Each group used biblical quotations to support their marriage customs—in some cases identical verses. The Mormons and the Shakers received prophecies, spoke in tongues, healed the sick, felt themselves in close contact with God, and had other religious experiences typical of the history of Christianity. These religious experiences happened in good faith to these people and gave sanction to their new ways of living. Each group believed it was the chosen group, that it had been shown a new and right way of life.

Apparently, religious experiences may be had with reference to almost any form of living and may give sanction to very divergent customs, so that for the people who have these experiences these ways seem the right ways. We are so accustomed to think of religion in connection with the system of morals which we accept and support that we are apt to overlook the fact that the subjective experiences of religion (inspiration, prayer, prophecy, emotional fervor, feeling of unity with God) may be aligned with and give support to almost any type of conduct. It is not enough to say that people should be more religious. Rather, religious experience is a kind of technique which makes any given kind of conduct sacred and acceptable.

Another point of interest in both the suicide and the religious group study is the organizing force of a religion which pervades all of life. The Protestant

religion is typically an individual affair. The Catholic religion has a community basis and reaches much further into social relations. The three groups just mentioned, the Shakers, Mormons, and Oneida Community, in this respect were similar to the Catholic religion. The religious leaders and the religious edicts regulated and supervised all phases of life. Not only religion, but education, recreation and family life were centered in the church and were directed through church leaders. Even to-day, when the isolation of the Mormons has been broken down, Mormons tend to live closely to the pattern set by the church.

Those of us who are Protestants tend to disparage this close supervision of all life by the church. I do not know whether it is good or bad, but I do know that it has definite effect upon conduct. To turn back to the study of suicide for a moment. Unfortunately, the mortality statistics in the United States are not gathered with reference to religious preferences. In Europe, the statistics are more complete. In region after region of Europe the suicide rate for Protestants is 60 to 100 per cent higher than the rate for Catholics in the same area. In earlier periods the difference was even more marked than at present. From such figures as these and from other, less definite indications in the study, it seems safe to generalize by saying that among the members of closely organized religious groups there is less of the disorganization which ends in suicide. This is perhaps partly due to the attitude against suicide in some religious groups; in part to methods of reorganizing and relieving unhappy persons, as through the Catholic confessional; but in part it seems due to the fact that in a well-organized religious community there is less chance that the person will find himself groping after things he cannot attain, or

be unable to fit himself into some satisfactory personal group.

It seems evident to me on the basis of these and of other studies that (1) human nature is flexible and is shaped in many respects by social influence; (2) that it can adapt itself, even after training along one line, to radically different lines of thought; and (3) that in religion lies a powerful force for building up allegiance to certain standards and for organizing people's lives.

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4. FORUM DISCUSSION

Chairman Todd: This section is to continue the discussion on the relation between the social environment and individual conduct.

Rev. T. L. Rynder (Protestant Episcopal Mission of the Holy Spirit, Toledo, Ohio): I have had the privilege of working for a number of years with a mission which does volunteer work. It comes to me that the factor of loneliness must enter very largely into the matter of suicide. I think that comes from dissociating from the soil people who have been accustomed to the soil and bringing them into our country where they do not know our language. They come from a country which has a higher degree of literacy than we have in America, and because of the language handicap,

extremely well-educated people have had to take the lowest positions in factories and work as day laborers. That is a depressing thing, to begin with. Then having to work seven days a week and sometimes eight, literally, when the shift changes every two weeks, in the midst of noise and dirt and confusion, riding on the street cars where people look at them in contempt and speak to them often with contempt, all have a very depressing influence. Then to come away from the beautiful churches of Europe and to have our churches try to reach them in little mission halls, in poor districts, storerooms that nobody wants, is additionally depressing. I know that in our city attempts to reach these people have been utter failures because of that. They have been used to fine churches in Europe and they can't get solace out of religion under these conditions. Then, of course, being away from their own folks has much to do with it. At this point it would seem that the sociologist and the therapeutist would agree, the one theoretically and the other practically, as to a very important function of religion as an integrator of character. Most of the difficulties, whether of suicide or delinquency, apparently occur in those sections of our community that are undergoing a process of disintegration, or where there has been a tearing up by the roots of the individual or the group from one community and a failure of those roots to strike down to the sources of new life in the adopted country or neighborhood.

Dr. Forrest L. Knapp (Director of Leadership Training, International Council of Religious Education): Did Doctor Cavan say that the suicide rate for Negroes in the South was lower than white people in the same area, and, if so, does she have some suggestion as to the reason?

Doctor Cavan: It is lower according to the mortality statistics for every area that I checked. I think the data are sufficient to make the generalization that in any given rural area or in any given city, the Negro suicide rate is lower than the white rate. I don't know the explanation.

Dr. John W. Shackford (General Secretary, Sunday School Board, Methodist Episcopal Church, South): I wonder if this is not partly the explanation: that with his simpler philosophy of life, though he is thrown into the midst of an environment that is complex for others, there is much of that environment that the Negro does not through his very simplicity react to; so that there is not as wide a divergence in the actual environmental conditions that affect the Negro as there is in those which affect some of the rest of the population. Even when the Negro moves from the country to the city, in his own Negro community life, there is more of a continuity in environment with his past than there is for the white man who moves from the country into the city.

Doctor Cavan: That may be a part of the explanation. It might be the same type of thing known to happen in the white group. Suicide rates are higher in professional groups than in the laboring class.

Professor Walter G. Parker (Professor of Religious Education, Evansville College, Evansville, Indiana): Suicide seems to increase with the higher level of mental and cultural development and decrease the farther down you go. Has a study been made of the rate of suicide in very primitive cultural groups?

Doctor Cavan: There are no statistics for primitive people, but apparently there is practically no suicide in primitive groups. You do find some of the institutional types of suicide, such as the Chinese and Japanese

used to have. You find occasionally in primitive groups, such as the African, that on the death of the husband, the wife commits suicide. You find that in primitive groups in some of the African races before they have had contacts with the white people. I think there are one or two Indian tribes that had something of the sort, but that is very rare; and apparently suicide for personal motives such as we find in our country is quite rare too.

Mr. Paul Boodah (Okenos, Michigan): We have in Chicago, Flint, and other cities quite a number of Persians of the old Nestorian faith. They believe in God and the immortality of the soul. Suicide is rare. This I believe is related to the strong faith they have.

Chairman Todd: Professor Byron has been making studies of the relationship between certain kinds of restricted environment and delinquency.

Professor William F. Byron (Professor of Sociology, Northwestern University): Having taught in several institutions, been in social work and done work with delinquents and criminals, I will say that I don't believe we have yet come to realize the astonishing similarity found in nonlaw-abiding attitudes among a student body in a college or university and among delinquents in correction schools, industrial schools, reformatories, and penitentiaries. Really astonishing similarities exist. Of course there are also outstanding differences. Just to mention one, the I. Q. is involved. This alone would account for considerable difference. It would explain why certain law-abiding attitudes in one group terminate in successful business men, doctors, lawyers, Indian chiefs, and so on; and in others terminate in gangsters, racketeers, criminals. This leads me to the belief (my special interest having been with the institutional treatment of delinquents)

that if considerable numbers of students who have certain nonlaw-abiding attitudes had little or nothing to counteract those attitudes, but, on the other hand, had them supplemented and strengthened by association with similar attitudes and practices, we should see results which would be very startling. A student with one nonlaw-abiding attitude is constantly in touch, on the campus, in the fraternity or sorority, and off the campus, with law-abiding attitudes which neutralize and in some cases prevent its working its way out to a logical conclusion; and in other cases these influences positively reform and remake the wrong attitude into something better and finer.

We send thousands of boys and girls every year to reformatory institutions. What can an institution do? Why do we send children to them? Do we send the children of the upper economic groups to reformatory institutions? No. We send them to private schools or military colleges or some such place. It is only those of the lower economic groups who are sent to the institutions. Why do we send them there? I think the main reason for sending delinquents to institutions is that we don't know what else to do with them. In the last analysis, an institution for a delinquent is a counsel of despair.

There are a few enlightened authorities who send children to an institution because they actually think that the institution will do them some good. Assuming that a child is sent there intelligently and not simply to be rid of him, what constructive influence might we expect from an institution? It would be fair to expect such effects as these:

1. Provide a sharp breaking of undesirable habits
2. Give opportunity for setting up new habits of thought and action

3. Provide a chance to "think it over," see where others are heading, and so pause and go in another direction

Some of the reasons our reformatory institutions do not produce better results in molding character are the following:

There is no classification as to age (they range from 10 to 18 years), I. Q., emotional type or physical condition (which ranges from normal to epileptic). The boys range from the relatively naïve to the thoroughly slum-wise, for whom no mysteries (except those of life's beauties) remain at sixteen. The boy merely truant goes in with the safe-cracker. And we get the results which might be expected from this system.

The formal education provided is inefficient. The teachers are largely political employees and young women who have no knowledge of delinquency. Then with little or no proper classification of pupils and with all grades of I. Q. thrown together the teachers are given no chance to succeed.

In the matter of informal education, such as that coming from social environment, the case is even worse. Take only one phase of this—sex education. What beautiful sex education there is in an institution, where you have exploitation of the boys both by the older boys and not infrequently the officers themselves! What an experience to prepare a boy for a happy love life!

On the side of vocational training in a reformatory institution. The State runs the institution as economically as possible. It must save money, so it establishes a trade, such as tailoring or shoemaking. But the standard of work is so low that no firm would employ a boy trained in such a system.

No proper home life is provided. "Home" fathers

and mothers are provided, but at negligible salaries and with no real tests as to fitness for such a position. About the only standard impressed on the boys is that of absolute cleanliness. Floors are polished (by means of fifty-pound concrete mops) until they are a menace to life and limb. The boys are not allowed to talk at meals, or in the house, or at night, or while at recreation or at work. Silence or furtive whispering is the rule.

Much is said in certain quarters about the relation of punishment to character. I mentioned the concrete mop. If the boy has committed a more serious offense, he puts the concrete mop on his shoulder and marches up and down, up and down until he drops. And this, incidentally, is a mild form of punishment.

What does the reformatory institution do to maintain a boy's (or a girl's) self-respect? I haven't found anything directed to this end.

What of the religious influences brought to bear in these institutions? Most institutions are located in rural areas. The local minister, priest, rabbi comes in. His salary scale is on a par with his community, and salary scale sometimes does represent ability. I see no likelihood of improvement in character through the ministrations of religion in most of our reformatory institutions.

These are a few of the factors involved in sending young delinquents to institutions. I bring them up in connection with the question whether, wherever possible, it is not better to keep a boy or girl in a community where he or she may be in contact with those who have a superior philosophy of life and from whom they may learn by practice and precept. Should we send them to institutions where, in the very nature of things, they will associate with those who in all probability will be worse than they are (the reverse of the picture being

that they will contaminate those who are better than they), and where the staffs of the institutions are, because of the low salaries paid, scarcely qualified to build up character, teach the value of beauty or give a spiritual outlook on life?

Chairman Todd: I will ask Doctor Byron what possibilities he sees for adapting a program of religious education to prevent delinquency or to serve delinquents who have been sent to institutions.

Doctor Byron: I can only answer that in my contacts with delinquents I have been unable to detect any influence that religion is having or has had in restraining them or pointing them in another direction.

(The nature and value of religion as a force of social integration was here discussed.)

Mr. E. T. May (Secretary, Y. M. C. A., Lansing, Michigan): In connection with the Y. M. C. A. I have been working for twenty years with boys and men in smaller towns and local communities. Often have I found the religion of the churches a disintegrating factor. Too often the churches love the Lord and hate each other. And half of America is still made up of these small centers where much of this spirit prevails.

One preacher teaches his church-school class that the world was created four thousand years ago. The high-school students object and the war is on—religion suffers. In another town of three thousand the Klan had five hundred members. Again there was trouble and discord in the churches. This sort of thing teaches war and controversy, while we are appealing to the idealism of youth to look above such negative attitudes. Rural youth, surrounded by this pettiness and lack of vision, is under a severe handicap.

Dr. Vieth: In week-day religious education we are attempting on rather a large scale to secure community

programs supported by the several churches united in the common enterprise. This seems to be both an integrating factor and a way of securing better religious education.

Mr. Rynder: I should like to speak of the fruits of week-day religious education at Toledo. We have statements from principals of schools that, as a result of the week-day work in religion, lying, stealing, cheating in examinations, impertinence, have decreased. Mothers tell of reverence shown in the home, of willingness to work, kindness to animals. We can give you case after case of that because our movement is thirteen years old.

If you look into the statistics of the Juvenile Court of Minneapolis, you will find that following the close of the Great War there was an increase in juvenile delinquency of three hundred per cent. They were greatly alarmed about that, so the juvenile court officer, working with the Council of Religious Education, placed eleven vacation Bible schools in the very centers where delinquency was worst. They did not have either the staff at that time to teach, or the money to supply the whole city, but they cut juvenile delinquency from three hundred per cent down to one hundred twenty-one per cent in one year in the centers where the vacation Bible schools were held, and there was no decrease at all in the centers where there were none.

Mrs. Mary Hawthorne (Director of Week-Day Religious Education, Royal Oak, Michigan): I should like to speak about the integrating influence on personality of a week-day school at Royal Oak, Michigan. Our pastors have made the statement that no other influence or factor has had so integrating an influence on any community program, which had reference to

religious effort, as the week-day school. Our week-day school is in the public school, and we are therefore integrating a secular and religious education in the life of the child. The result has been that the unchurched children after ten years are taking our week-day work one hundred per cent. The Protestant children of the community are taking our work one hundred per cent in the grade schools.

Mr. Davies: What caused the pupils in Gary who have been having religious instruction to strike when thirteen colored children were in school? If you are going to have any really adequate measurement of what is coming out of any church school, aren't you going to have to find out what the men in that school are doing now when they are heads of industrial concerns, or when they are in labor movements, or when they are establishing homes, and what the women are doing as they go out in social service and become heads of homes? Can you really give any definite data that amount to anything unless you as a university follow up your graduates and see what they are doing, or as a school follow up your pupils and see what they are doing?

Dr. Shackford: Considering our entire problem and the discussion of the morning, is not this true? In the midst of the larger community the individual, in order to make his adjustments, needs the smaller community. And sometimes the way to lift the individual is to create for him a smaller community of a higher type than the larger community.

That is the function of the family. That ought to be the function of the church. I think that has been the historic function where it has properly fulfilled it. An individual, unable to wrest himself loose from an unsatisfactory environment alone, is enabled to do that by virtue of his integration with a smaller en-

vironment that is on a higher level. It seems to me that our problem is to create such an environment, whether in the church or the week-day school, as will afford a helpful environment which pupils may not have otherwise.

IV. THERAPEUTIC VALUE OF RELIGION

1. RELIGION AS A REMEDY FOR PERSONAL AND SOCIAL MALADJUSTMENTS

WILLIAM S. SADLER, M.D.

THE therapeutic value of religion depends entirely upon its ability to contribute to the relief of the mental anguish and physical suffering which accompany physical disease, mental distress, and social maladjustment.

In the domain of therapeutics we have two great groups of remedies. One is devoted to the amelioration of symptoms and is designed to relieve the patient's suffering, thus indirectly contributing to a more hopeful state of mind and an improvement of morale. The other group of therapeutic agents is aimed more directly at the removal of the causes of the disease, and, of course, this is by far the more efficient method of treatment.

When we take up religion to examine it as a therapeutic agent, we find that almost any form of religious belief—faith in a Supreme Being, confidence in the supernatural—seems to possess therapeutic value when looked at from the symptomatic standpoint; that is, they help the sufferer temporarily by enabling him to minimize his sufferings and externalize his thinking. Not all religious beliefs aim at the cause of sickness and suffering, and therefore they are not fundamentally true therapeutic agents in the real and curative sense.

In organic disease we must recognize that religion is not a curative therapeutic agent; it can only serve as a

palliative treatment. It is not my thesis to discuss divine healing. In fact, all healing is divine in the sense that it is nature that does the curing. The surgeon makes the wound, but God, nature, heals it. I do not wish, at this time, to discuss the subject of miracles. I am perfectly willing to admit their possibility, but I have never seen one. In a quarter of a century's careful study of this question, I have yet to see a single bona fide case of organic disease that has been cured by prayer, Christian Science, Dowieism, or any other of the healing cults. Religion no doubt has greatly ministered even to these incurables, in that it helps promote fortitude, patience, and it better equips the sufferers to pass through the ordeal of the suffering attendant upon the end of an incurable disease.

In the functional diseases, religion serves a great purpose. It augments morale. It sometimes lessens suffering. It promotes hope and courage. It contributes to that determination which is a part of the cure of every sick person who recovers. But it is in the domain of mental and nervous disorders, the field of mental medicine, that religion exerts such a tremendous influence, and this, after all, constitutes the great bulk of human sickness and distress. I have no way of statistically proving the statement I am about to make, but I nevertheless firmly believe it; that is, that outside of surgical disorders, contagious diseases, and accidents, nine tenths of all the sickness and suffering that comes to a doctor is directly or indirectly the result of the mental status and nervous attitude of the patient. They belong to the domain of mental medicine, and it is in this realm that religion functions as the master mind-cure.

The real cause of most of human suffering and un-

happiness is fear—that biologic emotion associated with the instinct of flight—which so valuably served our primitive ancestors as a survival reaction, but which has, under conditions of modern civilization, come to be associated with the new and modern defense reaction of civilized races, the flight from reality. Fear now comes to be largely utilized by the so-called subconscious mind for conjuring up a thousand alibis, camouflages, and other defense reactions to help these unconscious cowards flee from reality, dodge difficulty, get out of doing disagreeable things.

Religion, then, becomes a real and basic cure of the disorders of fear when it is a religion that inspires faith. Fear is at the bottom of much of our sickness and misery. Faith is the only known cure for fear, and religious faith is the master faith cure. No other form of faith can sweep through the mind and annihilate fear with such certainty and power as religious faith. Religion is one of the basic human emotions, and with its associated group of feelings and sentiments, is able, in the case of the average human being, to dominate the entire personality, even to control the almost equally powerful sex feelings and emotions.

And it is in the sense that Christianity is curative of fear that it becomes one of the most powerful of known therapeutic agents. The Christian religion is therapeutically and psychologically sound—at least the teachings of Jesus are. Christ claimed that he came that our "joy might be full." His standing invitation reads: "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." Even the antecedent Jewish religion contained much of this gospel of faith, hope, and courage. The Wise Man, three millenniums ago, proclaimed that "A merry heart doeth good like a medicine."

Christianity is the only religion, excepting perhaps the antecedent Jewish teachings, which has ever demonstrated such therapeutic efficiency. The primitive religions were an outgrowth of fear and superstition, merely an effort to find some sort of an insurance scheme against chance and ill luck, and, sad to record, much of the so-called Christianity of even the present day is all too largely a religion of fear instead of a life of triumphant faith. The teachings of Jesus carry with them the therapeutic attitude of faith triumphing over fear. They beckon struggling mortals to self-confidence and superb courage in meeting all the harassments of life. Universal acceptance of the teachings of Jesus would serve to wipe out the whole disease category of those disorders resulting from social vice, intemperance, and drug habits.

But what is religion, considered therapeutically? I have come to require just two tests in my efforts to ascertain whether or not my patient has religion, in a therapeutic sense: First, the *belief in a Supreme Being;* and second, the *belief in a hereafter.* In conducting an emotional analysis, I feel it is my duty to stop when I have ascertained these two things. I personally believe that the teachings of Jesus have greater therapeutic value than any of the other religions, but as a physician I have no right to concern myself as to whether or not my patient is an adherent of the Jewish, Christian, or Mohammedan faiths, much less whether they are Protestants or Catholics, or to what branch of Protestantism they belong. Psychologically, if they believe in a Supreme Being and a hereafter, they have the way open for emotional elimination by the religion route, and unless they initiate a further discussion of the subject, I have always felt it my duty to stop at this point. Most of my patients happen to be at least nomi-

nally Christians, and there is often an opportunity to offer a suggestion about sloughing off the fear element of the dogmas and adhering more strictly to the courageous, inspiring faith teachings of Christianity's Author.

It does seem too bad that we should fall into the mistake of using the consoling features of the Christian religion, as is done in so-called Christian Science, and along with it carry such teachings as would lead us to neglect to summon medical service when a child is dying with diphtheria or to secure prompt surgical interference in a case of acute appendicitis. Not long since, one such believer, who was in the hospital convalescing from a surgical operation, asked me my real opinion of her healing cult. I answered: "My dear lady, I regard these teachings as a sort of philosophic morphine. They work like morphine in quieting the symptoms, but they do not always cure the fundamental disorder. I regard Christian Science as a real remedy for an imaginary disease, and as an imaginary remedy for a real disorder. It represents the shortest route in the world for getting over a disease when you haven't got it."

Religion is a wonderfully efficient antidote for monotony. One of the greatest causes of monotony is this machine age. The tendency to specialization of labor is increasingly robbing the individual artisan of opportunity for self-expression. Religion enables us to live in two worlds, often in many worlds simultaneously, and is going to prove a valuable antidote for social unrest, economic dissatisfaction, and increasing psychic disquietude.

In this connection, I want to say a word about humor. In the case of any therapeutic measure it is a very serious matter to give an overdose. Strychnia in small doses is a valuable stimulant; in large doses it is

nothing more nor less than rat poison, producing muscular rigidity and death. Now, play, we will all grant, is an antidote for work, when following the concentration and tension of daily labor. Work is physical labor; play, recreation, is an antidote. Religion, in a way, is spiritual and psychic labor. Humor is the antidotal relaxation which constitutes the psychic safety valve to prevent overdosage of religion. Humor does for the danger attendant upon too much religion what play does for the dangers attendant upon too much work.

I recently refused to recommend a very devout gentleman as a foreign missionary wholly on the ground that he was lacking in a sense of humor. Physically he was perfect, but I have seen too many missionaries, who took themselves and their calling overseriously, break down in the foreign field.

Religion stimulates the speculative faculties and broadens the horizon of the imagination. Man is naturally an adventurer. Civilization is gradually lessening man's opportunity for experiment and adventure. True, travel, in some ways, serves to compensate, but religion—at least a true vision of the teachings of Christ—opens before man vistas of universal dimensions and transcendent grandeur. In imagination the depressed soul looks at a universe he hopes subsequently to journey through as a translated spirit personality. A stimulating religion of this sort satisfies the curiosity, and does something to gratify our craving for adventure.

Man is naturally a fighting animal; war is biologic; peace is the goal and ideal of revealed religion. Religion contributes to the sublimation of man's animal pugnacity into righteous indignation, the fighting of sin, the resistance of evil, etc., and thus it functions,

along with playing competitive games, and the sense of humor, in helping society attain its ultimate goal of peace.

The practice of prayer can be utilized as a means of augmenting one's mental suffering or as a powerful curative agent. When prayer grows out of fearful forebodings of doom to come, then it certainly adds to human misery. When one prays over some trifling besetment, it only serves, by autosuggestion, to fasten the habit upon the praying soul more securely. But when prayer is a real spiritual communion; a service of praise and thanksgiving; when prayer contains more of worship in that it ceases to ask anything for the one who prays; when it comes to be an expression of gratitude and praise to the Creator for what the creature envisions this Creator to be, then prayer becomes a marvelous dual therapeutic agent. It has a sedative effect, bringing sleep to troubled minds and rest to distraught souls. It also exerts a tonic effect in that it spurs the indolent to action and urges the doubting and fearful forward to new conquests and greater victories.

Let me make it clear that the influence of a therapeutic agent depends not upon the benefits of the agent itself, but upon the reaction of the living organism to that agent. The good from the cold bath is not due to the influence of the cold, which is depressing. It does good because the body, in its effort to resent the insult of the cold, increases the circulation and arouses the entire system in an effort to bring large quantities of rapidly moving warm blood into the skin circulation. Likewise the therapeutic qualities of religion depend much upon the individual's reaction.

I not only find the Christian religion to be psychically sound, in that it reasons out well, but I have

found it to be clinically effective. I have proved it, as others have, to be a real remedy in the sick-room. Religion, more especially the teachings of Jesus, constitutes the master technic of sublimation, helping the spiritual nature in its conflict with the primitive racial instincts and emotions, thus enabling the mind of man to conform with the demands of civilized society without that oversuppression of the primitive biologic instincts which brings in its train a flock of functional nervous disorders. Religion becomes the automatically acting antidote for the necessitous arbitrary suppression of animal instincts and primitive emotions, and humor is the antidote for an overdose of religion. Man is the only animal possessing religious and humorous reactions. You can teach a chimpanzee to bake bread, and an orang-outang to pick cotton, but neither of them will attend a prayer meeting or laugh at a joke. Religion and humor are exclusively human attributes.

Man is an emotional animal. He is ruled by his heart and not by his head, and it would seem that the Creator, not unmindful of this, provided for the gradual evolution of a mastering emotion, one even strong enough to control the otherwise all-dominant sex urge, and that mastering emotion is religion. I would not think of trying to offer any plan of teaching sex hygiene in adolescence that did not contain religion. You start out to teach sex hygiene from the flowers and plants, and it is all fine in the nursery. Then you go out in the animal world, and long before adolescence arrives, you are in trouble. Your son or daughter will be quick to recognize that practically all the animals are promiscuous in their sex relations. You can't build the ideal home of Christianity and modern civilization without providing for supersex emotions,

a power that controls even the strongest animal urge, and there is no such power in the average human being outside of religion. Even many of our folks who think they control their human instincts without religion are found, on examination, either to be quite deficient in some of these instincts or to have been, under another name and quite unconsciously, all the while utilizing the very essence of religious control and ethical restraint.

I find a great many of my patients confuse religion with church or creed. When asked if they have a religion, they say "No," meaning they are not church members. Not long ago I had a middle-aged business man consult me, who was on the verge of a nervous breakdown, more or less depressed. He answered very promptly that he had no religion. When asked if he believed in a Supreme Being, he said it was doubtful, he rather thought he did not. He seemed much surprised that I did. He asked me what proof I had. I replied that it was a matter of believing, that I had no proof, that it seemed to me reasonable and consistent. He said it seemed strange to him that a man of my standing would believe anything without proof. I replied by asking him if he loved his wife. He said, "Yes."

"Do you think she loves you?" I asked.

"I am sure she does," he replied.

I asked him: "How could you prove it scientifically?"

He blushed a little, and said, "I see what you mean. It is a matter of personal experience."

I told him it was. In answer to my question as to whether he believed in a hereafter, he replied, "Emphatically no." He said it was rank egotism to have lived once and want to live again. He asked if I believed in a hereafter, and I replied that I did, and

upon his inquiring what kind of a hereafter I believed in, I replied: "I haven't a very clear idea. I have thought about it a great deal and I find that my belief varies as I grow older." Then I asked him if I might go beyond where I would be justified in going from a medical standpoint, and inquire if he believed in evolution. He replied that he did, that all educated persons believed in evolution. I told him that at least some folks who thought they were educated did not agree with him, but that I did. Then I put this question to him:

"You believe in evolution; that it has required tens of thousands of years for the human race to arrive where it is. Do you consider that you and I represent the finished product, the end of all the years progress, that there is nothing ahead?"

He hesitated a moment and then he looked up, I think he was really sincere, and said: "Why, hell, there must be a hereafter of some kind. I never thought about it in that way. I don't believe in the hereafter I was taught about in Sunday school, but I guess there is something ahead of us. We are not the finished product."

Religion is an antidote for narrow introspection. It provides a universal outlook. An ego-centric religion has little permanent therapeutic value. Jesus taught a religion that reaches out even to the "many mansions." Philosophy is entertaining, diverting, and has therapeutic value. But nothing else has the power or influence possessed by faith in a personal Deity. Christianity, through the Master, provides a real and living way between the creature and the Creator. Jesus proclaimed himself the "Son of man," as well as the "Son of God." Personality must be the goal of a truly therapeutic religion. The fetish of an

ignorant African has far more therapeutic value than all the sublime concept of pantheism; the fetish at least was concrete—one could grasp it.

Of the five great world religions, Christianity does more to meet the demands of a therapeutic agent than all the others combined. It lessens fear and self-contemplation; it stimulates spiritual vision and enlarges the intellectual horizon. It makes it possible to have a philosophy that is consistent with history, science, and civilization, and these three things constitute the yardstick whereby we should measure any religion to ascertain its medical and social therapeutic value.

I am not unmindful of the value of ethics as a motive for personal social control. But religion seems to be a capsule that serves to facilitate the taking of a much larger dose of ethics on the part of the average human being. Man just naturally seems to be religious, "incurably religious," and it seems to me to be one of an educator's problems to help mankind get hold of the best religion and to get the greatest good out of that religion.

Religion will be found to be far more efficient in combating crime than will be the employment of the spiritually sterilized simon pure ethics. In our earlier professional experience, my wife, Dr. Lena K. Sadler, was considerably interested in helping unfortunate girls whom she met at the dispensary. As time went by, I was rather amazed by the fact that practically all of these women turned out well. I one day asked her for an explanation as to why practically every woman she had selected had so magnificently acquitted herself. She replied: "There are just two tests I give any unfortunate girl before I spend much time upon the case. (1) Is she sound-minded? Is she free from

feeble-mindedness and other indications of a subnormal intellect? (2) Does she have the capacity of spiritual receptivity? Is her soul normal? Has she got a religion, or is she a likely candidate?" Then she made this significant statement: "If they are lacking in either of these, I do not care to waste my time upon them."

It has been my experience that religion as a therapeutic agent, as a social police force, is impotent in just the proportion that a given individual is afflicted with feeble-mindedness. There must be a moral nature, a spiritual soul, to react to religious teachings before you can expect to obtain therapeutic results. Remember, it is not the therapeutic agent that does the curing, it is the reaction of the organism to the therapeutic application. If the human intellect is deficient, there will be a deficient moral and spiritual reaction to all the therapeutic and sociologic applications of religion. Highly defective human beings are just about as devoid of the capacity to react to religious teachings as are the higher animals of the Simian tribes.

Both the Old and New Testament Scriptures link the idea of health with religion. All through the Old Testament the effect of fear upon both happiness and health was coming into recognition. Declares the psalmist: "Though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil." "Fear not" is the perpetual injunction of the New Testament. Throughout the New Testament it is declared that "the just shall live by faith," and many times the Master said to the sick, "Thy faith hath made thee whole." No more powerful medicine can be given the victim of an anxiety neurosis than the sustenance which is to be found in the belief of such promises as

"casting all your care upon him; for he careth for you."

The whole problem of religion as a therapeutic agent is summed up by John, who said: "There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear: because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in love." The psalmist gave voice to the same comforting and healing teaching when he wrote, "Cast thy burden upon the Lord, and he shall sustain thee." "Commit thy way unto the Lord; trust also in him; and he shall bring it to pass."

The teaching of true Christianity looks toward the elimination of fear. Said Paul: "For God hath not given us the spirit of fear; but of power, and of love, and of a sound mind." But no New Testament writer had a clearer vision of this matter than did Isaiah, who wrote: "Fear thou not; for I am with thee: be not dismayed; for I am thy God: I will strengthen thee; yea, I will help thee; yea, I will uphold thee." Faith is a real remedy; good cheer is a powerful medicine; determination is a part of the cure of every nervous patient who is restored to health. Religion is the motive power for a life of social service, a career of self-forgetfulness, and self-forgetfulness is one of the greatest secrets of health. No first-class vital organ will do good work if you spy on it. Eat a good meal; begin to think about it; listen in on the process of digestion, and within thirty minutes the chances are you will be in gastric misery.

I would then most emphatically affirm that religion is a therapeutic agent; that all religions are of value in alleviating symptoms. I would go further and say that the Jewish, and more especially the Christian, religions are basically curative as therapeutic agents in that they strike at the root of most mental disorders

—they substitute faith for fear. I would go further and say that Christianity is the master mind-cure, the superlative therapeutic agent, designed to relieve those mental attitudes of fear, doubt, unrest, dissatisfaction, monotony, and loneliness. And when I make this statement I refer to Christianity, not as it has been misrepresented by scores of its mediæval and even of its modern advocates, but as it was proclaimed two thousand years ago by the lowly Nazarene and practised by him.

2. METHOD OF APPLYING RELIGION AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT

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I FEEL that this is a topic of utmost importance. To me at any rate it seems to be one of the great justifying factors for religion. I am very well aware of the fact that when one uses the term "religion" and does not define it, he is liable to be talking about one thing and the audience thinking about something quite different.

The conflict between feeling and intellect—or shall I say the conflict between those who hold that religion is primarily a matter of intellect?—on the one hand, and a matter of feeling on the other, is perhaps irreconcilable. The idea that religion is merely a matter of emotion and primarily a condition of emotional disintegration, whether it is given its positive interpretation as it is by the German school or its negative interpretation as it is by certain psychologists, seems to me to be inadequate. Likewise the concept that religion is purely a matter of ideas, a type of rational

philosophy of life, or an ideal framework for purposes of cosmic description is inadequate. I presume that the time will never come when people the world over can have a purely intellectual religion, for the simple reason that their whole lives are lived so closely upon a purely emotional level.

There are very few people who are capable of living a life that is entirely adequate, whose adjustments are perpetually complete, whose perspective about life is never distorted or broken down by the encroachment upon them of circumstances greater than they are. As long as men live in a world which can and often does become greater than they can understand and adjust to, so long will there be emotional reactions in place of purely rational or intellectual reactions, and so long will there be a need for the creative emotional experience which religion brings.

On the other hand, as long as men are attempting to build some kind of cosmic pattern for their universe and find a place for themselves in the scheme of things that is meaningful and coherent, just so long will religion be a valuing attitude that involves a perspective broad enough and outlines vast enough to fit into it any particular intellectual question that may arise.

As I understand the situation at the present time, the dangers from maladjustment are of two kinds, because maladjustment has two major characteristics. A great many people never think about their world in the sense that they try consciously and deliberately to build some kind of an intelligent cosmos. These people always react on what we might call a basically emotional level. For them religion, with its forms of worship and its acts of devotion and its blanket beliefs, becomes either a basis for just enduring the *status quo*, and therefore a tension-reducing device, or it

becomes a basis on which they can retreat from reality and find a new emotional balance in some projected fantasy that is not in keeping at all with the world as it is.

I believe that for people whose lives are lived on that level the purely emotional aspect of religion has its value. Under those circumstances, religious beliefs that may not be at all in keeping with any scientific view of the world will have a definite value, a positive value in maintaining and furthering the life history of these people. The world will always be a little bit greater than they are. The need for psychic support will always be present. A religion of authority with its promise of ultimate satisfactions will alone satisfy them. On the other hand, we have great numbers of people who are fairly adequate in their minor life adjustments, who are faced with no great emotional problem in the everyday give and take, but who find themselves quite incapable of making an adequate intellectual adjustment to vaster problems or to large concepts. Such persons find themselves quite capable of giving meaning to immediate experience, but quite incapable of finding significance for life as a whole.

For these people, too, religion has its therapeutic and its integrative value. In the first place, it may furnish a basis for a valuing attitude toward the relativity of things, toward the idea of instability, of uncertainty. So that these facts which would ordinarily disintegrate and produce inadequate adjustments are so included, so objectified in their scheme of things by this attitude, that life takes on a pattern and a significance and maintains a balance.

When I am talking about the therapeutic value of religion, I am including both of these concepts of religion. Allow me to illustrate both types: Yesterday

afternoon there came into my office downtown a woman who is thirty-three years old. She has been coming to my office now for about six weeks. She came the first time in a condition that approximated as complete an emotional disintegration as I have ever seen. After she had been talking with me a little while and had told me all of her problems and how life was just too much for her and she could not make heads or tails of it, she was in a terrible condition. I said to her, "Have you ever developed the habit of praying?"

"Oh, I don't believe in God," she said. "I don't believe in God. I don't believe in anything that is supernatural. I have a feeling that unless I can help myself I cannot get any help at all."

"Well," I said, "have you ever figured out ways and means of effectively helping yourself?"

She said, "No, I have tried, but I haven't succeeded."

Then I said, "Let us pray."

She said, "I don't believe in God."

I said, "I don't care whether you do or not. Pray, anyway."

I wrote out a group of prayers for her, and I told her she had to memorize them and say them the same way a Mohammedan would turn to Mecca three times a day. She had to assume the attitude of prayer. She had to go to herself in quiet, and whether she believed in God or whether she didn't, I told her she had to pray.

Some will say that this couldn't be prayer if she did not believe in God. I say it was prayer because the fact of the matter was that she, in the praying of the prayers that I had written for her to pray, developed progressively an intellectual perspective about her problems, and in a condition of relaxation began to substitute, for all of those negative emotional tensions which were the product of fear and worry and anxiety,

an emotional relaxation, if you please; at any rate a state of visceral relaxation that made possible the building of an entirely new emotional outlook.

She came into my office yesterday an entirely different person in appearance and attitude than she had been six weeks before. Religion had a therapeutic value in this case, in that, by developing the form of a religious act under controlled conditions, it facilitated an emotional readjustment.

I have another case of a quite different type—a young man twenty-one years old. He has been an emotional failure all of his life. He has been devotedly religious. He has done all of those things that characterize what we might call the traditional or the conventional religious person. He has prayed regularly. He has gone to church and Sunday school regularly. He has talked with his minister many times. He has read his Bible. Life is still some kind of an emotional mess for him, so much so that he finally decided that he had better come to a psychologist for help.

Here is a man who has not been making use of his religious beliefs in any creative way. They have been the basis which has furthered his emotional inadequacy. Yet it was possible over a period of time to give that man a use for his beliefs. By tying up a different type of emotional experience with those beliefs in God and immortality, and a lot of traditional concepts not directly related to these major ones, it was possible to carry on a process of emotional re-education that has gradually changed his life. I have done it by making use of these traditional beliefs which for twenty-one years had been of no value to him. That is why it seems to me that in discussing the therapeutic value of religion we have to recognize these two classes of individuals: (1) those whose emotional difficulties

grow out of the very tendency that they have to find in the emotional disaster that is overtaking them; (2) those other individuals who, while making satisfactory adjustments from day to day, need to find a sufficiently broad perspective on the basis of which they can discover for themselves an intellectual, rational structure for the building of their life history.

What is the basis for this therapeutic value? I think that we might express it in this way: On the one hand, it is, in the case of those types whose life is lived on a purely emotional level, a process of robbing them of the satisfaction which they have gotten from their emotional retreats from reality, and substituting in its place a positive emotional experience that is directly related to the objects, so-called, of their faith. In other words, when faith becomes dominant and creative, it changes the character of the object toward which that faith is directed.

From the point of view of the psychological mechanisms that are operative, it seems to me that we have a case something like this: In most types of repression where there has been an emotional conflict, we find the traditional sequence of events which characterize what we might call a religious experience. In every case of repression where there has been no assimilation, we find that the original or one of the basic causes of the repression was a sense of guilt; that sense of guilt being the mechanism, so to speak, or the inciting factor in furthering the repression itself, and becoming, therefore, a basis for further emotional conflict.

Isn't it true that, traditionally, religion has insisted that, in order to get right with God you have to have first a sense of guilt, then a period of self-examination in which you look forward or beyond yourself for aid and guidance, a feeling of having been forgiven, and a

reconciliation? That religious process or order, traditionally determined and given a great deal of theological verbiage and coloring, is a type of sequence of events that characterizes the work of emotional reintegration and re-education which occur in cases of emotional disorder where repression has been one of the dominant characteristics.

It seems to me that mental hygienists, physicians and psychologists must recognize the fact that in religion as an experience emotional in character you do have potentially a creative agent or a repressive agent. You have a mechanism by means of which people can flee from reality, or a mechanism by means of which they can face reality courageously and effectively.

Religion as a creative experience has an integrative function which may act in the lives of those people who, owing to the stress and strain of modern adjustment, have become emotionally disintegrated and unbalanced. Religious devotion may become the basis for an effective reintegration and reorganization of the emotional life of the individual. As a valuing attitude religion may become a dynamic factor in the development of a spiritual interpretation of the world and a satisfactory perspective about life giving meaning to the immediate experience in terms of some larger value.

So convinced am I of the validity of religion, even when looked upon in these two different ways, that I have no hesitancy in advising the use of religious techniques as an effective instrument in psychotherapeutics.

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3. READJUSTMENTS OF CONDUCT UNDER THE STIMULUS OF RELIGION

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IN considering the problem of the value of religion for curing maladjustment, we should face up to the situation that has been brought out again and again in these conferences—that at the present time we are all maladjusted. Our ideas are in a turmoil. Our old religion and old concepts are failing. The problem which we must face, and for which I hope this conference will give new data for solution is—Is there a religion anywhere in the universe which can really reorganize and remotivate experience? The problem of this conference has been stated so clearly that we cannot miss it: "Whether religion as we interpret, teach, and practice it to-day is capable of motivating life."

In one of the exhibits sent out preparatory to this conference, there were five statements of the problem implied in my topic, "The therapeutic value of religion in curing maladjustment." In all five statements of the problem it was made clear that the maladjustments intended are character or personality difficulties.

Obviously from these discussions it is necessary that

clinical patients have enough *idea* of God and the future life *in order to have faith* in it so as to readjust their behavior. Their principal trouble is fear, Doctor Sadler says, and unless there is faith, their fear, their emotion, cannot be relieved. But they cannot have faith to control their behavior, to make a readjustment, until they have some idea or knowledge as a basis for their faith.

It is exactly at this point where the crux of our problem lies. Walter Lippmann's *Preface to Morals* takes up this problem. You remember his very first pages. He says that the old ideas are breaking down. There is no compelling reason which certifies the moral code. That is the crux of our problem to-day. That is where we are maladjusted. We are maladjusted in our concept of the universe. How can we relate ourselves to God (relating the self to God was implied and frequently defined yesterday as the essence of religious experience) if we have no idea of God, or of what we are, no idea of this universe, or of relationship—no plan of action?

If we have a faith, the faith which Doctor Sadler would require, and Doctor Stevens constantly implied, for healing in a religious way, one of two things would have to be true; either we must have thought through the modern dilemma and uncertainty to a confident conclusion, or we have not yet partaken of the modern uncertainty at all.

Therapeusis, therefore, would not be for that great mass of people who, we are led to believe, are now uncertain and seeking for a sign, but have not yet found the sign, nor thought through their uncertainty. Doctor Mecklin last night talked about the "Suk Cow" belt in America, the Puritan stock which is still behaving according to the patternings of Scotch-Irish

ancestry. He showed how, in crises for which these people have no immediate response, they fall back upon a traditional form of conduct, irrational if not actually nonideational. Perhaps this is somewhat in contradiction to Doctor Freeman's idea of reason controlling conduct. But even these people are having their maladjustment, their questionings about religion. They are still in the first moments of thought, as Hegel calls it, the blank emotional bafflement, or the violent negation. The psychoanalysts point out that excited emphatic defense of a belief is a sure sign that the belief is questioned and clung to so emotionally just because it is already challenged and doomed. Why pass an anti-evolution law unless the anti-evolution belief is about to totter and needs bolstering up?

We cannot depend upon faith in God and in immortality to last us long, or perhaps I should say to be revived, in our present state of affairs, unless we can discover how to reconstruct our universe of ideas, so as to have a firm foundation in a newer religion. No thoroughgoing therapeutic technic is possible, then, for ministers or for psychiatrists either, until we have worked out a satisfying conceptual universe within which man is related to God.

Doctor Freeman showed how futile and despairing is Bertrand Russell's concept of man as a tiny atom of impure carbon and water, in a meaningless cosmos of blind and brutal force. Such a materialistic or hopeless idea or concept of the universe is absolutely ineffective for curing any maladjustment. If you have read Lippmann's *Preface to Morals*, you know that he is struggling against a profound conviction of exactly that sort of a universe. He is trying to give a humanistic interpretation to Bertrand Russell's concept of

ideas in order to save for himself some sort of a hope which Bertrand Russell evidently feels is impossible.

First, then, imperfect human beings can be helped only if they can develop an ideational-emotional experience called faith. And, *second*, a rational conception of life is a prerequisite for permanent and adequate readjustment. We must have a rational God as a basis for our faith.

If we cannot reconstruct our religious beliefs, we land in Bertrand Russell's world. If we can reconstruct them, then we can be cured. This is precisely the unique function of the minister. But has he a *new religion* to teach us? Can he help us to make a *new God* and a *new Cosmos?* The psychiatrist is helpless when his patient has no faith. Only the minister can help. Moreover, he must help, and that soon, for in this modern world almost everyone is ideationally maladjusted, as I said. Our old faith is gone. The churches are not giving us a new one.

Something must be done to give us a vital, real religion which will do things for us, which we can understand and which we can believe, in which we can have faith. The problem of curing maladjustment is so enmeshed with one's philosophy of life, with one's metaphysics, with the bias which has determined one's answer to the fundamental questions, What is the nature of ultimate reality? Who is God? that to proceed without making some declaration concerning it would be confusing and baffling. And that is just where the churches are leaving us.

Doctor Wieman yesterday carefully passed this question by because it is not the problem of this conference. But it is absolutely fundamental before we can get anywhere at all with the question of motivation. It is a philosophical question, but it is abso-

lutely essential to have a philosophy of life before we can motivate our life or make any adjustment. Otherwise we are simply tiny atoms of impure carbon moving about in a blind cosmos.

Motivation is here taken in its widest inclusive meaning—not only the push behind overt conduct, but also the push behind all behavior, the push which drives human beings through their life span, the push behind the behavior which is characteristic of all phenomena, driving all the universe through all eternity.

"We are but parts of one stupendous whole." When the subject of therapeusis in human behavior is introduced, there is already an underlying implication that the drive behind an heroic act may be intrinsically identical with the drive behind the change of starch to sugar in the digestive tract. This we know to be the same force which sends the sun's rays to earth and turns Betelgeuse in its orbit. I think that we are constantly searching for God in the universe, and yet we are held by our old, old prehistoric, antediluvian, Eozoic prejudices of dualism, ourselves as over against the universe.

In organizing a philosophy of life we must answer one of three questions:

First, is the ideal within man himself, as his reaction upon a totally indifferent universe? Or, *second*, is it the product of social living, evolved in human experience? Or, *third*, does it come to men from the universe? (I am using "ideal" as the highest human concept we have of this push toward development.)

If man himself is the measure of all things, we may choose between Berkeleian idealism, or pragmatism, or humanism. That is, if we answer the first and second questions by saying that man does react upon a totally indifferent universe, we get Berkeleian idealism

in all it implies, solipsism. Or if we claim that the ideal is the product of social living evolved in human experience, we get what I think the humanists are trying to tell us. But we have another, a third possibility: Does the ideal come to man from the universe itself? If they do (and I believe that to be the intrinsic conception of Christianity and theism), we then can accept a hypothesis that ideals are inherent in the universe, and that man is evolving in conformity with a majestic development. Then we have the basis for the grandest of all conceptions of God.

There have been all sorts of experiments with the unknown forces of the universe in the past ages. *The Golden Bough* brings to us a pageant of man's efforts to utilize these forces in order to enhance his own good. The shrine at Lourdes and other centers of mystic healing typify the everlasting call to God to work his healing will upon sick humanity.

We here to-day are seeking a sign no less that we are gathered in a scientific spirit of inquiry. Though we have tried to lay aside our emotions and prejudices and prepossessions, in order that we may inquire candidly, nevertheless science itself has laid upon us inhibitions more serious than any traditional heritage of superstition. We are prone to hold fast the materialistic science of our own college days. Haven't you caught that note throughout this conference? No one has dared to put forth even a tentative hypothesis that anything could be introduced into our religious experience which is supernatural. And all of us are reacting to the subconscious patternings left upon us by Hume, Berkeley, Huxley, and Bob Ingersoll.

We are setting about compassing an intelligent, rational statement of religion which will place its forces at our service, harness the universe of spirit as we

have harnessed the unseen ether waves. We are hoping to find a clew to human behavior which will enable us to control it, as we turn our radio dial and bring a harmony from Nashville or from Pittsburgh. And yet we have still the dualistic conception of mind and matter inherent in Gage's *Physics*.

Kant, that majestic philosopher who founded our thinking upon a bedrock of logic, demonstrated incontrovertibly that the noumenal has no place in rational thinking. And yet it seems to me if we are to have a religion which works pragmatically, we shall have to set bravely forth on the "wide and stormy ocean" which Kant describes as "constantly deceiving the adventurous mariner with vain hopes, and involving him in adventures which he can never leave, and yet can never bring to an end."

We now know far more about the universe outside of man than Kant ever dreamed possible. The dualism which seemed to Descartes so inevitable has been broken down by modern science. In modern science I think we have the basis for reconstructing our religion. This is not an attempt to give any one of you an authoritative statement of how you should reconstruct religion for modern experience, because there should be no such thing as dictation from authority or even the imposing by tone or gesture or emphasis the experience of one person upon the experience of another. It cannot be done, psychologically. It should not be done, ethically. It would not do for us morally. It certainly would create religious maladjustment if any one of you accepted my religion as your religion on my dictum.

Nevertheless, to illustrate what I mean by the necessity of giving some sort of a philosophy of life as a basis for rational living, I am taking the liberty of

giving you a glimpse into the way I personally have been compelled by the force of circumstances to reconstruct my own thinking, because I have four children who have asked me questions for twenty years, and because I am meeting parents, mothers particularly, all over the country who want help. Either I have to say there is none, or I have to think the thing through for myself and show them how I did it, so that they may go and do likewise.

Monism, the oneness of the universe, is a tenable hypothesis which does not do violence either to our finest conception of spirit or to our most rational interpretation of matter. Eddington, Compton, Pupin, and all the modern students of the nature of the universe make comprehensible to us the ultimate power which is the push behind the behavior of the stars and the behavior of human beings. The naïve dualism of the nineteenth century is as antiquated as its machinery.

It is my own hypothesis that man is one of the focal points of the force which moves the stars and atoms, and that far from its being contingent upon his consciousness, he is contingent upon the universal force.

Everything seems to argue for the tenability of such an hypothesis. All the findings of physicists, chemists, biologists, and archæologists tend to place man in perspective in a world which finally and demonstrably reduces to an ultimate, desirable, comprehensible, and to a degree, usable cosmos. This cosmos, God, is infinitely responsive to our slightest action, infinitely reacting upon us as individuals and as sharers in the universe.

This conception of God makes an experimental religion possible; indeed, there is no bound to the experiments which relationship with such a God opens up.

It becomes a legitimate object of scientific research to seek the final control of disease through whatever avenues we can find, through mental therapy, through scientific research, through focusing the sun's rays upon the body, because all forces are one force manifested in many ways.

Radioactive energy is being isolated in minute substances from tons of gross earth. The voice of a President in Washington is selected from a billion billion sounds agitating the ether, and carried around the world. What may not this God whose evolution is being slowly comprehended by human consciousness eventually reveal to us of his infinite store.

Dr. C. Judson Herrick, in *Brains of White Rats and Men*, computes the enormous potentiality of neural connections in those brain areas related to the higher mental and behavior activities. The increasing ability to motivate conduct, as described by Doctor Freeman, is paralleled by the development of the cerebral cortex. Here, then, is the physical potentiality for the evolution of an unguessed conceptual system, the possibility of unlimited education—the neural mechanism to "justify the ways of God to man."

Each human being is a self-conscious personality focusing in his consciousness the God who is the cosmos and whose nature is essentially evolution; not blind, purposeless movement, but a movement which progresses toward the ultimate values which we see now as in a glass darkly. The universe is teleological, yes, but not being evolved for the sake of human values, but for ultimate values in which man participates.

Religious experience is the human consciousness of the cosmos, and practice of religion makes the focalizing of universal forces more effective in life.

This conception gives us an experimental religion.

In olden times the crude experiments with tapping the reservoir of energy latent in religious experience let loose forces which could not be understood or controlled. In the revival was exhibited the tremendous capacity of the human being to become the focus of wholly unknown spirits and devils. We became afraid of revivals. The tremendous forces focalized in religious fervors were capable of creating maladjustments as well as adjustments.

But are we seeing new ways of using the religious experience, ways to relate the self to the universe? The technics of the psychiatrist and the psychologist are not the technics of religion. Dr. Ernest Harper wrote an interesting thesis, making a beginning of a science of consultation upon emotional maladjustment, but he has not shown that religion has or could have any specific place. To be religious the consultation technic must be supplemented by the minister with all the technics which have been worked out by the race, and with all the technics which our best modern intelligence may experimentally work out to focalize God in human aspirations. The challenge to us is to work out these new and adequate technics, and not to hang on to the old technics brought down in our visceral behavior.

For a long time we have been thinking of prayer as the only religious activity which deliberately relates the human being to God. We are still reading the prayers of the Middle Ages. Some of them are adequate, and that is the reason we are doing it. Some of them are not adequate, but we are still doing it. But other experiences besides prayer assist materially in polarizing the human being to the infinite forces. Drama, poetry, and liturgy enrich religion. Yesterday President Edna Dean Baker gave several illustrations of the

effectiveness of drama for reorganizing conduct, that is, for education in ideals. She was speaking of the small child, but "a little child shall lead them."

There can be no value in prayer unless we know that prayer does something for us, for prayer means faith in something. If we are humanists and pin our faith upon a power in ourselves, or some combined power resident in socialized human nature, we are expecting to lift ourselves by our boot-straps, and are closing our eyes to the obvious universe in the midst of which we are set. Drama, poetry, art must be used deliberately to enhance religion, or they, like revivals, become a degradation.

Let us continue, then, in the great experiment of religious life. It seems to me that now more than ever before we are justified in our belief in a God who can cleanse us from all sin. Now, more than ever before, it has become possible to discover how this faith can become a cleansing power.

Man is an intelligent constructive part of the universe with a tremendous duty to work out his own salvation. His ability to utilize the forces of the universe is a measure of his personality. It matters, in the long run, to the whole universe, but it matters most of all to him here and now what he does with the talents which have come to him.

If we would have a religious therapeutic to cure human ills—emotional, social, physical—all the findings of all the sciences will need to have added to them the unique practices of religion: faith, prayer, utter dependence upon God, and abnegation of the contrary self—all the "worship technics" which put the soul in tune with the Infinite.

The minister can use these technics to cure his parishioners of their personality ills only when he can

help them to reconstruct their religion, to find their relation to their own universe. The minister cannot be an authority prescribing a God, a faith, or even a technic of worship. No man may make another's religion for him. No authority can impose a god or a creed or a way of life. The learner must solve his own problems, make his own adjustments, save his own soul. The educators have found that out and they call it progressive education. It is time that religious educators found it out and worked out a progressive religious education, not teaching facts and creeds, not even imposing by dramatic emphasis and idea, but leading the souls in their own evolution.

Meanwhile the minister *must* experiment with the educative process, and with religious concepts which commend themselves to modern experience, in order to save the church as the vital factor in religion. If we do not go out of this conference with a plan of what we are going to do to-morrow, if we have not reconstructed our own experience, then the conference has failed that far in affecting our conduct satisfactorily.

We have to-day been stating the problem. If I may use the analogy of the process of learning, we have been analyzing the problem-situation which we are all facing. Is religion capable of being a basis for progressive, satisfying reconstruction of experience? We are dissatisfied, that is why we have come here to study together that problem. We must gather data for the solution. The data which we have been discussing here have been, *first*, the nature of that universe to which we must relate ourselves if religion is to be an essential factor in satisfactory living, a source of power, a free focalizing, developing agency in our lives; *second*, the nature of the relation of ourselves to the

universe, progressively harmonizing with the infinite laws of infinite development, and contributing to them.

But having come to some hypothesis for solving this problem, a plan for action should evolve. Then we must carry that plan into execution. We must go forth from here with a procedure for experimental behavior, testing the value of our hypothesis by action. We should go home and do something about it.

What have we now to contribute to our friends as an outcome of our two days together? What shall we do for our churches and Sunday schools? Can we help to adjust the maladjusted, to help those of little faith to a new religion, a new relation to the universe, to appreciation and contemplation—prayer? Can we plan a higher moral behavior, a new social conscience, a progressively satisfying personality?

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4. FORUM DISCUSSION

Dr. Laurance Plank (First Unitarian Church, Omaha, Nebraska): If religion is to be of therapeutic value in curing maladjustments, religion must do some readjusting itself. That is not true with the truly evan-

gelical church, with the Roman Catholic communions. I believe that there are millions of people who can still be helped by these groups, as there are many who can be helped by the New Thought and Christian Science movements. There are many who, as was pointed out yesterday, are interested in removing symptoms. There are certain group developments in our civilization to-day that are very adept at removing symptoms without touching causes. There are all of these people who do not wish to be readjusted in maturity, but wish to go back to the perfect adjustment of the child, to which environment comes the adjustment of complete and unquestioning, harmonious dependence. For such, communions like the Roman Catholic Church offer complete satisfaction.

Some compare the priest with the psychoanalyst and the confessional with the psychological clinic, but it is a false comparison; for one who goes to the priest goes to the mother church and, as a child who has been wearied by the perplexities of the day climbs into his mother's lap and finds peace, finds peace in the arms of the mother church. But he who is true to the newer technique of the medical psychologist is thrust back not to the mother but to himself. There I believe is essentially the new type of God that many of us are seeking to-day. I suppose it does not matter what we call this spiritual influence or power, whether we call it God or nature or the spirit of man. Instead of looking for this redemptive spirit and experience outside ourselves, we, who are discontented with the Fundamentalistic movement or with the Roman Catholic communions and who cannot be satisfied with the Christian Science or New Thought developments, now seek it within ourselves.

Whether we call it one thing or another I think is

immaterial, as was pointed out by Professor Stevens a little while ago. It is by the proof and not by the terminology that we judge. If a man can find in a closer communion with God a truer solution of the actual problems, then religion, theistic religion, has been of great help to him. But if, on the other hand, a man can get the same results by entirely humanistic means, then who is there that would quarrel?

Theoretically, there are people who are free. They are free from what they call superstition and a false supernaturalism, yet emotionally they are still reacting as though they believed in these things. Many of them, even with a positive hostility to all theistic ideas, are still reacting emotionally as though they believed in theistic ideas. Their interest in God is just as extreme if they are preaching against God as is that of their brothers who preach for God. Whether there is a minus sign or a plus sign in front of the interest, the interest is still the same.

Many of the emotional difficulties arise in very similar ways in those who call themselves theists and those who call themselves humanists. So these theological, intellectual definitions do not seem to count so much; it is the emotional reaction that counts. I think that the emotional reactions that cause the most trouble are undoubtedly those of fear. I believe it is not fear of any future hell; it is fear of a very existent hell on this earth, the hell of divided self, the hell of depleted energy, the hell of distrust of self and distrust of others.

I believe that fear of life is essentially the difficulty with many of the liberated people of to-day—fear of the life principle within the universe. The only way, as I see it, that religion can be of positive benefit is in reinterpreting life to these people who are in difficulty.

We have been taught in the Christian tradition that

God was more or less outside the universe. We have been taught that the universe was more or less dead, if not actually, venomous. The pagans, however, as represented in our own Southwestern Indians, believe that the universe is alive. I think to some extent we must come back to that conception; evolution is bringing it back to us. This impulse back of evolution we see outside of ourselves. I have known many people to be helped who were led little by little not only to see it outside themselves, but to see it inside themselves. Somehow they had to be taught that this same impulse in nature that springs up in beauty and in august harmony was in them, for they were a part of life.

Professor Charters has emphasized to great avail that life is *one*. But we must not only think that, we must feel it, we must experience it. We must experience somehow the oneness of life. I believe that Christianity for the most part, like some other historical religions, has separated the individual from his kind too much, has separated him from nature too much, has separated the mind and the soul from the body too much. We are learning these days through our newer sciences, the visceral foundation, so to speak, not alone of our emotions, but even of our thoughts. We are learning that life is one. Body and mind are aspects of the same live force.

There are many people who get emotional help and mental stability by being led through concrete experiences, not from any authoritative background of course, but through experiences perhaps indirectly suggested, so that they feel they have made them themselves. They feel the barriers that have existed between them and their environment and the rest of the race broken down. Our generation is in the most difficult situation of all because we have inherited the

ideas of the old. The new is being born before our very eyes, and we are torn between two worlds. That is the dilemma of our generation.

It is very difficult to be of help. Just to be a minister does not mean that one can be of help, any more perhaps than just to be a psychologist means that one can be of help. The minister or the psychologist must somehow have come through some of these things himself. Somehow the person who comes for help must feel, "Here is one who has experienced some of the same difficulties and is honest enough to admit it—one who puts on no airs, is a human being like myself. Somehow this person has come through, he will be sympathetic with me, and I can find a new perspective with him."

I think essentially the ministerial mind has been apt to think it was somewhat representative of the superior mind. It is not quite humble enough, human enough, to come down and ask, "What are these forces in religious life, in human nature?" The only way we can command human nature is to obey, by actually observing the way human nature works as part of the process ourselves, as participants in the human drama.

The minister who is willing to do that, who is willing to go through life observing and sympathizing, identifying himself with human aspirations and frustrations, with human observation and experiment, will find increasingly that people come for aid, counsel, or simple guidance as to an older brother who might give guidance. He will find that if he be of help, he will have to reverse the attitude of religion in the past and no longer think of God as being outside, but of God as being inside the process, whatever we call it. He will find that many a person who is bothered by a terrific sense of guilt, inculcated by the teachings of the

church and home in his childhood and youth out of proportion to any real facts of the situation, can be helped by just pointing out: "You feel that you have made so many mistakes. You feel you are doing things so wrong. You have watched the child learn to walk. Would you as a father think that the child should be punished when it is learning to walk because it falls and tumbles? Are we not all children learning to walk? Isn't the human race a child learning to walk as well as every individual? A man who climbs a mountain trail may slip." Why bring in a sense of guilt at all? The churches have taught guilt, but why bring in a sense of guilt at all?

So it seems if one can find the barriers breaking down, himself becoming merged with the whole process of evolution, a good deal of good can be done for the individuals in difficulty. If they can only be led to feel and think that they are part of a process, part of an organic process, that this power we call God is the life immanent in the universe, that humanity is part of the universe, that human nature is part of nature, all of it an evolving process the details and scope of which we cannot at the present time understand but which we are trying to understand, it will be of great help to them.

Then there is one other very concrete thing that I think has caused much trouble among those with whom I have contact. It is parental dependence prolonged, due perhaps to the selfishness of parents in keeping their children close to them. I believe religion here again has a great part to play. "Call no man father upon the earth; for one is your Father which is in heaven." "Where is heaven?" The kingdom of heaven is within you, our Father who is within heaven, our Father who is within ourselves.

I have known mature men even in their forties who lost a father perhaps, to be completely broken. The only way they could come through at all was to localize the father in themselves. I believe that essentially the new religion is going to be of incalculably more therapeutic value to the race by this very process. You can come at it from any angle you choose, and it is the same thing. To my mind it is this: the internalization of experience, of authority, of aspiration, then the universalization of the inward, the recognition that the life impulse is the same in the universe, only in man (perhaps this is the distinction between man and the rest of nature) it comes more completely.

The false teaching about nature being separated from God and about our bodies being inferior to our souls has caused most of the mental disturbances of our generation. These can be cured by the minister, by his representing a religion that sees the divinity of the whole universe, of the whole man; that validates by spiritual sanction the nature that is man, the impulses, the tendencies of the body, soul, mind organism; that ties the man together again as a unit, expressing the beauty and the power of life itself; and by the internalization, the looking within for all authority in the individual, the looking within for the seeds of development.

For the minister can be of the greatest therapeutic value in the new age as he does not point to himself any more than to any book or to any church or to any external saviour, but says: "The kingdom of heaven is within you. The Father in heaven is within you. Looking within yourself, experiencing more deeply and striving to understand the significance of your experience more wisely, living more richly, living more vitally and more completely, more humanly, including

all the roots in the soil as well as the most ethereal blossoms, including it all in yourself as one tree of life, more and more it becomes the universal tree of life with all humanity, with no prejudices and no barriers, you the individual will find the joy of the kingdom of heaven and its power and its glory."

Mr. W. H. Roberts (Department of psychology, Northwestern University): I would like to ask three questions which seem to me to be problems involving a negative criticism of religion. *First,* does not religion divert attention from human relations and attract it to supposed divine requirements? This question might be stated in another way by saying: Does not the presence of the idea of God stand in such relationship to the problems of human adjustment as to distract attention from the problems of adjustment themselves in favor of the problem of appeasing the Deity? *Second,* does not religion through its doctrine of sin intensify emotional conflicts rather than resolve them? *Third,* does not the Father symbol tend to perpetuate an infantile attitude on the part of people instead of encouraging maturity?

Chairman Stevens: In answer to your *first* question it is only fair to say that in its traditional forms religion has often placed greater emphasis on the idea of appeasing the Deity rather than on meeting the obligations of human relationships. On the other hand, in the teachings of the Christian religion we find Jesus saying that the first obligation of a man who has been antisocial or unsocial in his behavior is first to make a new and adequate adjustment of his social relationships before making any approach to God for forgiveness.

In answer to the *second* question, one of the pressing needs in our present religious thinking is that people

should get rid of the old doctrines of sin and guilt and the negative emotional reactions which accompany them, and substitute in their place conceptions of human striving and struggle in keeping with what we know about the meaning and the significance of the human venture.

In regard to the *third* question, if religion has perpetuated a prolonged infantilism on the part of people through its Father symbol, it has been due to their wrong conception of parenthood rather than to the use or the fact of the symbol itself. Our training of parents and children nowadays into new conceptions of what constitute effective parenthood and child-parent relationships will do much toward eliminating any prolonged infantilism on the part of religious people through the use of the Father symbol.

Dr. Marion O. Hawthorne (School of Education, Northwestern University): I have a few questions. The *first* question: Are we talking here about a type of religion that is going to be an anæsthetic? Are we undertaking to upset theological points of view so that in a new interpretation the individual will be made more alive or more dead to the facts of life?

The *second* question is whether or not the psychiatrist or the psychologist who undertakes to deal with human problems and does not employ theological or religious terminology is more successful or less successful than those who attempt to give a theological or religious interpretation to the problems of life.

The *third* question: About what are habits, ideals, and attitudes to be reorganized? What is to be the central organizing factor in our interpretation of life and religion? Is it a concept of God, or a concept of self, or a concept of human relationships?

Chairman Stevens: Doctor Sadler, will you answer Miss Hawthorne?

Dr. William S. Sadler (Director, Chicago Institute of Research and Diagnosis, Chicago, Illinois): In a given case or difficulty there are sometimes many remedies, not one. We are very successful with cases of neuroses, in the case of those people who refuse all sympathy with and contact with religious ideas. They get well. Some of our most remarkable cases have no religious therapy.

I should like to correct the opinion, if it obtains, that in the medical practice religion is a routine. It is merely a part of an effort to remove the cause of the patient's difficulty, to adjust the maladjustment, to do for him all we can and to go with him as far as he will let us. We try to correct his wrong ideas, even so far as we know in our own weak way in religion. We ask the question, What basic difficulty underlies the obvious disorder?

I look at the thing in this way: There are five great emotional groups in ninety per cent or more of average human beings, and these must be looked into, eliminated, cleaned up and set in operation if we are going to cure these maladjustments and have them stay cured.

First, the life urge, the nutrition instinct, eating or satisfaction of hunger, which I put down as the top of all; not sex or religion, but simple self-preservation.

Second, the sex urge, and sex in everything from its physical to its spiritual aspect.

Third, the power urge; selfishness, the ego instincts, the property acquirements. That comes, in my opinion, third in the average case.

Fourth, the religious group of instincts, the spiritual life, the worship instincts, reverence and the like.

Fifth, the herd group of instincts, the social philanthropic and altruistic urges.

The permanency of the cure consists of the adjustment of these things. I pay just as much attention in my practice to all of these five groups as I do to religion. I am afraid I am going to be misunderstood from my paper last night, because the topic assigned to me was religion in these adjustments. I believe just as much in the other four and practice them in different cases as I do religion. Where there is an overdosage of religion I try to antidote it with humor. I not only prescribe prayer, but not long ago I got a written signed contract from a highly fanatical Y. M. C. A. secretary not to pray for thirty days. I told him I would be responsible to Saint Peter if anything went wrong. So please let me correct any erroneous impression about my own attitude.

Mr Samuel Stagg (Missionary, Manila, Philippine Islands): As a pastor of one thousand college students on the other side of the world, and very much interested in discovering ways and means of being more effective in dealing with their mental and emotional difficulties as well as the normal development of their religious life, I would like to know how one may acquire a satisfactory technique with which to deal with these problems.

Chairman Stevens: Technique in dealing with these mental and emotional disorders is not easily acquired. In a majority of cases where difficulties grow out of lack of understanding on the part of the student of himself as a physiological and psychological being I have found that a very simple conversational procedure is best. Every attempt should be made to relate directly the subject's difficulties to the process of enlightenment as you carry it on. More often than

not ignorance causes most of the distorted rational and emotional reactions of so-called normal people. The interviewer should adopt a sympathetic attitude and make every effort to have the subject feel that he not only understands his difficulty, but has experienced similar difficulties himself and can by this very fact be of service to him. In cases where the emotional conflict involves repression with a definite knowledge on the part of the subject of the source and origin of the conflict itself, I find that it is exceedingly useful to have the subject talk himself out of his difficulty. By this I mean that as he objectifies his emotional experience through reciting it in the presence of a sympathetic listener, it becomes possible for him to discover for himself a way out of his difficulty. In cases where there has been emotional conflict without assimilation, wherein the repression has involved a conscious forgetting of the source and origin of the difficulty, an ordinary untrained interviewer should refer the case to a trained mental hygienist.

Doctor Hawthorne: Do you think that in the case which you cited in your paper in which you used prayer as a technique you could have gotten the same result by a process of autosuggestion or with the use of any type of material, such as having the subject count from one to ten or recite algebraic equations?

Chairman Stevens: An act of faith in which the individual attempts to project his problem by referring it to some point of reference beyond himself is not autosuggestion. Autosuggestion involves a shuttle effect between ideas and relationships within the individual's own consciousness. Prayer involves a projection of these relationships in such a way that the individual and his problem become related to a third point of reference.

Doctor Hawthorne: What is the third point of reference—God externalized in the universe?

Chairman Stevens: It seems to me that the third point of reference does become in the thinking of many people an idea of God, but it need not take this form. It may be merely at that point at which the relationships involved in his problem become effectively related by the individual to his larger concept of life as a part of some universality, some whole, which may take on a dynamic character as the individual becomes aware of the place that he and his problem occupy in the total scheme of things. Under these conditions he may, as Doctor Wieman suggests, find relief and aid in the knowledge that the forces of life in nature and in the world are his to use if he but understands them.

Dr. James M. Yard (Director of Religious Activities, Northwestern University): There is a question in my mind as to whether or not we are trying to name certain things religion which are nothing more or less than scientific psychology. Am I right in assuming that the same values could be realized in human life by the use of your scientific techniques without calling it religion?

Chairman Stevens: The point that I have been trying to make the entire morning, Doctor Yard, is simply this: that unless religion recognizes these things as an essential part of its make-up, it will not have the value that it should have in human experience.

Professor Ralph Emerson Browns (Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, Illinois): As I understand you, you do not require that people making use of prayer as a technique should believe in God. Personally, I cannot see any difference between the description that you gave a moment ago of this woman leading the religious life, and morality.

Chairman Stevens: The difference is this: that morality as it is objectively determined constitutes a particular attitude toward certain social values as related specifically to the social situation in which the individual is living. The valuing attitude that I think of as the dominant basis for religion has a larger point of reference. It has its significance largely in the terms in which the individual interprets his life history, seeing it as he does in terms of the larger life of the universe as he experiences it from day to day, and as he seeks to interpret it in terms of ultimate rather than immediate meaning.

Professor Browns: I have a question that I should like to have Doctor Sadler and Doctor Stevens answer. Do you consider that there is a real difference in motivating force between differing conceptions of the ultimate reality? For example, will the conception of a personal God be more effective in dealing with people than the conception of an impersonal totality of existence, or a summation of human ideals, or an impersonal tendency of the universe or any of the other modern interpretations?

Doctor Sadler: I would make no attempt to use as a therapeutic agent the concept of an impersonal God. I would write that off as a total loss. I am dealing with personality, and I do not care to waste my time on any such impossible wild-goose chase as to get a personality to look for some help from some impersonality. I like to use cosmos and star dust and all this thing as a stage setting, but I ask this individual to do what I do; try to personalize it. He can take it in Jesus Christ or he can take it in Mohammed. But I ask these people to personalize this thing and get down to brass tacks. I get right down to dealing as a person with a person and about a Person.

Dr. R. D. Hollington (Garrett Biblical Institute, Chicago, Illinois): The most practical problem that we ministers face is this: Where should the dividing line be drawn between the task of the minister and the task of the psychiatrist or the healer?

Chairman Stevens: It is impossible to make a categorical answer to this question. In general, one may say that a thorough knowledge of mental mechanisms and mental deficiencies is essential as equipment for every minister who intends to do any work in mental hygiene. The more clearly he understands and can isolate symptoms common to mental and emotional disorders of a pathological nature, the more simple it will be for him to determine when a case necessitates the type of treatment which he can give, and when that same case should be sent to a trained psychiatrist.

Doctor Hollington: The question is: Can the average minister be so trained?

Chairman Stevens: I think that if he is to be the pastor that he ought to be in this coming generation, he will have to be able to make those distinctions.

Mr. Lewis F. Lessemann (President Chicago Training School, Chicago, Illinois): Recently there have been a few books published that have attempted to give the pastor some direction in the cure of souls, such as MacKenzie's *Souls in the Making* and Pim's *Spiritual Direction.* Can you recite any other authorities or any other books that would be of real value?

Chairman Stevens: These books are very good, but are too general and untechnical to be of real value. I have the feeling that every candidate for the ministry ought to have a certain amount of clinical work and have been thoroughly trained in the principles of normal mental hygiene. I do not believe that the minister in the field who has not had this thorough

background can do very much more than get the broad and very general information with regard to these problems. I would recommend that he read Professor Morgan's book on the *Psychology of Abnormal People* and Pressy's book entitled *Mental Abnormality and Deficiency*. He could read with profit White's volume on *Mental Mechanisms and Character Formation*. I believe that every minister should take the *Journal of Mental Hygiene* and read all the bulletins which are edited by this *Journal*.

V. RESEARCH IN THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGION

1. RESEARCH IN RELIGION

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IN an article by Koos and Crawford, *School and Society*, December, 1921, there is presented a discussion of past and present aims of higher education. I am aware that we are not concerned here with higher education only, nor merely with what is ordinarily described as formal education. The list is, nevertheless, interesting and suggestive and is broadly enough conceived to include the problem of this conference. I have selected from the list those aims which seem to come directly within our purview and want to present you the contrasts.

The first list was numerically determined by the number of times a particular item was mentioned in the leading discussions found between 1842 and 1876. The same items were counted in discussions occurring between the years 1909 and 1921. The items chosen and their contrasting frequency of mention are as follows:

Civic and social responsibility,	past, 8;	present, 30
Morality and character,	" , 15;	" , 25
Religion,	" , 13;	" , 14
Leadership,	" , 3;	" , 11
Domestic responsibility,	" , 1;	" , 6
Manners,	" , 2;	" , 0
Training for life's needs,	" , 2;	" , 10
Guidance and exploration,	" , 0;	" , 7

With the exception of manners, the frequency of mention is all in favor of the later period. The total frequency for these items is, proportionally to the total number of items, past, 44, present, 54. The interpretation of such figures is obscure—assuming their accuracy. We may, however, picture to ourselves the reflections of the thoughtful educator as he listed his aims in the two different periods. The complexity of the social structure has grown. The means of communication are more numerous and more rapid. These changes in themselves thrust upon his attention in the later period a greater number of defections from the ideals he automatically seeks to foster. Insofar as we are able to judge, his measures of the relative number and of their relative importance are still the crude ones of the earlier period. The impacts are greater and more frequent; some of the techniques of abandonment of standards are more spectacular. The identity of standards for the two periods is tacitly assumed. No wonder that the urge to influence youth through the formal educative process shows increasing mention.

Other explanations will doubtless occur to you. I hope some of them will appear as we proceed. Just now I would emphasize the need for research in the direction of knowing *what is actually taking place in the whole time series in which we live.* To become a reformer about an item of social or individual behavior which does not strike my particular fancy makes no appeal to my understanding of modern scientific method. Nor do I believe that such an attitude eliminates the reformer. Sanctions have always existed. Men have suffered, to live by them; they have suffered, to break them. The research problem emphasized here lies *in determining the changing relative strengths of those*

sanctions by which men live. Is the numerical relationship represented by the figures just quoted, indicative of continued lack of social emphasis upon the religious element, or does it represent the relative strength of this element in character development as that is conceived by the educator? The figures are used wholly as illustrative. The problem is general, apart from these data.

It is perhaps apparent that the research field just presented is secondary to finding out *what the sanctions are by which men live.* Some few do not choose to live straight through. Others exist but do not seem to live fully. *There are relative ways of living.* Conceptions of the good life have a tendency to be "fuzzy," to use a bit of scientific slang. "Good" boys sometimes become "bad" men.

A third general problem appears immediately. *Are there any elements of consistency in characterizations of stages of growth in a particular individual?* These are sometimes spoken of as persistent patterns of behavior. To be more specific: What can be changed and what cannot be changed? Do we need to make any changes? *If the environmental factors, that is, "reacted to" situations, retained their relative qualities and strengths, would religion as a function of life also retain a constant value?* More pertinently possibly, can the behavior of a boy or girl be translated into a formula which will enable us to compare the boy or girl with the resulting man or woman?

The problems I have just listed, strength of sanctions —relative groups of sanctions and relative constancy of these—are characterized by one feature: they all present the logical aspect of relativity. Not perhaps as that is conceived by the physicist, but at least in respect to their interplay. Presumably we shall find

as we develop more adequate understanding of these problems that they do shift and change and that their values undergo transformations of many kinds.

May I quote an illustration from Langmuir? " . . . Imagine two planets moving past one another at high velocity, and two observers, one on each planet, provided with means for observing each other and communicating with each other, by such means, for example, as light signals. Einstein asks, What are the operations by which the two observers could compare their units of length and time? He finds that each observer would logically conclude that the other observer's unit of length is shorter than his own, and that the other's unit of time is longer than his own" (*Science*, October 25, 1929, p. 388).

The problems for the physicist become questions of closer approximations to descriptions of happenings. We are much farther removed from the accuracy of description in discussing the function of religion in the molding of character.

I have inserted this illustration at the close of the brief statement of the three general problems because it seems that we must not only exercise care in the statement of the problems for research, but also must proceed with caution in their solution.

It may justly be asked further, why I consider (*a*) the question of what is taking place, or (*b*) why it is necessary to seek out by what sanctions men choose to live, or (*c*) the relative persistence of factors in the genetic process, sufficiently important here to place them at the beginning of the fields for research. My answer would be that to focus on a single factor, however significant it might be, is not scientific description of operations taking place. Attack upon these general questions of social change will establish a broad base

upon which the finer questions of practice can be investigated with a surer hand.

We may now turn to a few questions of this last type.

If we look at the problem of religion as functioning in the life of the individual, or in a group, more closely, there is perhaps one problem which overshadows all others. It may be briefly stated as the problem of the genuine religious attitude and the character of the effects which such an attitude is expected to produce. I believe that the important phase of this statement lies in the discovery of the religious attitude among the multiplicity of responses that are possible. For example, different points of view may characterize an attitude and form of behavior as religious, as political (that is, patriotic), as domestic, æsthetic, and so forth. It is for this reason that I feel rather strongly the need for a more compact consensus regarding the characteristics of the religious attitude.

Scientifically we might readily approach the problem of developing an attitude without any investigation of the above question. That is, we might proceed to raise the general question of the genetic process, indicate within that process *the position and significance of attitudes*, then proceed to show *how attitudes are useful tools in the process of growth and for measuring the stages of growth.* We are coming to recognize, however, that abstract investigations of this type are rather likely to produce even more abstract concepts which do not bear any close relation to reality. What the investigator will find to be much safer ground is the field of operations which apparently contains the germ of truth he seeks to discover. It is for this reason that I have put the research respecting the sharpening of the concept of religious attitude first.

So soon as there is a fair agreement with respect to characteristics of the religious attitude, the findings regarding other attitudes may be brought to bear upon the mechanics of the process by which these attitudes are induced. We are all aware of the many attitudes which have characterized the religious life through preceding periods of history. It is probably among these that we shall discover the process which has been most powerful in the development of one or the other historical attitude. The experimental method is also of great importance here, provided we can bend its rather rigorous rules to our complex data.

I have in mind, of course, the probability of developing better methods for formulating curricula, for writing its materials, and for ordering those materials. I have in mind also the relationship between formal and informal inculcation of attitude. Such a question as the effect produced by separation of church and state on the religious attitude—the separation in more recent times of church and state and education—is also a typical problem within this group of problems relating to the mechanics of the process.

I have assumed that it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss with you the techniques of research in these problems that I am mentioning. Those of you who are interested in the question of attitudes will immediately recall the numerous papers that have appeared within the last few years involving questions of method and measurement. We are, I think, sharpening the tools which may be of use within this field. I am of the opinion nevertheless that the methods we have now are not sufficiently attuned to the character of the problem to do more than clarify our ideas respecting the problems and to indicate the character of new methods not yet invented.

Within the field of attitudes is the further question of the multiplicity of situations which must be responded to. Or, put in another way, it is the psychological question of specificity of response. Some of the investigations of the last few years—and certainly one well-known psychological theory—point to the belief that no such thing as a general attitude exists. What actually does exist is a series of attitudes or responses to an equally large series of separably describable events. Whether or not we approve the position taken by those who hold the general attitude view, that is, that there is such a thing as the genuinely religious attitude, or whether we hold the second view, research is also possible in the latter case. For example, *we shall need to determine all the kinds of responses which an individual is required to make that ought to be influenced by the religious point of view.* That is, there are many ways in which a situation may be responded to. Certain of those are described as religious plus the other necessary factors; others are described as secular plus the other necessary factors. If we want to make people honest, all of those situations to which the term "honesty" may be properly attached, can be listed and the matter of the teaching which religion should give determined in each specific instance.

It seems highly probable that we shall find both of these lines of research converging in what may be called *kindred attitudes and responses.* It is in this general notion that I think one of the great interests for research lies. We may list either a series of responses and situations or a series of more generalized attitudes. The problem will become in either case, How closely are these related? Is there, for example, a closer relation between the political attitude or political situations and the religious attitude than there

is between the ethical attitude and the religious attitude? A careful investigation of the possibilities that seem to inhere in this problem suggests that there may be a closer relationship of some sort between certain of these and the religious attitude than between certain others and the religious attitude. If this should be true, the consequences for practice seem rather great. The principle for developing attitudes might take some such shape as this. In order to develop a religious attitude there should be an educational process directly bearing upon that attitude and supplementary educational processes bearing upon its associated attitudes with decreasing strength. For example, the æsthetic attitude, the altruistic attitude, and the ethical attitude, to mention no others, should, perhaps, have their appropriate educational processes closely enough associated with the one we are attempting to inculcate so that the conditioning process will be physiologically and psychologically sound.

In summarizing the problems I have discussed they may be described as falling into two general groups: *First*, those problems which concern the general structure of society and the place of any factor in influencing the past, present, or future conditions of that society. *Second*, the specific effect that a religious attitude when properly defined in terms of the first problem will have upon the individuals acting with respect to the complex series of influences and sanctions which make up the thing known as character.

It may be wise to say in conclusion that the above formulation of questions needs considerable refinement and restatement before they are satisfactorily shaped to the hand of the investigator. Each one must be discussed in the light of the methods of investigation that are available. Undoubtedly, each one needs a

genius to invent and to use new methods more appropriate to the complexity of the situations involved. We are in the early stages of the belief that social problems are open to scientific methods of investigation. The crudeness of present-day attempts need not discourage us.

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2. SOME PROBLEMS DEFINED

BY PAUL H. VIETH

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MOST of the great questions which have challenged human thinking have first been discussed on the basis of untested assumptions and only later in the light of scientific fact. The question of the relation of religion to moral conduct is no exception. Not so long ago the broad assumption that *of course* religion is a primary factor in motivating conduct was generally accepted. More recently there has been a tendency to question this assumption, taking the form in many communities of systems of moral education from which the religious element is entirely absent. Many of those advocating religious education have countered with the assertion that no system of moral education will reach its highest effectiveness unless it finds its basis in a faith in the nature of the universe as itself

moral and personal, or as some put it, unless it is "undergirded with the sanctions of religion." This has drawn such rejoinders as, "Morals have no need of support in dogmatic theology."

Wherever there is a vital problem such as is involved here, there must be facts which, if known, will lift the solution out of the field of assumption and place it on a plane of scientific proof. What are the facts in this case? It is high time that the instruments of educational research were invoked to help in finding them.

The problem to which we are inviting the attention of research may be simply stated as follows: *Is religion a factor in motivating conduct?*

But the problem itself is by no means simple. Before we can make any progress toward a solution, we must come to some agreement as to what we mean by religion. We all use the word freely and without hesitation, but to what extent do our ideas of what religion is coincide? It is conceivable that one man in this conference would give an affirmative answer to our major problem as stated above, and another a negative answer, not because they have widely different ideas of the factors which motivate conduct, but because their definitions of religion differ very widely. The principle of religious freedom has been carried into the very definition of the thing itself. This may be very well in developing the individual religious consciousness, but it will not do as a point of departure from which to launch a program of research. Here at least we must have a common understanding of what we mean by the terms we use. This does not mean, however, that there must necessarily be one conception of religion which is accepted by all. We may well recognize several possible types of religion (for example, religion of authority, religion of freedom,

"humanitarian" religion) and investigate the different types side by side to determine their influence on conduct.

There are some definitions of religion which make it so nearly coincide with moral character that it becomes impossible to ask the question whether religion is a factor in motivating conduct, because religion *is* moral conduct. The vast majority of religious leaders would, I think, take the point of view that religion must permeate all of life and that a person could not be spoken of as genuinely religious unless religion *did* manifest itself in conduct. Yet they would find in religion more than a pattern of ethical conduct. It would seem that for the purposes of our investigations we would need to separate out from the total concept of religion this "plus" element which distinguishes it from ethical conduct as such. Let us be clear, however, that after we have made this arbitrary division we are not dealing with religion in the full sense of the term.

It is not a part of the task of this paper to state what these elements are which make experience specifically religious. Yet such a statement must be made before our research can proceed. Perhaps just a suggestion will not be out of place. It would seem to the writer that religion is not so much a thing in itself separate and apart from the rest of life, but, rather, an attitude toward the whole of life. In this attitude a large place is accorded to belief, valuation, and faith. There is belief in a higher power, a Supreme Being who sustains a very definite relationship to the world and to the individual human personality. There is a sense of values. The Supreme Being is regarded as the embodiment of the highest values, as interested in the conservation of values, and

through him a criterion is established whereby all other values may be seen in perspective. There is faith, a firm conviction that the character and purpose of the Supreme Being may be shared by human beings and that these ideals will be progressively realized in the world and in human society. The specific content which any religious person will embody in his own religious attitudes will be determined, on the one hand, by the particular religion he professes and, on the other hand, by his own religious experience. The Christian will approximate the teaching of Jesus in his beliefs, his valuations, and his faith.

Assuming that for practical purposes we may agree on our meaning of religion, we are next confronted with the task of devising instruments whereby the religiousness of persons may be measured. We will have no basis on which to demonstrate the efficacy of religion in moral conduct until we have some reasonably accurate means of measuring religion. Merely to assume that persons who have attended religious schools must therefore be religious persons is not an adequate basis for a scientific investigation.

Progress in this field of measurement has been slow. It is perhaps one of the most difficult fields which the measurement movement has approached. It would seem, however, that some of the techniques which have been employed for the measurement of attitudes, the measurement of appreciation, and the measurement of belief might provide a clue for a possible battery of tests through which a religious index might be established. If we think of religion in terms of attitudes, we may investigate such problems as the following: How do specific attitudes originate and develop? What is the range in attitudes within a given area, such as race relations? What shifts in attitudes are possible,

for example, with reference to the growth of attitudes and sympathies to include more persons and greater causes?

Another problem which confronts us in pursuing research in the field under discussion is that of adequate measurements of ethical conduct. This involves, on the one hand, a definition of what shall be deemed to be desirable conduct and, on the other hand, a scheme for the measurement of performance. Fortunately, in this field of investigation much progress has been made in recent years. Through the efforts of Hartshorne and May, Watson, and others, we may look with hope to the time when a battery of tests shall be available which will give us a valid index of ethical character and conduct.

We are now ready to consider possible approaches to the scientific solution of the problem to which we have set ourselves. Assuming that we have successfully negotiated hurdles discussed above, we have still a long way to go before arriving at a solution of our problem. We have, in fact, only collected and sharpened our tools ready to begin the task.

Ask any twenty-five intelligent men and women whether religious people, on the whole, are better morally than nonreligious people, and the chances are that the vast majority will answer in the affirmative. The reason for such easy disposal of the question is in itself an indication of the difficulty of the task which awaits us. The uncritical evaluation of character does not take account of the many variables which determine the behavior of any particular individual, and easily assigns the qualities of religious people to religion as a primary cause. Granted that, on the whole, religious persons may be of higher ethical character than those who are not religious, is it not true that other

conditions which affect character may be more favorable for those who are the religious people of the community than for those who have taken no interest in religion? For example, the religious people may come from the "better" families. Before we can establish experimental conditions we must bring under control the various factors which determine conduct so that the one factor of religion may be the variable, the application of which is to be measured in our experimental work. This indicates the necessity for analyzing the various factors which motivate conduct so that they may be brought under proper control.

We should not overlook the fact that there are a few studies which have been made having a direct or indirect bearing on our problem. Some of them are very suggestive from the standpoint of procedure. Without attempting to give an exhaustive review of such studies, brief references may be made to three or four.

1. Mr. Merle E. Bonney of Salem, Oregon, attempted to discover in a group of high-school students how important religious influence is in character attainment, and what types of religious influence are of most value. The method employed was that of (1) separating the student body into three character groups (highest, second highest, and lowest) on the basis of students' and teachers' judgments; (2) having each student fill out a questionnaire to determine the extent of the religious influences operating in each group. He found that the groups ranking highest in character also ranked highest in Sunday-school attendance, church membership, church attendance, attendance at young people's societies, Bible reading, habits of prayer, participation in church activities, and the reading of religious literature. This, of course, does not give

conclusive evidence of the efficacy of religious influence because it may be that high rank in desirable character has led them to an interest in such religious activities rather than that the religious activities have been influential in the development of character. He found also that there is little or no relationship between character and the factors of religious influence over which the individual has little or no control, such as the religious habits of parents, children's bed-time prayers, blessing at table, and parents' instruction in right and wrong. The investigator's conclusion from his study is that there is a close relationship between character attainment and religious influence, provided that this influence come through the students' own wishes and desires.[1]

2. The extended investigations carried on by Hartshorne and May under the Character Education Inquiry have revealed much data which have a direct and indirect bearing on our problem. Among these should be classed their investigation into the religious ideas of children and the relationship between certain types of conduct and religious influence in home or Sunday school.

3. Harold S. Tuttle, of the University of Oregon, made an attempt to test the value for character growth of (1) worship, (2) moral instruction, (3) projects in co-operative altruism, and (4) Bible study. He divided one hundred forty-three grade-school pupils into six groups. One group received training in all the four elements, a second group had worship omitted, a third group had moral instruction omitted, a fourth group had projects omitted, a fifth group had Bible study omitted, and a sixth (the control group) had no

[1]Bonney, Merle E., "What Forms of Religious Influence Are of Most Value in Character Building?" *International Journal of Religious Education*, October, 1927.

training in any of the elements. He attempted to check the effectiveness of each of these methods of approach by means of a battery of tests covering religious ideas, civic attitudes, and cheating.[2] Professor Tuttle is at the present time experimenting with the influence of worship on conduct.

4. Mr. Harold I. Donnelly, Director of Research of the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church, U. S. A., is at present engaged in an investigation through which he plans to establish a test for the measurement of faith in God among high-school students. He plans to use this test in connection with the curriculum of the church school in order that its effectiveness may be measured. It is intended to become one of a battery of such tests. Mr. Donnelly says about his study: "Faith in God is combined to include at least belief in God which is largely intellectual, a feeling of trust or confidence in God and an actual influence upon conduct in certain situations. The test has been constructed upon the basis of these three divisions. Part I of the test is a vocabulary containing a list of moral or religious terms used in the rest of the test or important in the religious instruction of high-school boys and girls, particularly as it relates to faith in God. Part II is a list of general questions involving certain beliefs, attitudes, practices, and habits which may be influenced by faith in God. This part of the test consists of questions with suggested answers which are to be checked. Part III is a collection of statements of attitudes involving either trust or distrust in God or the lack of both. This material is planned to form a scale similar to the scale developed by Professor Chave, 'Measuring

[2] Tuttle, Harold S., "Testing the Curriculum in Its Natural Setting," *Religious Education*, February, 1929.

Attitudes Toward the Church.' Part IV of the test is a series of questions involving various forms of belief. The preceding part is planned to indicate only attitudes toward God without giving any special indication of the concept of God in the mind of the pupil. Part IV in this way supplements Part III by attempting to discover the meaning of that concept."

The test is still in its experimental stages. It has been given to approximately one thousand boys and girls of high-school age in summer camps and conferences. The investigator states that it is still too early to make any prediction concerning the possible success or value of this undertaking, but that his work to date has re-emphasized the great need for the development of some such instruments.

Nothing could be more useful both to religious education and to moral education than to have a large group of investigators center attention on this problem of the relation of religion to ethical conduct. The thing at stake is too important for us to be satisfied with general assumptions.

The Committee on Arrangements for this conference suggested that I state a few problems which, in their solution, might have a bearing on the major question of the place of religion in motivating conduct. Here are a few random suggestions which have come to me from various sources:

1. Faith in God and its relation to ethical conduct. This is the study which Mr. Donnelly has in process, as applied to high-school students, which was described above.

2. To what extent does the experience of worship influence ethical discrimination and moral conduct in actual situations?

3. The relative effectiveness of moral instruction

apart from religion, and the same moral instruction given under religious interpretations.

4. How does religious education as practiced in our best religious schools differ from moral education in our best day schools? In other words, what is the distinguishing mark of religious education as it has taken shape in actual practice?

5. To what extent, if any, are religiously educated persons superior to similar groups not so educated in (1) ethical discrimination, (2) fair-mindedness, (3) large-group consciousness, (4) moral conduct in situations which permit deceit, theft, lying, or other negative responses?

6. What is the relative lag between moral knowledge and moral conduct in (1) persons who are religiously educated, (2) persons who are not religiously educated?

7. To what extent have religious educators recognized the need for sound moral education as a part of religious education as evidenced in the situations utilized, the social facts provided, and the ethical principles enunciated in the best modern curriculum materials?

8. Do religious leaders recognize the essential relation between religion and conduct outcomes, as revealed in the content of modern sermons?

9. A comparative study of the religious biographies of one hundred best citizens and one hundred notoriously undesirable citizens.

10. An experimental study of the ideals which appeal to growing persons at different ages to determine to what extent religious ideals find a place among them.

11. A study to determine the correlation between participation in religious schools and other agencies and the development of religious personality.

12. The influence of religion in shifting attitudes and rectifying ethical norms.

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3. FORUM DISCUSSION

Chairman Yoakum: The question of research in the field of religion as related to conduct is now open for general discussion (Dean Yoakum, being called from the conference asked Dr. Charles E. Rugh to take the chair).

Rev. F. H. Hutchins (Curate, Grace Episcopal Church, Oak Park, Illinois): Ought not another question to be added to the list given by Doctor Vieth at the end of his paper—the question as to the priority of religion or morality? If there is a correlation between religion and morality, is it because religious education has inculcated morality or because people of moral standing naturally seek religion?

Chairman Rugh: Doctor Vieth stated that in research dealing with the relation of religion to morality religion would have to be made the variable factor. What are some ways in which religion could be made a variable factor?

Doctor Vieth: Religion is made a variable factor when we undertake to discover the relative moral status of persons who are receiving religious instruction and those who are not.

Chairman Rugh: If we accept the statement that every human being is incurably religious, is it not difficult to make religion a variable, since everyone will have some of it?

Doctor Vieth: It would be the quality of the religion possessed that would then be the variable.

Doctor Coe: May I make a suggestion on that point? I am constantly troubled by the attempt of myself and other people to use the term "religion" in a general sense. When I come to the details of history and of conduct, I discover that in every instance religion is something specific. There are many different religions, and within the religion here most commonly represented, the Christian religion, there are also a great many variations. Anything that men want can be religious. Everything that men want has been made religious. Religion can sanctify anything that anybody wants, and it has done it. I do not see, then, how we are going to reach economy in our thinking and research by the continual use of the term "religion" without qualification. It seems to me that our researches, if they are going to be fruitful, have to assume that the theme being investigated has the specific character of some sort of religion in some sort of situation.

Mr. W. J. Mutch (Ripon, Wisconsin): Are there any elements in religiousness that can be measured and, if so, what are they? Similarly, are there other elements that cannot be measured? To be specific, consider particular values like truthfulness or duty. Can these qualities be measured?

Doctor Vieth: This is the crux of the whole matter. How are we to determine in quantitative terms the thing I have called religiousness? It is conceivable that by a battery of tests we can secure some kind of index by means of which we can say, "That person is a religious person and this person is not so religious." Tests for attitude have been conducted with some success. Donnelly is trying to measure faith in God. If he can do this, he can determine how faith correlates with moral conduct by using a battery of moral conduct tests.

Chairman Rugh: What is the difference between quantitative measurements in which you have a quantitative unit and measurements in which you merely rank?

Doctor Vieth: I think the idea you have in mind is that we have no absolute from which to start. If we have a numerical score, we can then rank, but we can also rank without necessarily having a numerical score.

Doctor Betts: We have, I think, no measures of religiousness on the personal side, though when we are measuring attitudes we are coming close to this problem. There are, however, many quantitative facts in connection with the individual's relation to religious institutions which it would be desirable to know.

What, for example, is the correlation between one's participation in the formal aspects of religion and his conduct? That question can be made entirely objective and quantitative. We could discover, for example, whether the fifty per cent of our people who are in more or less close contact with our churches rate better in divorces, crimes of violence, or other specified lines of behavior than do the fifty per cent who have no church connection. A careful study of the religious biography of (say) five hundred distinguished individuals and five hundred individuals notorious for their bad citizenship would indicate something of the relation of at least formal religiousness to conduct and character.

Doctor Coe: It strikes me that the difficulty we are facing is a difficulty of technique and method and not a difficulty of theory. Thorndike has said, "Whatever exists, exists in some measure." Apparently, anything that we can comprehend is objectively there and can be apprehended as more or less. If so, then it can be theoretically measured. You can get at it through

observation if in no more exact way, and that is a common method for securing numerical values.

Another problem I should like to suggest: the degree to which conduct is specific. This would seem to require research. If we say that the conduct of an individual is determined by his physical condition, the social situation in which he is placed, or the kind of problem he is facing, then we seem to dissolve moral conduct into a set of atoms so unrelated that we have before us the question, Is there no way of organizing behavior?

I understand that Hartshorne and May found lack of organization in particular children and that some evidence with regard to it will come out in the third volume of their research. That volume will take up specifically the question of the integration of the moral self. A distinction will surely have to be made between the specificity of conduct and the integration of character. These are two concepts that must not be confused.

One or two other problems for research in this field: The psychoanalytic movement, or some parts of it, has brought forth conceptions concerning religion and its sources of motivation. Freud makes specific affirmations as to the fundamental religious motivations. Are these affirmations wholly true, or partly true, or wholly false? This is a field of research that is entirely practicable.

A second problem seems to be forced upon us by the conditions or our world: For a long time there has been a type of economic thought which has maintained that the fundamental control within religion is economic. This, then, becomes the question: Is religion wholly controlled by economic motives, or partly controlled by such motives, or not controlled by economic motives

at all? This is a problem of first-class significance in our world. We need to know, for example, to what extent the Christian churches about us are actually under the control of economic presuppositions. If we could ascertain that, we could immediately judge what next needs to be done in certain directions in the churches.

Mrs. Arthur G. Gill (State Chairman Child Study Circles, Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers, Chicago): My question is on the degree of reliability and validity in the various ethical tests and attitudes tests which have been proposed. Do these tests reflect the true character of the pupil upon whom they are used?

Mr. Hutchins: I have the same question about verbal testing. You may ask a pupil about the extent to which he trusts God, and he may answer you, but can you really tell how much he trusts without placing him in some situation where he shows his trust or lack of it?

Doctor Vieth: A person's statement of his moral conviction or religious attitude is, of course, not necessarily an index of the conduct which will follow. Nevertheless, intelligence or moral insight is a factor in intelligent moral behavior. We need to know whether a failure in moral conduct is due to lack of knowledge, lack of intelligence, rather than to lack of good will. Any true test of conduct must, of course, be taken in connection with actual situations where adjustment is required. The difficulty is to get a situation that is actual and real. The pupil must not know that he is being checked upon. There is also the difficulty of placing a child in a situation where he is tempted to do wrong and thereby actually teaching him wrong conduct.

Doctor Betts: Going back, for a moment, of the question of testing conduct. There is real educational value in the testing of moral and religious discriminations. For, while we cannot be sure that good conduct will follow proper discrimination of moral values, nevertheless without clear discrimination good conduct will follow only by imitation or accident, and such conduct is, of course, not moral in the true sense. If we should discover, for example, that our children and youth are not keenly sensitive to moral values, then here is a part of their education that would need attention. If, on the other hand, we should find that their moral discrimination is sufficient but that their conduct is unsatisfactory, then the problem would seem to be one of ideals and other forms of motivation.

Professor V. D. Melconian (Bible and Religious Education, Parsons College, Fairfield, Iowa): May I inquire whether or not there has been research on the teaching value of the Bible as related to conduct and character?

Doctor Vieth: Professor Tuttle, of Oregon University, used biblical instruction as one factor in the study reported in the *Religious Education Association Magazine* of February, 1929. This study was not very exhaustive, but the method is interesting.

Mr. H. P. Armstrong (Maywood, Illinois): How are we to understand the term "conduct"? Does it include ethical integrity, various altruistic qualities, such as service, sharing, or what is its meaning?

The question was referred for answer to Doctor Betts.

Doctor Betts: I doubt very much whether we will gain for our present purpose by any attempt at formal or technical definition of conduct. Conduct is one's reaction in adjusting himself to the situations which

he meets. A situation is any set-up in experience which requires some adjustment or readjustment. The way one behaves and what he does when he meets that situation is his conduct for that situation. Conduct summarizes the details of behavior; character summarizes the concept of conduct.

Chairman Rugh: Yesterday you stated that character is inseparably related to conduct. Do you imply by that that conduct is not retroactive into character? Character has been defined by Charters as the sum total of conduct. That such definition is correct there can be no doubt, but character also is a predisposition to more conduct of the same kind that went into the making of that character.

Dr. S. M. Duvall (Scarritt College, Nashville, Tennessee): One of the problems that we feel as teachers is the need for a research which will help us put in the set-up capable of producing the results we seek. I don't know that any research has ever been made on what and how to teach in order to produce character. The researches I know about are in the fields of arithmetic, reading, and the like. Do we have any comparable studies as to the educational procedures which will result in the development of personality traits? And if there are no such studies, would not this be a fruitful thing to attempt? I should like to know if there is any research which will enable one to know how a course in Bible study or in sociology should be taught in order to produce a certain desired effect.

Mr. William B. Lyon (Chicago): Toledo has a plan which places before the pupils some significant life situation and through a process of discussion helps the children arrive at their own conclusions as to suitable conduct. The Bible, health education, nature study and other elements are brought into the discussion

when they will throw light on the solution of the situation.

Mr. Charles F. Boss (Methodist Board of Education, Chicago): In thinking of educational materials and programs perhaps we should make a distinction between not knowing anything about a subject and its outcomes and knowing it to the point where we can be precise and accurate with reference to the techniques to be employed. In religious education as in general education very little has yet been proved as to the fundamental outcomes. Observation and insight may allow us to know that we are getting results in a certain direction although we cannot accurately measure these results. Physicians were able to tell when their patients had fever and when the fever had subsided long before there were clinical thermometers. We are becoming able to diagnose some of the difficulties of conduct and character without being able to measure them and are in some degree able to determine the educational programs to meet these situations.

Professor Frank M. McKibben (University of Pittsburgh): I heartily endorse what Mr. Boss has just said. Despite our inability to measure and prove in religious education, notable progress has been made in many directions. Yet I think a conference of this kind should go on record as approving the efforts of individuals and organizations now attempting to organize research in this field. It will be a slow process as it has been in public education. People are everywhere looking for facts and seeking methods for the interpreting of these facts into practical programs. The work of the Religious Education Association and of the International Council, in attempting to gather into regular reports research studies which have been going on, lays a heavy responsibility on all of

us who are brave enough to undertake research investigations in our field. All of us will profit by a wider knowledge of what is being done in research.

Mr. Boss: I should like to go back to Doctor Coe's statement that we should use research methods to check on certain things as, for example, claims from psychoanalysis. We should not accept claims or assumptions too easily, but be ready to check on them. As an example of this principle we have Doctor Michelson and men of his type in physical science who have spent ten or fifteen years in re-examining claims as to the speed of light and then found that these claims needed correction. When we have made one experiment or test in our field we should not be too satisfied with our conclusions as true or final.

Doctor Coe: It may perhaps be of interest if I make a very brief reference to the point of techniques as it applies to the character education research made by Hartshorne and May. I can speak with knowledge because I have been on the Advisory Committee and in the beginning had something to do with the original outline. The prime objective of that entire research was a discovery of methods of research in this field. That was clearly understood by the directors of the Institute of Social and Religious Research. We did not assume that we were going to cover a field of knowledge. We started out to find out how we could investigate the field. That research has already cost a good deal over $100,000. That has been expended on precisely this question of valid methods, and if we don't have that kind of concentration on methods, we shall always be at loose ends with the whole business. The matter is one of extraordinary difficulty.

Professor Earle E. Emme (Chicago): I raise the question of curriculum investigations. A point of view

emphasized in current curriculum discussions is that of starting with certain experience situations. I ask Doctor Coe whether there are any investigations showing how we may start with some particular experience and relate it to total experience.

Doctor Coe: I can only refer Professor Emme to an experiment conducted by Miss Atchison, who conceived the idea of living as closely as possible with a group of juniors over a considerable period of time. She went into their homes, associated with them in all ways possible and kept a careful record of what they did and said, following up clues as to their interests and problems. From these contacts she has brought together an illuminating body of data and in addition given us valuable suggestions as to method. She proved that many of the problems present in society are also constantly being met by these juniors. Such research will, I think, help us forward toward a curriculum.

Dr. Martin H. Bickham (Committee on Social Analysis of College Communities, Chicago): Professor Emme has for several years been working with a group of college students in something the same fashion. I have for the last three years been visiting about one hundred colleges and living as far as possible with the students and getting from them their experiences. I have been trying to find out what they are actually passing through, what life situations they are now facing, and the problems which are arising in these situations. I am still in the midst of this project and I am not therefore prepared to speak as to the results.

Mr. Boss: We have in connection with work I am directing a laboratory situation just in its infancy which involves nine churches and two universities. Some of the techniques being applied are as follows:

An attempt to secure a check list of interests and of problems of pupils; study and observation to determine situations which are capable of definition and use; case study; personal interviews.

VI. STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF A PROGRAM OF CHARACTER EDUCATION THAT OMITS RELIGION

1. THE PUBLIC SCHOOL AND CHARACTER EDUCATION

PROFESSOR CHARLES E. RUGH
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THE public schools are the center of reference for this discussion, and in the public schools the child as a citizen is the center of reference. Citizenship, I think, is best defined as a reciprocal obligation of protection and allegiance. The state, as I am using the term this afternoon, I would define, as Burke does, as the partnership of the living, the dead and the yet to be born in all virtue, all science, and all art. "Only the best is good enough for a child," said Goethe, and made the argument on the ground that he represents the cumulative continuity back of him and that he only goes this way once. Dewey said: "What the wisest and the best parents desire for their children, that must the community desire for all children." In these three quotations are four centers of interest and effort: the child, the parents, the community, and the state. In a total social program three others must be added: industry, the church, and the school.

These seven centers of interest and effort constitute interlocking directorates out of which emerge conflicts, confusions, and, in the nature of the case, controversies. The problem before us is greatly com-

plicated by a confusion in certain basic definitions, and this confusion leads to conflict of opinion and even to controversy. What do we mean by the terms "education," "morals," "religion"? A further source of confusion arises from the very rapid change in the logic employed in thinking of educational problems, the Aristotelian class giving way to a statistical group who are attempting to work out a theory of education from the organismal point of view.

Interest in education in "morals" began in England as early as 1891 in a union of ethical culture societies that had as its objective the introduction of systematic moral and scientific instruction in all schools, making the formation of character the chief aim in education. This effort was known as *The Moral Educational League.* (See *Education and World Citizenship*, by Garnett.) A somewhat similar movement has gained headway in the United States for the purpose of introducing instruction in morals and religion into the public schools.

The most remarkable pronouncement on this matter comes from two national documents: (1) *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education*, and (2) the *Report of the Superintendents' Convention in 1928.*[1] Cardinal Prince stated in his first sentence that education is determined by the needs of society, and indicated seven objectives for the educative process, the seventh being *ethical culture.* This he stated to be the inclusive purpose of education.

In 1925 the Superintendents' Convention named a commission to reformulate the objectives of American education, and for the first time the child was made the center of reference. The commission said that education is determined by the need of the learners,

[1] Both published by the National Education Association.

and to discover those needs they went to the learners themselves.

They selected forty-eight school systems in the United States, and for two years the principals and teachers and children were asking: "What do we want? What do we need?" The conclusions of this study are contained in the *Sixth Year Book* of the Department of Superintendents. According to this study, the general objectives of all education are stated as follows: "To promote the development of understanding and appreciation," locating the process within the child, instead of external to it. The commission named four fields in which there is to be promotion of development of understanding and appreciation: (1) the field of self, (2) the world of nature, (3) organized society, (4) the force of law and of love that is operating universally. The individual self, nature, society, and God—these four, and particularly the adjustments which the individual self must make—constitute the objective of education. The report states further, "No greater task rests upon the school than to help its pupils to find their God," and then enunciated as the basis for this method and procedure the love of adventure and the desire to create as strong normal impulses innate in the learners.

The best thinkers in American education are locating the process of education within the life process itself, proceeding from two hypotheses: (1) That life as we live it here and now affords the point of departure in every theory of the inner education or religion. It makes no difference where you are going from here, you will have to start from here. It doesn't make any difference why you are going, you will have to carry your own personal baggage, even though you may discover that some of it is useless. (2) That life as we

live it here and now must afford the criteria of values, the total life span becoming the center of reference for educational theory and practice. This span must be considered at three levels, in four dimensions, in five institutions. The three levels: (1) biological, (2) psychological, and (3) sociological. The four dimensions: (1) the length of days, (2) the breadth of interest, (3) the intensity of this range of interests, and (4) the integration of the total personality or organism in response to its world. The five institutions in which the educational process must center are (1) the family, (2) industry, (3) the church, (4) the state, and (5) the school, each of these having its own principle of authority and obedience.

The school, as an institution, originates in the will of the pupil, not in the legislature or in the parents or in the pupil's ignorance; it originates in his will to attend. He may be sent to the place at the time programed for schooling, but if he does not intend to attend, he is not there. However, that will of his to attend must be matched by the good will of the teacher. The teacher wills that he be good in attendance and good in attention. If she is a spelling teacher, she wills that he be good in spelling. It is the joint endeavor of this will to attend and the good will of the teacher on the subject or on the activity that makes the school emerge.

With such a view of the school, we have an entirely different theory both of the school and of the public. In order to understand the public's view at all, it becomes absolutely essential to distinguish between personal, private, and public experience, and here is the crux of the whole matter, to my mind. You have experiences that are your own; you have access to them and nobody else has. I would not go so far as Whitehead and make that the essential factor in religion, but it certainly

is a fundamental one. You, with your wife or your physician or your attorney or your father confessor, have experiences that you and they alone know are privileged experiences. They are private and they are treated as such and are not to be violated. Then you do things that are public, accessible to all competent observers. That distinction is one of the most important ones for purposes of understanding this problem of religion and education and morals—the distinction between personal and private and public experiences. Perhaps the best single approach is in terms of their accessibility. This personal experience is accessible to one and only one, and it is sacred. Private experience has some forms of sacredness in it. By public experiences we mean those that are accessible to all competent observers and which constitute appropriate material or data for science.

It is not the right nor the duty of religion or the church to dictate or to censor any one of the five institutions. It is not the right nor the duty of the church to dictate to the parents; it is not the right nor the duty of the church to dictate to the industries. I don't need to argue that it has no right to dictate to the state. There are those who would debate the problem of the right of the church or of religion to dictate to the schools.

Now, I come to distinguish between the private and public schools. School as an institution is founded on the authority and obedience within that group of persons within the situation in which they operate. The public school is not a family. I will put it this way: no school is a family. The private school, by selection of the parents and by preferences for the teacher and the subjects, may assume certain responsibilities that the parents want to delegate to it, but

the school emphasizes the mental aspect of experiences and as such does not usurp or take on the function of the parent.

The school is not an industry, no matter how industrious it is. There are trade schools and industrial schools, so called, but they are not industries. The objective there is to make the workman, not to produce the work. The school is not a church and cannot be a church, and any attempt to usurp any of these functions makes the school something else than a school.

The public-school teacher of spelling is in authority in that subject because she is an authority. She is authorized by the law and by the State to take charge of those children in that particular function. She has the respect and support of the children because they attend. She has enough respect of the parents to have the support of the parents in the absence of the children from home. The teacher is authorized by the school administration. In other words, I am bounding the function of any school. The public school has a very limited function. The most remarkable limitation is the fact that the pupil generally gets in the public school at about six years of age, when the biological and the emotional and the sociological set is well on the way.

If the findings of Mr. Adler in Vienna are correct at all, then a large part of the child's primary education that gives him his attitude toward persons and toward his world is over before he ever enters the public school.

No matter how important that looms in the parents' lives or the child's life, that is the fact. When he comes to school, he spends a few hours five days in the week, a few weeks in the year, and when you figure it out, by the time the children are through with high school

they have spent only one tenth of their time in the public schools.

It is not the business of the teacher to teach religion. This starts with the parents in the home. It is not the place of the church to talk to the parents about religion. But if the parents are not religious, they miss the glory of parenthood, because that co-operation with the heavenly Father to perpetuate the race is the highest function that human beings have ever engaged in.

It is not the place of the church to dictate to industry, but the workman who is not a workman unto ultimate things misses the glory of work. It is not the function of the church to dictate to this teacher of chemistry or spelling any religious doctrines, but the teacher who is not religious misses the glory of education.

Let me present that from another angle. Since 1912 the educational theorists have separated educational processes into the range of habits, knowledge, and attitudes. Each of these may be presented as a hierarchy in the realm of responding to recurrent situations. You have impulses; above those you have imitation; above that you have habits; above habits, skill; and above skill, the expert. That is a very interesting hierarchy, and it has in it the same range in function as the statistical group.

Within the realm of the hierarchy of knowledge there might be information, which, if integrated enough to be somewhat reliable, might be knowledge; above knowledge, understanding; above understanding, insight; and above insight, wisdom. Wisdom is somewhat of a religious term.

In the realm of attitudes, apprehension, interest, appreciation and good taste (in the Edmund Burke sense), ideals and sentiment make a very interesting statistical group or range.

Religion in relation to this process of education becomes confused in a maze of definitions. On this problem William Brown, of Oxford, says:

"The religious feeling has been defined by Schleiermacher as a feeling of 'complete dependence.' One finds Professor A. N. Whitehead saying that it is 'what we do with our solitariness.' Professor J. Bissett Pratt defines religion as 'the attitude which the individual takes up towards the determiner of his destiny.' Religious feelings are aroused in the individual so far as he considers, subconsciously or consciously, his relation to God, the determiner of his destiny.

"Among the most general mental attitudes toward existence, the religious attitude should be considered as distinct from (1) the logical attitude, the attitude of thinking things out, (2) the æsthetic attitude of appreciating beauty and ugliness, and (3) the ethical attitude of recognizing moral obligation and different degrees of good. Religion and religious experience are based on a fourth general mental attitude, a very concrete attitude, the attitude of the individual toward the universe so far as he envisages it as something upon which he completely depends and to which he attaches ultimate value. One may think of the individual facing the world with the question, 'What is all this?' The answer is given him in the various sciences, in which there is being gradually worked out a systematic knowledge of the external world and also of the world within. That is knowledge. Or, again, he considers the distinctions of the beautiful, the less beautiful, and the ugly, and finds in himself the power of appreciating these distinctions, which power can be developed more and more adequately in the course of his life through self-discipline.

"Again, he observes that there are different types of actions, some better than others in the given circumstances, and some characters better than others, so that he learns to discriminate between the good and the less good, between good and evil, both of character and of conduct, and he recognizes duty when he sees it. There, again, he attains discipline of character, which gives him ever-deepening insight into the moral aspect of the world.

"Now, so far as we consider these three separate aspects, they seem to represent three distinct and equally fundamental ways of responding to the universe. It may seem that this is all one can do with the universe, namely, appreciate it logically, æsthetically, and ethically. But these three are abstract points of view from which distinct and mutually exclusive aspects of existence are dealt with. Logically, there must be a further attitude, the attitude of the entire man to his entire environment, and this attitude may be named the religious attitude, the attitude which he takes up to the totality of reality, the whole universe, and according to which he may more or less explicitly order his life."[1]

What, then, is the relation of religion to education? In this connection let us consider this synthetic formula for education, taking into account the total life span of the individual. *Education is the total procedure by which personality and institutional progress are achieved.* In other words, the progressive improvement of the learner's behavior, defining behavior as the specific response of an agent to a particular situation.

The function of religion in the total educational process is (1) to aid the individual learner in making

[1] *Science and Personality*, Yale Lectures, 1929, William Brown, Ed. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

right responses to the situations of his daily life, (2) to cultivate within him an enlarging appreciation of and insight into the new situations which he confronts, and (3) to aid him in developing an enlightened conscience with respect to the totality of his experience. Education involves the interplay of intelligence and knowledge and the resultant ability to habituate right responses to the situation which the individual confronts in his life span in all levels and in all dimensions throughout all the institutions of life.

In conclusion, what is the function of the school in the teaching of religion? According to Wieman's definition of religion as worshipful problem-solving, the function of the school is to develop the method of approaching problems by means of a mental aspect of life. That is profoundly set forth by Dewey in his new book, *The Quest for Certainty*. The supreme problem of education is method, the way of facing the problems of the world. The supreme problem of religion is to develop that process of worship that brings about that attitude. Can this be taught in the schools?

Everybody will agree that any subject that is worthy to find a place in the public school is a good enough subject into which the child shall put his whole life and his whole soul, and never will religion or morals or education be so defined that we will stand for indifference or carelessness. And insofar as the total life of the child has been absorbed in the process, he is religious to that extent. It is no credit to God to describe him as being of such a character that he is in or out of school because of something we do or don't do. I don't want to be misunderstood in that, but the good Father of all has more power and his arms are longer than to allow us to decide whether he is in or

out of a child's life because of something we say or do not say in school.

The public schools of America have all the faith that they need. The school has a remarkable function. If it takes the method of approaching life's problem by means of knowledge and intellect, it has fulfilled its function. And if the family and the church, by the respect of persons for persons and the respect of the parents and the pastor and the Sunday-school teacher or the religious teacher, develop that spirit of worship and that attitude toward the heavenly Father that make it possible to talk doctrine and then talk discipline, you have the situation for religious education; and that has no place in the public school.

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2. THE RELIGIOUS MOTIVE IN EDUCATION

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THIS topic, phrased as it is, "Factors of Strength and Weakness in a Program of Education That Omits Religion," will most certainly be interpreted by a great majority of people to point to the supposed deplorable absence of religion in our public schools and the necessity for some sort of church education to supplement that of the schools.

I wonder whether it would help us to see the question

more clearly if we were to ask: "What is omitted from a program of moral education that omits religion?" If religion means Christianity, as inferred parenthetically in the syllabus of this conference, then should we ask about Christianity? Is it the Protestant or the Catholic? If Protestant, is it Baptist, Presbyterian, Methodist, Disciple, Congregational, Unitarian? Is it Baptist of the open or closed membership?

Of course we remember Professor Freeman's and Doctor Tittle's papers of yesterday. They both asserted that ideas are central in conduct control. But I wonder whether having ideas, in some quarters of the church at least, is not a very hazardous undertaking. Which leads us to query further: Whose ideas of religion are omitted from our public schools? In Tennessee and Mississippi, the schools omit reference to evolution, this by State law.

In Arkansas an anti-evolution initiative measure carried almost two to one, and is now in force. In several other States the teaching of evolution has been practically abolished by rulings of boards of education as members of churches. Books on evolution have been publicly burned in three States, and State-appointed committees of Fundamentalists have purged college libraries of scientific works. Page upon page of illustrations of the disgraceful separatism and, one might say, unsocial life of our churches can be cited. Even our liberal churches know scarcely anything of deep-lying co-operation in "worshipful problem-solving."

This country's lack of all genuine co-operativeness and, seemingly, understanding of the reality of religion gives Dewey, it seems to me, every right to say, with regard to religion in the schools:

"We do not find it feasible or desirable to put upon the regular teachers the burden of teaching a subject

which has the nature of religion. The alternative plan of parceling out pupils among religious teachers drawn from their respective churches and denominations brings us up against exactly the matter which has done most to discredit the churches and to discredit the cause, not perhaps of religion, but of organized and institutional religion: the multiplication of rival and competing religious bodies, each with its private inspiration and outlook.

"Our schools, in bringing together those of different nationalities, languages, traditions, and creeds, in assimilating them together upon the basis of what is common and public in endeavor and achievement, are performing an infinitely significant religious work. They are promoting the social unity out of which, in the end, genuine religious unity must grow. Shall we interfere with this work? Shall we run the risk of undoing it by introducing into education a subject which can be taught only by segregating pupils and turning them over at special hours to separate representatives of rival faiths? This would be deliberately to adopt a scheme which is predicated upon the maintenance of social divisions in just the matter, religion, which is empty and futile save as it expresses the basic unities of life.

"We are far, indeed, from having attained an explicit and articulated consciousness of the religious significance of democracy in education and of education in democracy. But some underlying convictions get ingrained in unconscious habit and find expression in obscure intimation and intense labor long before they receive consistent theoretic formulation. In such dim, bland, but effective way, the American people is conscious that its schools serve best the cause of religion in serving the cause of social unification, and that under

certain conditions schools are more religious in substance and in promise without any of the conventional badges and machinery of religious instruction than they could be in cultivating these forms at the expense of a state consciousness."[1]

Speaking somewhat to this same point, Nicholas Murray Butler, in a convocation address before the State University of New York, says:

"The unsatisfactory form and content of our present-day education is to be found in the excessive and impossible burden which is put upon the school by the collapse of the family and the church as co-operating educational agencies. Sound and complete education is a product of three factors—the home, the school and the church. No one of these can assume the task of either of the others, much less that of both of them, and succeed. Where instances of particularly well-trained young men and young women have come to my notice in recent years, I have taken pains to seek out an explanation. Invariably this explanation has been found in the fact that family influence and family discipline were playing their proper part, and that to the school was left only that which the well-organized and well-conducted school can reasonably and properly do. If parents are to turn over the entire training of their children to school-teachers and to abdicate their own just authority and responsibility, we are faced by a situation which, to speak mildly, is alarming."[2]

A proper appraisal of the present situation of adequate character development on the part of our schools will certainly need to give due appreciation to the strenuous efforts now being made in the schools in what is known as character education. School-

[1] John Dewey, *Characters and Events*, p. 514. Reprinted by permission of Henry Holt and Company, publishers.
[2] Reprinted by permission.

men generally recognize that the main drive in the public schools at the present time is that of character education. An increasing number of schools have supervisors, superintendents, directors of character education. Some of these, to be sure, are using a formal course of character training, but an increasing number are making all sorts of experiments in utilizing all the school's processes as they are attached and related to the community for the building of character. In doing this an increasing number of schools, while recognizing the absolute necessity of outlawing sectarianism, claim that they cannot dodge the responsibility of the religious development of their pupils. Nowhere in America is religion outlawed, but throughout the whole of America sectarianism is outlawed, and that only.

One very prominent superintendent, when asked whether he was teaching religion in the public schools, answered: "We are not teaching sectarianism. We are, however, attempting to serve the whole child, and in order to serve the whole child we must develop his appreciation for things of worth. We must relate the child to the great living of man. In doing this we feel we must use the great characters of all ages. To us this is a religious enterprise."

Our time for discussion is limited. May we close this very brief reference to the schools by suggesting that a closer study of the present public schools might reveal the fact that our schools are even more energetically facing the problem of character growth in the children of the land than is either the church or the home? Furthermore, many schoolmen, while emphatically refusing sectarianism a place in the schools, believe that real religion is present in the school.

The answer to the question of "omission of religion" really forces the asking and answering of many ques-

tions. For example, is religion synonymous with institution, or is religion, like science, a phase of life discovering itself? Science may become institutionalized, but it is always vitiated whenever this happens. The university promotes science, but the university is not science. In like manner can our church institutions promote religion without enthralling it? Is not religion fluid, like science, when seen as a phase of life discovering its enrichment?

On this very point, Charles H. Tuttle, the United States district attorney for the district of New York, voiced his feeling as follows. He was talking about "Shooting It Out With Crime," a question that he confronts daily. He said:

"Proper programs set up by the community, or by organizations acting within the community, will go far to reduce the catastrophe of crime. Such programs would seek to lessen the failure of youth properly to employ its spare time; would endeavor usefully to develop the particular capabilities resident in the individual child; would aim at equipping every able-bodied person with a training sufficient to be self-supporting; and would strive to awaken those ideals and moral convictions which impel to right conduct and good citizenship.

"In this task, true education should recognize itself as having the same end as true religion. In the work of promoting social and preventing antisocial conduct, they belong together. They have the same common task and end of fitting the individual more perfectly to his environment in order that he may have a more abundant life. Their difference is solely one of emphasis, for perfect education must teach that which is true and beautiful and good, whereas religion, pure and undefiled, will teach that which is good and beautiful

and true. As said by the great philosopher, Thomas Huxley, in words adopted by Herbert Spencer: 'True science and true religion are twin sisters, and the separation of either from the other is sure to prove the death of both, for science prospers exactly in proportion as does religion, and religion flourishes in exact proportion to the scientific depths and firmness of its base.' "[1]

He goes on further to say: "Although church and state are separate, the unwritten understanding is that the state will remit the taxes of the church and the church will use its utmost endeavor to guarantee the moral integrity of the citizenry of the state. The church, moreover, can teach, and the church can minister. The public conscience and the wayward, unfortunate, and fallen are part of its supreme business. There is no such thing as justice without mercy; and somewhere there must be an imperious and persistent summons to exalted citizenship. The church has its wedding feast ready, but does it go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in?"[2]

In concluding this brief discussion let me generalize some of the tasks that lie before us:

First: getting the church to accept itself as the agent of religion.

Second: re-examining the claims and present programs of week-day religious education as a solution to the lack of religion in the public schools. The effort to provide week-day religious education stands at the present moment on very uncertain ground. If anyone were to ask me to-day just what is the status of week-day religious education in the United States, I should have to hold up my hands, for I do not know.

[1] *Vision*, page 4, October, 1929. Reprinted by permission.
[2] *Ibid.*

Frankly, our information does not at present allow either wholesale affirmations or negations. The whole philosophy of the movement for character education within the school, as well as in the family and the church, is so shifting that the whole matter must have re-examination.

Third: One of the items needing grave attention is the fact that when churches come together, for example like that at Lausanne, the great purposes of the church cannot be discussed. So far only the doctrinal and formal find expression. The struggle of life for spiritual adequacy seems banned, and does not find opportunity for expression.

Fourth: One other thing needs mentioning, and as a warning. As one watches the public-school movement in America, it seems to be taking on its program and its curriculum by accretion rather than by thoughtful discovery and reorganization of what is good for the child. Everything that comes along that is good is added, so that we have community after community in which even the families cannot have their own children. I have children to which that applies. Their time is so occupied by the school that none is left for home or church or other agencies. Hence, the question seems to be this: Are the time element and the physical strength of these children to play any part in the decisions that we make as to what we think is good for them?

My discussion has not followed closely after Professor Rugh's paper. Nor have I answered specifically the question "Factors of Strength and Weakness of a Program of Education That Omits Religion." In summary may I say, first, that sectarianism must be omitted; second, genuine religion is not synonymous with institutionalism; and, third, a religion, when considered

generically, need not be omitted from any education; in fact, no education is worthy when it is omitted.

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3. FORUM DISCUSSION

Chairman Frederick E. Clerk (Superintendent New Trier High School, Winnetka, Illinois): We have a short interval now for open discussion. You have been asked a question. I should be glad if somebody would attempt to answer it.

Mr. Samuel Stagg (Manila, Philippine Islands): What better use can the parents and the church make of the child's time than to have the child prepared in the way the school is now doing it?

Professor Frank M. McKibben (Religious Education, University of Pittsburgh): I think we have had a very illuminating discussion of this broader aspect of education, character education or religious education, whatever you want to call it, a total process with all the factors that represent the different emphases we might have integrated in it.

I share the sentiment expressed by Doctor Artman that the church's effort to get further into the totality of this educational experience in the formal week-day school is on very precarious ground, that the move-

ment is uncertain. The question I have in mind relates to the public-school teacher appreciating the opportunity he has to make all education religious. How can we guarantee in any substantial manner that the teacher and the school that teacher represents will take full advantage of that opportunity? If the teacher doesn't have the religious point of view, if the schools that train our teachers do not include that in their curriculum, what guarantee is there that the large class of teachers and school administrators will include that emphasis in the totality of the public-school experience? I feel also that parents are responsible; but in organized education how can we make sure that our public-school teachers are going to introduce that emphasis in the totality of the educational experience of the child?

Mr. D. W. Staffeld (Minneapolis, Minnesota): It was said by an instructor in the summer session of the University of Minnesota that she was giving the first course in character education in that school of education which has trained thousands of public-school teachers. How the public schools of the State of Minnesota are to train the children in character or religious values without having the technic or securing the technic in the normal school and university, seems difficult to understand.

As a churchman watching the movement of religious education within the Protestant Church of America, frankly I believe that the American Protestant Church is beginning to show the public schools the way of character education. I refer to the leadership of the International Council of Religious Education, which is the Protestant Church of America in action, cooperatively, for religious education. Public-school education is doing character education only in spots.

There are a few bright, shining examples here or there. It is true that the church is doing religious education of a high grade only in spots. But I have a great deal of confidence in the church leadership of America.

Mr. Frank H. Burt (Oak Park, Illinois): In answer to the question asked here as to what better the church or the family could do if the public schools did give them a chance in the lives of their children, let me say that it is very questionable to assume that the public schools are doing everything right and that the home and the church could not do any better. A very vital thing in many of our communities is the way the public school absorbs the life of the children. The parents often regret it. To ask whether the church or the home would do any better if they had a chance is evading the question.

Mr. M. D. McLean (Chicago, Illinois): May we have some illustrations of the constructive work of the church? I should like to hear some of the constructive experiments that the church is conducting in connection with the schools in character education.

Chairman Clerk: Is there anyone here who can give Mr. McLean some suggestions as to specific examples of constructive work being done by churches in this connection?

Mrs. W. T. Sawyer (Evanston, Illinois): I don't know that my experience is quite comparable with that of some of you; I have not taught school, but I have taught Sunday school for over twenty-five years. In not one of the families that have really taken an interest in their children and shown a serious attitude and influence in the lives of their children have those children failed to turn out well. My observation leads me to feel that the parents who did not give their children the religious things of life have lost touch

with them when they have been old enough to go to college and to go out in the world. I have yet to see a case where the children have not turned out well when the parents led them from their babyhood through their childhood with prayer and religious teaching, co-operating with the school and with the church.

Dean Earl K. Hillbrand (University of Wichita, Wichita, Kansas): It would be worth while to find out what the superintendents of the public schools think about this matter.

Two years ago, as State chairman of the South Dakota Committee on Character Education, it was my privilege to interview practically all the superintendents of that State. I found, with respect to week-day religious education, that the majority of them were opposed to it. Their arguments were: "We take our children out of a good classroom situation and put them into what is usually a poor one; we take our children away from well-trained teachers and put them under teachers, usually, who are not so well trained; we take our children away from a good disciplinary situation and put them in a situation which is not a good disciplinary situation."

I asked these superintendents, then, where they thought character education could be applied in the public-school system as such, and I was surprised to find, in a symposium of those men gathered together, that the consensus was that character education could be best taken care of in the public schools through the extra-curricular activities, and not directly through the courses.

Then I asked these men what they thought would be the greatest development in public-school education during the next fifty years with respect to character education. Boiled down, it was this: that the biggest

development will have to do with the emotional life of the children. Whether or not you put ethical instruction, moral instruction, or week-day religious education into the schools, our teachers will increasingly learn more about the development of the emotional life of the children.

Rev. J. W. F. Davies (Winnetka, Illinois): I should like to give an experiment that has worked out recently in answer to the question of one gentleman, which shows the value of co-operation and the possibility of getting an actual result.

Last year, at Halloween, in a near-by town, a man was killed because a rope was stretched across a street and as he went along in a fast machine he was caught under the chin and his neck broken. Another man went to answer the doorbell, and was greeted with rotten tomatoes. He slipped on the porch and was very severely injured.

This year, a month before Halloween, representatives from the high school, the public schools, the police, the village council, the churches, and the parent-teachers' association were called together by the president of the village because he feared if a serious accident occurred, somebody would ask: "Why in the world didn't the village council undertake to straighten things out in advance?"

Briefly, the procedure was this: The student councils in the various schools had the matter brought before them, and they discussed it. They sent their own suggestions to the village president. The Boy Scouts and the Camp Fire Girls and Girl Scouts and boys' clubs of the community did likewise. It was discussed in the church schools, and it was taken up in every group organization in the community.

The result: A very large party was held in the com-

munity house in the village, starting at half-past seven, continuing until ten o'clock, with about three thousand people present. After ten, a dance was held for the older young people. The next morning the police reported that there was not a single piece of mischief committed on the streets of that community on Halloween, and to date many of the boys and girls have been heard to express themselves as rather proud of the fact that they put it over on Halloween.

VII. SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE

1. A REPORT AND INTERPRETATIONS

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IT is a hazardous undertaking to endeavor to point out what this conference has meant. Probably a good deal of time will need to elapse before we can fairly evaluate its meaning.

As I interpret the function which I am to fulfill, it is simply to give a few impressions which have come to one who has sat through the sessions, listened, and participated in the discussion only to a very limited extent. One's reactions are largely determined by his background of experience and his life interests, and I think it is only fair that you should know that the present speaker is connected with religious education in the somewhat popular sense of the term, in so far as it relates to the rank and file of church schools in the forty-one denominations which hold membership in the International Council.

My first feeling is one of gratification in the fact that the place of religion in character education has been so fully recognized in this conference. The very attendance signifies that there is much interest in this subject. We have complimented ourselves on the fact that instead of two hundred there are six hundred or more registrations. Numbers, of course,

do not in themselves signify results, because only what those numbers receive from the conference in new thought and new adventure will determine results; nevertheless, the large attendance is not without significance.

I am frank to confess that as a member of the group called religious educators I am a little disturbed by the fact that most of those I have met are religious educators and that there is but a small representation of those who are specifically responsible for what may be called public education and character education as it manifests itself in the public schools. I am a bit disturbed by this fact, not because I regret that all these religious educators and ministers are here, but because I wish more of the others had recognized the importance of the subjects discussed here.

I have been impressed, during this conference, by the optimistic note which has been struck. Coming into the conference I feared that because of the very nature of the main topic a negative sort of impression would go out as to the value of religion in life. This has not proved the case. While speakers have been willing to face frankly all available facts, there has been, all the way through, an assumption of the great value of religion in human living.

Another impression which has come to me is the weakness inherent in any kind of approach which appears to set religion over against character and conduct. After all, we cannot departmentalize religion in that fashion; and while most of the people in this room probably think of religion as something more than what for lack of a better term I shall call mere conduct (not mere in the sense of being unimportant), and while there are certain factors in religious conduct which may not be present in that which we call just

ethical conduct, nevertheless religion cannot be separated from ethical conduct.

What we have experienced is this: As we think of religion in the broader and more inclusive sense, we approach nearer and nearer to the ideals of ethical conduct; on the other hand, as we look at ethical instruction or moral instruction in the broader and more inclusive sense, we come nearer and nearer to what we call religious education. It seems to me that the very best interests are going to be conserved if we converge the two into one inclusive process which sees the close interrelation between ethics and religion.

A third impression which I have gained in this conference—not very strongly felt, and yet it seemed to crop out a time or two—is of a certain uneasiness lest religion shall not find an important place in the motivation of character and conduct. Perhaps the very fact that the question was raised may have given reasons for that feeling of uneasiness. The thing which impressed me most in this connection was the fact that, on the whole, the speakers who were least closely related professionally to religion were the ones who were most certain about its value. Possibly the reason for that is not so much that those who are professionally connected with religion are less certain about it, except perhaps that being closer to the problem, they have analyzed it more completely and therefore speak with greater caution on certain points.

This leads me to remark that the one subject with which we did not come to grips is that of a clear definition of what we mean by religion. Perhaps it is as well that we didn't, because had we done so in the beginning of the conference we probably never would have passed to the consideration of other subjects. Yet I confess (and perhaps I am the only one who feels this way)

that in the face of the splendid addresses, the two papers we have just heard, and the excellent statements concerning the place of the public school in religious education, I do not know at this moment just what the speakers meant by the religion which the public school can teach.

Personally (and I speak just personally), I liked the way in which Doctor Sadler went at it when he said there are just two things he wants to know about a person's religion: first, if a person believes in God, and second, if he believes in a life hereafter. Some of us realize that these things form essential elements in a person's religion, but we want to go a bit further and find out what is the person's attitude toward others as it may be inspired by his religious convictions and his religious experience.

There is a fourth impression, namely, how little, after all, we know by way of actual fact regarding the fundamental question which we have discussed. A number of speakers, including Doctor Tittle, presented strong arguments in favor of the place of religion in determining conduct. They did so on *a priori* grounds, on grounds of common assumption, on grounds of logic; and yet how little there was of the citing of actual data to bear out the contention.

We had a splendid paper in the first session, on the place of motives; certain studies were cited and certain data given as to the kinds of motives which are effective in life. But when the speaker came to the subject of religion, he just seemed to fade out. While he seemed to regard religion very highly as a motive force, he appeared to be by no means certain as to how we might tie in religion as a motive.

The same uncertainty with reference to actual facts was noticeable in the session this morning when

certain things were said by the present speaker which seemed to bring into question the value of various types of schools which seek to teach religion. To use a phrase which I think Thorndike used in his early studies when he began to put educational psychology on a sounder foundation, the anecdotes that popped up from all over the room, of the beautiful efficacy of the vacation Bible school and the week-day school of religion, were perfectly amazing. But how little there was that could be put on paper, that said: "Now, here are the facts; you can go and find them for yourself, you can make these experiments over and over again, and if you do thus and so, these will be the inevitable results."

This same impression was strengthened in the conference on research, where we discussed the great need for research, and attempted to review a few of the studies which have been made to determine the place of religion. But when the discussion concluded, I think the state of mind could best be described as one of being up in the air, for the reason that, on the one hand, we have very little by way of measuring instruments to determine how important religion is in character, and, on the other, we are just in the beginnings of developing instruments whereby we may test moral character and conduct.

It seems to me that in following up the results of this conference, one of the best things that could be undertaken would be an extensive piece of co-operative research in which we would block out the major problem before us, and then analyze out of that problem certain minor problems which might be attacked by research agencies, graduate students, and others for the purpose of finding an answer to the question, What is the place of religion in motivating character and conduct?

Another impression, which I have felt before, came to me with new force when Doctor Wieman was speaking of a technic for what he called worshipful problem-solving: How little attention is given in our church schools to the technics of the religious life; how much time has been spent in the attempt to teach certain facts, and how little thought has been given to the means of achieving a religious experience? In that brief presentation there was furnished a suggestion which might well occupy the attention of curriculum makers for many sessions to come.

It seems to me exceedingly fortunate that the two great movements of religious education and character education should be considered in the same conference.

Religious education is just beginning to find itself. In many of our churches experiments are going forward which are quite as significant as some of the experiments carried on in the public schools in connection with the teaching of other subjects. Religious education is learning a good deal from the character-education movement; it helps us to slough off some of the unimportant things which have encumbered our curricula, and presses us over into the great areas where religious experience must develop and where religion must have an effective place in human living. If it should be shown that as at present conducted our religious schools are not having the effect on character that they should have, that information would be a blessing in disguise. Some, it is true, might not consider it a blessing; but personally I believe it would help to unify the Protestant Christian forces—well, I need not limit it like that, it would help to unify all the religious forces to focus attention upon a great necessity, a great human need, a great program, and in so doing perhaps would eliminate some of the things which are now taking time

and attention and which do not seem to have a very definite relation to human living.

These, Mr. Chairman, are a few of the thoughts that have come to me in these two days. I think it has been a very worth-while conference.

2. WHAT DID THE CONFERENCE ACCOMPLISH?

DR. PAUL HUTCHINSON
Managing Editor The Christian Century

IT is obvious that in the case of a divided program, where the observer cannot possibly be present at all the meetings, the picture any observer takes away is an incomplete picture. I beg of you to bear that in mind in relation to any comments that I may make. I am speaking only on the basis of the sessions of the conference that it was possible for me to attend.

I am sure that we all feel that Doctor Betts did magnificently by us in his statement of the problem in the opening session. You remember the way in which, at the very beginning, he said that we were here to discuss one single problem, namely, Is religion as we interpret, teach, and practice it to-day capable of motivating life? You remember also his—I fear it must be called optimism, that we would not go astray from the main topic.

What I am supposed to do is to answer three questions, in the light of what has happened since he thus set before us our task. I presume that, just as Doctor Vieth has said that he is answering those questions from the standpoint of one who is engaged in the work of religious education, I should at this point say that I have probably been brought in here to

answer these questions from the standpoint of one who looks at the work of the religious educator from the outside, the man in the street.

Very briefly, I think I could sum up my answer to the first question, *What facts seem fairly dependable?* by saying that aside from the fact to which Doctor Vieth has already referred, namely, the very evident fact of interest in the subject, there appear to be no facts that can be described as dependable.

For the second question, *What hypotheses need further testing?* my answer would have to be "All."

For the third question, *What chief problems await solution?* again my answer would have to be "All."

Doctor Freeman started us off with a psychological treatment. I was surprised that in a group of this kind there was not more dissent. Certainly, in the field of psychology as a whole to-day there would have been considerable dissent expressed in some quarters, and yet while there is always a danger that needs to be kept in mind, that of linking the fate of religion with the fate of any school of thought in another field, Doctor Freeman did a very great service for us—he gave us something solid to go on.

Then Doctor Tittle came along and built on that solid basis his plea for what he called the kingdom of God as the controlling idea to be established in the lives of people. I need not tell you my complete sympathy with that plea and my acceptance of the idea of the kingdom of God as the one that has most inspirational value for me. I wonder, however, whether there is not a danger, if we use such a term as that, in leaving out the child. I know that it is possible to interpret the kingdom of God in terms that are comprehensible and inspiring to the child, but, practically, have we ever done it? Practically, isn't it a

term that at present has meaning only for those in adult years?

From that first session I went into the meeting where we got into immediate and rather strident confusion on the question as to how institutionalized religion can best serve as a means of social control. We were led by Professor Davis with his refreshing sense of the realities of the world in which we live, but it seemed to me that his treatment of the topic left out of account too much those two words which seemed to be the key words, "how" and "best." We could take the rest of what he said for granted. It is a fact that religion always exerts, or attempts to exert, social control, but isn't our trouble largely due to the fact that, to use one of these words that has been used a lot here, the only "technic" for social control that the church has to-day is *force?* that is, by organizing sufficiently the prejudices of the community to put the fear of God into someone.

We are all agreed that the church is losing, or very largely has lost, at least in this part of the country, its power to scare people theologically, but it is building up, or is trying to build up, means of scaring them socially, politically, and in other ways; and yet the very people who are thus scared and who are forced to respond when the church puts on that kind of pressure, and who submit to it, become thereby deeply resentful against the moral pretensions of the church. They think it has been using illegitimate means in dealing with them.

Doctor Bower made some very interesting statements along this line, approaching it, of course, from his particular standpoint, when he said that social approval or disapproval is not a legitimate means for the church's exerting social control. He made this strong statement

too: that when religion is institutionalized in the wrong way, then a tremendous train of evils always follows. Of course that raises the question that is the point of the thing: How much religion to-day is institutionalized in the right way, and what does it mean to be institutionalized in the right way, and does this all imply that you have got to have every so often a breaking away from all institutionalized religion?

Doctor Mecklin tried to deal with the same dilemma by drawing a line of division between the legitimate function of the church to organize religion and the field from which it is debarred by its very nature. I have the greatest respect for Doctor Mecklin. It was my privilege years ago to be a member of his classes in a college where he was making a gallant fight for truth, a fight that later cost him his position. I think that in all his treatment of the various topics with which he dealt while he was here, he had magnificent bases of historical fact. I quite agree with Doctor Vieth that the thing we are in danger of all the time is trying to get along without fact, but I doubt the value of that particular distinction drawn by Doctor Mecklin. I doubt its value when you put it up here, as he did the other afternoon, in terms of Bishop Cannon and what has gone on in the South in the matter of Prohibition enforcement. If you spoke to Bishop Cannon about that, he would accept that position exactly; he would say that it was the last thing in the world that he was attempting to do, to take over the machinery of the enforcement of the law, that he was handing that over to the expert, the government officer. Of course you ought not take your illustration, to begin with, from a hazy example like Bishop Cannon. Take a better one—

take Bishop McConnell. He, more than anyone else, was responsible for what happened in the case of the steel strike. Bishop McConnell would insist, and rightly insist, that he followed exactly the line of division that Doctor Mecklin tried to lay down. He merely collected facts on the basis of which he could make a moral appeal to the community. As to how those facts were to operate in the working out of the time schedule of laborers in the steel plants, that was up to the United States Steel Corporation.

What is the fundamental trouble here? Well, I have got to make a confession that is going to put me down as a conservative, but I believe that the fundamental trouble is our lack of a definition of religion that means anything to us. I notice that our discussion in here yesterday began with religion in the title, and then it shifted, in the papers that were given, to the church, and by the time it got out onto the floor it was the clergy. That is just the course it took, exactly. Religion is confused with the operations of the church. When we people, who don't know whether we have any religion or not, or, if we think we have, can't put it down in terms that mean anything to the mass of men, start to talk about controlling the conduct of those same masses in terms of religion, where are we?

It was just at that point that Doctor Sadler interested me, as he did Doctor Vieth. He knew exactly what he wanted to work with to cure sick minds. He called it faith. What faith? He said religious faith. What religion? Well, he said religion that can take those two points, belief in a Supreme Being and belief in a hereafter. Personally, I think both those points are mighty unsafe for the future, but Doctor Sadler knew exactly what he was dealing with for the present. There were two sentences that Doctor Sadler used that

impressed me tremendously; I wonder if they struck your minds with the force that they struck mine. He said this: "The fetish of an African has more therapeutic value than all the concepts of sublimest pantheism. The fetish at least is concrete; he can grasp it."

That is the trouble with our attempt to relate religion to conduct and character. It is getting less and less concrete. There is nothing that you can grasp. Walter Lippmann is absolutely right on that point. You can sympathize with the redefining of religion to include the whole life, and of course we all do, but the way in which we are going about it is producing confusion rather than clarifying it. That is particularly true for the child, and the child is the crux.

When Mrs. Charters said this morning, "I have four children," I felt like yelling: "Hallelujah! That's the point. I have four children too." We have been reminded that from the time we get to be old folks, say thirteen on, we are pretty hopeless. About all we can do on this sort of thing we are talking about here is to try to make ourselves as innocuous as possible for those who are to come after us.

There have been two words in particular that I have missed out of this conference. I have never heard either one of them. The first one is "right," and the second one is "wrong." Perhaps they should be missed. I doubt it. I think that the disappearance of those two terms tells more than anything else why we are wondering whether the religion we have can have anything to do with character and conduct. Of course it is old-fashioned; it isn't the present jargon, but my boy wants to find out what is *right*, and my neighbor wants to find out what is *right*, and I want to find out what is *right*, and that is the first job religion

has on its hand. If it can't help me there, I don't care what becomes of it.

You can take the old Sunday-school class in its worst form. You can take the old Sunday-school class where the teacher sat here and the boys sat here, and the teacher stood up and said: "Johnny, read the next verse," and Johnny read it: "Peter said, Silver and gold have I none; but such as I have give I thee: . . . rise up and walk."

She said, "Johnny, what does that mean?"

"Be good."

"All right. Tommy, read the next one."

That is pretty terrible; nevertheless, that is true. But at least it had something definite to do with right and wrong in the mind of that youngster.

Of course, I know how these things I am saying can be twisted, but I have got to take a chance. In our determination to escape from these pitfalls of the past I feel that we are heading toward a position where there will be mighty little objective reality or power in our individual religious experience.

I heard it said here in this conference that we must get away from a sense of guilt. Of course I know why that was said. There are certain conditions under which I might say it myself, but I deny it. When I live in a society that has a Fall and a Doheny and a Sinclair in it, and that has me in it, I believe there is a place for a sense of guilt. And I believe that my child, as he grows up, if he gets into a position where he proposes to advance the kingdom of God, ought to have a sense of guilt.

I was talking to a very wealthy woman on the South Side just a few months ago. She is one of the most intelligent women I know in the city of Chicago. She is the woman who entertained Miss Maud Royden when

she was our visitor in Chicago. She told me that she had taken her twelve-year-old son out of the Christian Sunday school and put him in the Sunday school in Rabbi Mann's Jewish church because, she said, at least there he learned something about the prophets. If the prophets had anything to implant in the minds of the people to whom they talked, it was, in spite of our stupid talking, a powerful sense of guilt.

I think we have had an immensely stimulating two days, and as I said at the beginning, if we are looking for dependable facts emerging from this, I think a dependable fact will be our general confusion. We don't know what the sources of character are, we don't know what it is that reaches these sources, we don't know whether any conception of religion we might have is among those effective agencies, even if we knew how to go about reaching them. But it has been a fine thing to see this awakening to our situation. We are really getting started when we realize the position in which we are.

I have not forgotten, and I hope you have not, a year ago when Yale University sent out to us the announcement, in seven long mimeographed pages, of the formation, with that large gift from Mr. Rockefeller, of what they call the Institute of Human Relations, after saying that they would put into that Institute all the resources of the University that had to do with the influencing of human conduct, and after summarizing them, they never mentioned the fact that Yale possesses a Divinity School. Of course, the minute it was called to their attention they said how sorry they were of the oversight. It was an unconscious act, and as soon as we realize just where we are, the more quickly we will get down to the real tasks that are before us.

CLOSING PRAYER BY DR. ERNEST FREMONT TITTLE

Our Father who art in heaven, we turn to thee now in utter humility. The task which is set before us appears so great, our own abilities appear so small. But deliver us, we beseech thee, from a sense of discouragement. Help us profoundly to believe that we need not depend upon our small abilities alone, that in all of good which we undertake to do and to get done in this world, we may expect re-enforcement from that Power not ourselves, beyond ourselves, which is working for truth and righteousness and peace. In that conviction may we bravely return to our several fields and resume our several tasks. Help us to clarify our own minds so that more clearly we shall be able to see what is true and what is right. Help us to deepen and purify the springs of our own lives so that out of the cup we may minister to those who need us. Amen.

Conference at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN SHAPING CONDUCT AND CHARACTER

PROGRAM

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1929

I. GENERAL SESSION 9:30-12:00 A.M.,
President Frederick C. Eiselen, Presiding

1. *The Problem Stated,* Professor George H. Betts, Northwestern University
2. *What Are the Chief Sources of Motive in Human Nature?* Professor Frank N. Freeman, The University of Chicago
3. *How Shall Religion be Interpreted to Make it Function in the Control of Conduct?* Dr. Ernest Fremont Tittle, The First Methodist Episcopal Church, Evanston, Illinois
4. *Open Forum*

II. SECTION MEETINGS 2:00-4:30 P.M. (Two Parallel Programs)

1. *How Can Institutionalized Religion Best Serve as a Means of Social Control?* Address by Professor Jerome Davis, Yale University, Chairman

   Paper, Professor William C. Bower, The University of Chicago

   Open Forum

2. *How Can Personal Religion Best be Made to Function*

in the Control of Conduct? Address by Professor Henry N. Wieman, The University of Chicago, Chairman

Paper, Dr. George A. Coe

Open Forum

Concluding Statement, President Edna Dean Baker, National Kindergarten and Elementary College, Evanston, Illinois

(*Tea will be served in the Social Room of Harris Hall from 4:30 to 5:30*)

III. GENERAL SESSION (Open to the Public), First Methodist Church, Hinman and Church Streets, 8:00-10:00 P.M., President Walter Dill Scott, Northwestern University, Presiding

1. *Religion and the Social Conscience*, Professor John M. Mecklin, Dartmouth College
2. *The Therapeutic Value of Religion in Curing Personal and Social Maladjustments*, Dr. William S. Sadler, Director Chicago Institute of Research Diagnosis

(*The two topics of this session were made the basis of a Forum discussion in Saturday morning's session*)

PROGRAM

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1929

IV. SECTION MEETINGS 9:00-12:00 A.M. (Three Parallel Programs)

1. Forum Based on the Topics of Program III

(1) *Influence of the Social Environment on Conduct*, Professor Arthur J. Todd, Northwestern University, Chairman

Discussion, Dr. Ruth Shonle Cavan, Research Secretary, The Religious Education Association, Chicago

Open Forum

(2) *Therapeutic Value of Religion in Curing Maladjustments*, Professor Samuel N. Stevens, Northwestern University, Chairman

Discussion, Professor Jessie A. Charters, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

Open Forum

2. *Possibilities for Research in the Field of Religion as Related to Conduct and Character.* Address by Dean Clarence S. Yoakum, Northwestern University, Chairman

   Paper, Dr. Paul H. Vieth, Director of Research, International Council of Religious Education, Chicago

   Open Forum

V. GENERAL SESSION 2:00-4:00 P.M., Superintendent Frederick E. Clerk, New Trier High School, Winnetka, Illinois, Presiding

1. *Factors of Strength and Weakness in a Program of Moral Education Which Omits Religion*, Professor Charles E. Rugh, The University of California, Berkeley, California

   Discussion, Mr. J. M. Artman, General Secretary, The Religious Education Association, Chicago

   Open Forum

2. *Summing up the Results of the Conference*, Dr. Paul H. Vieth, Director of Research, International Council of Religious Education; and Dr. Paul Hutchinson, Managing Editor *The Christian Century*, Chicago

INDEX

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Conf. on religion as factor in shaping conduct & character

Religion & conduct

Geo V. Moore

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DEC 19 '30

David C Cook — OCT 14 '32

N. J. Marlee — DEC 14 '32

DEC 18 '32

MAY 5 '33

10

MAY 10 '33

MAY 10 '33

L. Bradshaw

MAY 13 '33 — 10:15

MAY 25 '33 — 5 $0

FEB 29 '34 — 17 '34

3/9-'34

3-16/34

OCT 21 — NOV 21

Conf. on Religion ---
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